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Health worker effort can have a dramatic influence on patient outcomes. This is 
especially true in developing countries, where poor overall quality of healthcare systems 
is the norm. There is evidence, however, that despite low levels of education and 
experience, clinicians in Tanzania underperform relative to their ability (Leonard and 
Masatu, 2005). Understanding clinicians’ intrinsic motivations may help us identify 
nonmonetary incentives for improving quality of care. To this end, this dissertation 
considers how risk, pride and social information impact altruism among Tanzanian 
clinicians. 
In Chapter 4, we study how risky environments impact social preferences. With 
experimental evidence from games with risky outcomes, we establish that social 
preferences of players who give in standard dictator games are best described by 
consideration of equating ex ante chances to win rather than of ex post payoffs. The more 
  
money decision-makers transfer in the dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize 
payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the 
transferred amount. 
Also, while some people behave generously regardless of the attributes of others, pride 
and knowledge about the recipient characteristics may also motivate altruistic behavior. 
In Chapter 5, we explore the role of social information and pride in determining pro-
social behavior among clinicians in Tanzania. We find that making someone feel proud 
increases the number of “fair” allocations (50/50 giving) and that those who do not 
respond to decreased partner anonymity are less responsive to induced pride.  
Chapter 6 combines laboratory data on social preferences and field data on clinicians’ 
workplace effort. This study is unique in that we observe the same subjects from the 
laboratory in a field setting, where pro-social behavior has large welfare impacts. We use 
modified dictator games to define subjects as fair types, social information responsive 
types and pride responsive types and test how those characteristics are correlated with 
effort in the workplace. We find that clinicians responsive to both pride and social 
information provide higher than average effort in the workplace. These results are 
suggestive of Ellingsen and Johannesson’s (2008) theory of social preferences wherein 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
Healthcare workers, like workers in all industries, face the daily choice of how much 
effort they should exert in their jobs. The common problems of optimal wage contracts, 
shirking and free-riding on overall firm productivity apply to construction workers and 
health workers equally. But unlike in most other industries, the effort choices that doctors 
and nurses make can have dramatic impacts on their patients’ lives. The impact can be 
positive or negative. Shirking in this context can have deleterious effects for patients. 
This is especially true in developing countries, where poor overall quality of health care 
systems is the norm. In these resource-poor settings, low quality is attributed, at least in 
part, to under qualification of health workers. Efforts to improve healthcare in developing 
countries, therefore, typically focus on increasing human capital: training doctors, nurses 
and rural health workers in the skills required to do their jobs effectively. There is 
evidence, however, that despite low levels of education and experience, health workers 
underperform relative to their ability (Leonard and Masatu, 2005; Leonard et al., 2007). 
Incentivizing healthcare professionals to exert maximal effort for their patients is the 
subject of a vast body of literature, describing a wide variety of experiences in both more- 
and less- developed countries. But how to best use incentives to improve performance 
among health professionals is still not well understood. Monetary incentives, such as 
increased pay or bonuses, are on obvious option for motivating doctors and nurses. But 
non-monetary incentives present another – and less well-understood – set of options for 




nonmonetary incentives is small, and typically focuses on the ways in which monitoring 
and feedback can motivate doctors to provide more effort. In order to better understand 
how to construct effective nonmonetary incentives, researchers have also begun to 
consider the underlying, intrinsic motivations of health workers. What factors drive 
health workers to exert more than the minimal effort for their patients?  
This dissertation contributes to this literature by providing some insight on the intrinsic 
motivations of health workers. Our focus is the Tanzanian healthcare system. We aim to 
answer the question of whether clinicians have pro-social preferences and how it may 
impact their effort choices in outpatient consultations. Laboratory-generated evidence of 
pro-social behavior has been documented for countless samples of university students 
(e.g. Andreoni, 1990; Andreoni, 1995; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 
1996), but looking at social preferences in the workplace or among professionals is a 
newer phenomenon (Bandiera et al., 2005; Levitt et al., 2010; List and Mason, 2011). To 
our knowledge, clinicians in particular have not been brought into the laboratory. This 
dissertation focuses on two key components of clinicians’ workplace that may impact 
their expression of social preferences: an “interpersonal aspect” and a “risky aspect.” We 
consider the extent to which a certain type of interpersonal impure altruism may play a 
role in effort choice and the extent to which risky environments may impact generosity. 
Our research combines laboratory experiments and data from the field. We use the 
laboratory to address basic questions about social preferences that cannot be identified in 
the field. We also look at the same sample of clinicians in their ordinary workplace 
setting to determine the correspondence of social attitudes measured in the laboratory 




social incentives in effort choices for workers in the Tanzanian healthcare industry, and 
how these incentives might reflect on the broader choices made by the wider population 
of healthcare professionals in other settings. 
Healthcare workers provide an interesting sample because they are often perceived to be 
socially-oriented. There has been little work done, however, on how social incentives 
may (or may not) motivate their effort choices at work. The ethics of acting in the 
patient’s interest are central to the Hippocratic oath sworn by all doctors, but the extent to 
which health workers should sacrifice their own wellbeing is debated (Pellegrino, 1987; 
Reid, 2005; Straus et al., 2004; Tomlinson, 2008). A health worker’s job requires 
balancing of the worker’s own self-interest against the interest of patients and the 
interests of the institution that employs them (Morreim, 1995). The question of social 
incentives in the healthcare field is further clouded by the status benefits often associated 
with being a health worker. The title “doctor” carries respect in most societies and, in 
developing countries where perhaps the pay is not particularly impressive, it is at least a 
profession that offers more or less consistent employment. Still, there is some evidence 
that health workers bring altruistic attitudes to the job. Heath workers in Ethiopia, for 
example, report a desire to help others as a reason for entering the profession (Lindelow 
and Serneels, 2006; Serneels et al., 2010). Perhaps most likely is that doctors are 
heterogeneous in their altruism (Delfgaauw, 2007), with some doctors more motivated by 
monetary incentives and other more motivated by social (non-monetary) incentives. The 
question then turns to what forms of social preferences motivate doctors to work hard. A 
clinician, after all, has not only the patient to think about, but also may internalize 




Leonard and Masatu (2006) find that in Tanzania clinicians try to “buy” approval from 
their peers with increased effort levels when under scrutiny. The opinion of peers can 
also be wrapped into the clinician’s desire to qualify as “professional”. Professionalism in 
healthcare is important for establishing oneself as a reliable provider, to both peers and 
patients (Freidson, 2001). Furthermore, it is possible that this kind of “esteem-seeking” 
behavior may also occur to some degree with patients, and that the attributes of the 
patient, relative to the clinician’s own attributes, help to determine the resultant effort 
exerted on the patient’s behalf. This suggests that there is more behind clinician behavior 
toward patients than has been controlled for in past studies.  
For this research, we collected data with laboratory experiments and with a field survey. 
We conducted the laboratory experiments with three different groups of people. The 
primary group, and the focus of our research, is the Tanzanian clinicians. The clinicians 
participated in five experimental treatments, all of which were variations on a standard 
dictator game. The baseline treatment is a standard dictator game. Two of the other 
treatments explore the role of social information and pride in altruism. Finally, the other 
two treatments look at how risk impacts altruism. We piloted these five treatments (as 
well as four other treatments relating to risk and altruism) at the University of Maryland, 
before implementing them in Tanzania. The two groups that participated in the pilots 
were University of Maryland (UMD) students and a segment of the general public 
affiliated with UMD. The goal of the pilots was to learn which treatments would perform 
best in the experiments with the clinicians. We evaluated performance of the treatments 
in terms of the hypotheses tested, the saliency of payoffs to the different players, the 




limited for running the experiments in Tanzania, we chose only five of the nine 
treatments that were piloted.  
The treatments that deal with risk and altruism were piloted with UMD students. This 
pilot took place in a computer lab on the UMD campus in September 2009. We ran 7 
sessions. We designed the experiments in order to investigate how risk influences 
altruism in the laboratory. While serving as a pilot for the experiments we ran in 
Tanzania with the clinicians, these treatments also reveal results that are interesting in 
their own right. Results appear in Chapter 4. A complete write up appears in Brock, 
Lange and Ozbay (2011).  
We conducted the pilot of the social information and pride treatments on the UMD 
campus with a sample from the general public at an event known as “Maryland Day”. 
This took place in Spring 2010. We designed this second set of experiments to explore 
the role of pride and social information on altruism. The experiment took place outside; 
subjects used paper and pencil to record their choices, which mimicked the set-up we 
anticipated in Tanzania. Results and discussion of these treatments appear in Chapter 5.  
The final set of experiments with the Tanzanian clinicians occurred July, 2010 in Arusha, 
Tanzania. This implementation included 2 of the 6 treatments on risk and altruism that 
we piloted with the UMD students. It also included the 2 treatments on pride and social 
information that we piloted at Maryland Day. Lastly, it included a context free, standard 
dictator game as a baseline treatment. We conducted these experiments on the campus of 
the Center for Educational Development in health Arusha (CEDHA) in Arusha. We 




The results from these experiments are split into two different chapters. Our report on the 
risk and altruism treatments appear in Chapter 4, with the results from the corresponding 
pilot. Our report on the Tanzanian implementation of the pride and social information 
treatments is included in Chapter 5, with its corresponding pilot. Table 1.1. summarizes 
the different datasets and how we use them in this dissertation. The total number of 
subjects reported includes decision makers in the experiments (“dictators”) as well as 
recipients. The primary analyses throughout this dissertation use only the dictator 
choices, so we report number of dictators in each sample in parentheses below the overall 
totals for each data source. 
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The field survey we conducted in the outpatient setting in Tanzania. The data collection 
ran from November 2008 until July 2010. We employed a team of enumerators that 
consisted of three medical clinicians, six nurses and nine non-nurse enumerators. All 
enumerators received three days of training on the data collection goals and procedures. 
Enumerators collected data in teams of two, visiting one facility per day to conduct exit 
interviews with patients there. Clinician enumerators worked as observers for the data 
collection visits where we observed clinician subjects directly. We also employed a 
project manager to coordinate enumerators and obtain consent from clinicians at 
participating hospitals. We spent a total of 3 months in the field getting permissions from 
the national and regional Ministry of Health authorities, obtaining consent from hospitals 
and clinicians, and training enumerators and the project manager. Enumerators conducted 
4,512 exit interviews and observed 562 consultations. In this paper we utilize data only 
from the exit interviews. 
Most notably, the laboratory experiments with the Tanzanian clinicians and the field 
survey include the same subjects. Because these two datasets share a subject pool, we can 
use results from the lab experiment in our analysis of the field data. Also, the clinician 
subject pool is unique. Typically laboratory experiments are conducted using samples of 
university students. Conducting the laboratory experiment with the clinicians allows us to 
determine the nature and magnitude of clinicians’ pro-social behavior. One of the 
treatments tests how they behave in a basic dictator game; additional treatments show 
how their pro-social behavior changes from this baseline when we introduce information 
about other players or an induced feeling of pride. Then, combined with the survey data, 




laboratory to analyze variations in workplace effort. Combining data from the laboratory 
with data from the clinicians at work provides unique insights into the role of social 
preferences in clinician effort choices. It also helps us approach the deeper philosophical 
question about what “laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about 
the real world (Levitt and List, 2007),” which is increasingly a concern among 
experimental and non-experimental economists. Together, these two data sources present 
an exciting opportunity to relate lab results directly to a real world setting. 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation explore these issues in depth. Chapter 2 
provides a background for this research. We discuss dominant theories of pro-social 
behavior, theories of social preferences in the work place, the apparent clash between 
intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and the interplay between social preferences and risk. A 
review of empirical evidence of pro-social behavior follows, with a section discussing the 
broader literature on risk and altruism. Chapter 3 provides a more in depth summary of 
social preferences among clinicians, with a section outlining the healthcare system in 
Tanzania. Chapters 4 and 5 present results from laboratory experiments. The relationship 
between altruism and risk occupies Chapter 4. Chapter 5 considers pride and social 
information as factors determining the expression of social preferences. Chapter 6 
presents analysis of the survey data, combined with results from the laboratory. It is in 
this chapter that we ask whether social preferences help explain variation in clinician 
effort. A final chapter presents a series of sensitivity checks to the model analyzed in 
Chapter 6, and addresses the potential for non-random assignment of patients to 
clinicians in the field (identification strategy). It also describes our estimation of an 




effort measure (dependent variable). Overall we report that the results in the main 
estimation are robust to specification error.  
In conclusion, this research combines behavioral economics concepts with development 
economics to try to better understand effort choices of health workers in a highly 
resource-constrained setting. In the semi-urban health clinics of Tanzania, it is possible to 
examine the trade-offs between costly exertion of effort and potential social benefits 
among clinicians. Two unique data sets make it possible to test the hypotheses that a) 
clinicians behave pro-socially in simple dictator games, b) social information and induced 
pride influence giving in the laboratory and c) social preferences as measured in the lab 





Chapter 2 : Altruism, Workplace Motivation, and Risky Giving 
 
Social preferences play an important role in the research on motivation and performance 
at work. Workers are assumed to make trade-offs between costly effort exertion and the 
resultant benefits that accrue to themselves or their organization. Major themes in the 
literature include altruism, gift exchange and reciprocity, crowding out of intrinsic 
incentives, nonmonetary motivation, and optimal institutional arrangement (given a work 
force with social preferences). The expression of altruism may also be impacted by the 
presence of risk (Brock et al., 2010; Tomlinson, 2008). Individuals may have preferences 
over equity in terms of chance, as opposed to the more commonly assumed preferences 
over equity in outcomes. Further, how an employee allocates effort to reduce risk 
involves consideration of both her own risk exposure as well as the risk exposure of 
others, such as co-workers, employers or consumers. This chapter outlines the currents of 
this literature on social preferences and workplace behavior, including a focus on the role 
of risk in determining pro-social behavior. 
In the first section I discuss dominant theories of pro-social behavior. The second section 
focuses on theories of social preferences in the work place, concentrating on the apparent 
clash between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and the interplay between social 
preferences and risk. A review of empirical evidence of pro-social behavior follows, with 




2.1. Theory  
2.1.1. Social preferences  
Social preferences in economics can be defined as making economic decisions that 
benefit another. Charness and Rabin (2002) suggest that a person with social preferences 
would be characterized as “not maximizing own monetary payoffs when those actions 
affect others’ payoffs”. They assume people are self-interested and are additionally 
concerned about the payoff of others. Another term that describes such preferences is 
“other-regarding”, which refers to both positive and negative dispositions toward the 
other. This general definition includes positively leaning social preferences, as well as 
neutral (inequality aversion) and negatively leaning social preferences (negative 
reciprocity). 
A pro-social individual can be considered to have positively leaning social preferences, 
as opposed to neutral or negatively leaning. A pro-social person is in favor of others or 
society. In general, it is not considered important whether such pro-sociality is 
independent of social pressure and norms. In some cases, it is assumed to be a natural 
function of social pressures and norms, where pro-social attitudes come from 
internalization of norms that occurs overtime. Benabou and Tirole (2006) consider a pro-
social person as one who voluntarily engages in an activity that is costly to oneself but 
benefits others. Altruism is one form of pro-social behavior.  
Altruism is the subject of a growing body of theoretical and empirical work. A denotative 




Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 2009). According to 
Andreoni (1989), “The term was introduced by Barro (1974) and Becker (1974)...” 
Becker’s model has been the mainstay of work on altruism; it employs a public goods 
approach, where the total amount of a social good, Z, enters into an individual’s utility 
function, Ui = Ui (xi, Z). Becker’s model assumes that the individual does not get any 
personal consumption benefit from the good, but rather get utility from the total amount 
provided (not necessarily by them). Sugden (1982) does not think this model is 
descriptive of reality, however, pointing out that in reality people may maximize 
something other than their own utility and still be motivated to act altruistically. For 
example, he states that “An act utilitarian - or a rule utilitarian, or a Kantian - does not 
have to experience an altruistic externality in order to conclude that he has a moral 
obligation to help the poor, the sick and the handicapped.” In his seminal papers on 
altruism, Andreoni builds on Sugden’s insight, suggesting that individuals have an 
impure form of altruism – they like to contribute to the material gain of others because it 
makes them feel good (Andreoni, 1989; 1990). Anredoni (1989) refers to this as warm 
glow. In his model, individuals may contribute to a public good for two reasons. First, 
people demand more of the public good. This conforms with the Becker model (1974). 
Second, people get some private goods benefit from their gift, which Andreoni refers to 
as a warm glow. Because of this second, egoistic motive, his is considered a model of 
“impure altruism.” He presents preferences that include a combination of both altruism 
and egoism (the warm glow motivated component, gi):  Ui = Ui (xi, Y, gi). The distinction 
between pure and impure altruism is discussed at length in Rose-Ackerman (1996). The 




would prefer to free-ride rather than give of himself to help another. Rose-Ackerman 
discusses briefly some of the different forms of pro-social attitudes, other than pure and 
impure altruism, remarking that all motives for giving are linked.  
Another type of social preferences, linked to the altruism concept, is Rabin’s “fairness 
equilibrium” model (1993). Rabin’s theory suggests that individuals have conditional 
interest for other’s welfare. Rabin focuses on reciprocal kindness as the driving factor in 
determining pro-social behavior. The reciprocity in Rabin’s model is unlike Andreoni’s 
impure altruism, where the pro-social behavior is solely a function of the individual. In 
the fairness equilibrium, players help those who are nice to them and hurt those who are 
not nice toward them. Each player considers the pay-off of the other in his objective 
function. Rabin’s model additionally accommodates difference aversion or inequality 
aversion. In fact, Rabin’s model pre-dates the popular Fehr-Schmidt model of inequality 
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), though the importance of the interaction to trigger 
reciprocity is absent in the Fehr-Schmidt work. Thus the Rabin model offers a framework 
for thinking about interpersonal utility functions, with a focus on reciprocity. 
As an implicit answer to such narrow applicability in previous models, Benabou and 
Tirole (2006) develop an extensive model that accounts for a wider range of pro-social 
behavior than any other author. As is stated in their abstract, Benabou and Tirole’s model 
envelopes heterogeneity in individual altruism along with concerns for social reputation 
and self-respect. Like Rabin’s model, Benabou and Tirole focus on external motivations 
for pro-social behavior. They concentrate primarily on how others perceive an individual. 




off function. The model thus accounts for an individual wanting to appear pro-social and 
non-greedy, but does not allow for this desire to change depending on who the other may 
be. Their theory also includes the idea that individuals employ visible actions to garner 
the good opinion of others. Despite the wide range of behaviors their model can capture, 
however, the pride component of Ellingsen and Johannesson’s model (discussed below) 
is not one of them. Regardless, because of its individual heterogeneity and its general 
form, Benabou and Tirole’s work significantly informs a great deal of papers on social 
preferences. 
Building off of Benabou and Tirole’s work, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) construct 
a model of interdependent preferences that includes a term to capture the “feeling of 
being esteemed” by others. The model is one of many that parse pro-social behavior into 
potential component parts. Examples from empirical papers discussed above include 
Andreoni’s impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989) and Levine’s altruism and spite paradigm 
(Levine, 1998). Ellingsen and Johannesson narrow in on how the individual sees himself. 
While narrow in its purview, the model’s its strength lies in its detailed assessment of 
internal factors potentially behind individual altruism. Namely, Ellingsen and 
Johannesson focus on an individual’s own perception of how others may see him. The 
authors suggest that this “feeling of being esteemed” by another is equal to the other’s 
actual esteem, weighted by how much the individual values the other’s esteem. Ellingsen 
and Johannesson posit that this influence can motivate altruistic acts, in the sense of 
impure altruism, as well as what looks like altruistic behavior among non-altruistic 
parties. Their model also allows for pure altruism or pure materialism. Ellingsen and 




motivation is relegated to being an indirect influence on behavior, filtered through the 
individual’s own self perception. Whereas it is the own self-perception that gives the 
person increased utility. Ellingsen and Johannesson’ model of interdependent preferences 
thus illuminates the importance of one’s perception of himself and how he thinks others 
view him in determining other regarding behavior.  
Joel Sobel (2005) presents a compendium of work on pro-social behavior in his review of 
interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Engelmann and Strobel (2004) provide a 
rigorous comparison of the strength of various models in explaining patterns in the data. 
Their key result is that while these models of fairness and social preferences are 
important, they do not supersede more basic models of selfishness and efficiency 
concerns. This result provides a check on how important fairness concerns are in 
determining allocations. And while this work focuses on the role of social preferences in 
clinician decision making, it is rooted in a body of work that evaluates other, more 
classical factors that may explain the bulk of variation in decision making. Evaluating 
how social preferences may operate (in the healthcare setting in particular) is in fact most 
valuable as a complement to existing work on other kinds of incentives. 
2.1.2. Social preferences and risk 
All of the conceptualizations of social preferences discussed thus far, and indeed the 
dominant theories on pro-social behavior in the literature, exclude risk. That some 
subjects display non-selfish behavior, e.g. choose a 50-50 split in dictator games, is the 
basis for theories on inequality aversion, which are based on utilities over final payoffs 




Fischbacher (2008) show that besides distributional preferences on the fairness of 
outcomes, the interpretation of fairness intentions plays an important role in subjects’ 
decisions. Thus the process by which a fair outcome is reached is potentially a non-trivial 
part of final utility. A related strand of the literature considers procedural (or ex ante) 
fairness: Machina (1989) provides a classical example. Consider a mother with two 
children. She has a treat that she wants to give to them, but the treat cannot be divided. 
How will she determine who gets the treat? Although she may be indifferent between 
allocating the indivisible treat to one child or the other, she may strictly prefer allocating 
the treat based on the result of a coin toss. The coin toss is a fair procedure, as it gives 
both children the same chance to win. Nonetheless, it will not result in a fair outcome as 
only one child can get the treat. Just as in this example of not discriminating between the 
two children, the ethical debate on outcome versus procedural fairness is usually rooted 
in normative considerations (e.g. Grant, 1995). One model that attempts to include 
explicitly what people think they should get appears in Krawcyk (2008), which 
incorporates preferences over expected payoffs and is an extension to Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000). The resulting motivation function includes not only the share of the 
total endowment, but also the expected share of the total expected endowment. This 
nascent body of work thus attempts to extend social preference theories to risky 
situations.  
Brock, Lange and Ozbay (2010) yields further insights into this debate by considering the 
choices of individuals who are themselves directly affected by the outcome, rather than 
the beliefs or expectations of the recipients. Norms that might determine a receiver’s 




between two other persons as in Machina’s example, the decision maker decides the 
allocation between herself and one other person. Their model is similar to Trautmann 
(2009), but with a more general expression of preferences. And unlike the Bolton and 
Ockenfels models where the expectations of the recipient directly impact actual payoffs 
(as in the ultimatum game), the Brock et al. and Trautmann models consider situations 
where recipients do not have direct influence over payoffs (as in the dictator game). Such 
a model describes situations such as a grandparent choosing to save money for a newborn 
grandchild or a doctor choosing how much care to give to a patient. These examples are 
discussed further in chapter three.  
2.1.3. Pro-social behavior in the work environment 
Pro-social behavior can also occur in the work environment. Employees make decisions 
about how much costly effort to exert. To the extent that they choose to exert more effort 
than is minimally required to retain their job, they may be acting out of interest for the 
welfare of co-workers or of the organization. Much of the literature approaches this issue 
from the angle of worker motivation. Some workers may be motivated to exert excess 
effort to earn positive recommendations or build up work history, but these motives will 
not be discussed here. Instead we review the empirical work on crowding out. Crowding 
out in this setting refers to the clash between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation; there is 
evidence that people with intrinsic motivation to provide high levels of effort react 
negatively to extrinsic (monetary) incentives. We also discuss the importance of 




requirements and organizational goals requires motivation. To that end, pro-social 
attitudes may explain some workers’ motivation in the work environment. 
Crowding out occupies a central role in the literature on pro-social behavior in the 
workplace. Franco, Bennett, and Kanfer (2002) classify motivation into 3 categories: 
internal, organizational, and cultural. Organizational and cultural motivation comes from 
outside the individual (extrinsic factors) while internal motivation is about how the 
individual chooses to act absent external impetus. Kreps (1997) discusses how norms 
(preexisting intrinsic incentives) interact with economic/extrinsic incentives to determine 
behavior. He observes the “stylized fact” (though it has been well studied in the 
psychology literature) that extrinsic motivation (rewards and punishments) may dissuade 
individuals from working as hard as they otherwise would, absent the external influence 
(Deci, 1971; 1972; Deci et al., 1975). This is referred to as crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation. Kreps posits two possible rationalizations for the crowding out: 1) task 
ambiguity or 2) change of preferences (due to external queues). Sliwka’s 2007 work 
offers an alternative interpretation of behavior that may otherwise look like pro-social 
attitudes in the work place. His theory suggests that offering a flat wage with little or no 
control over employee effort levels (i.e. no targets or minimums) will reduce the 
crowding out more than if one offers an incentive-based wage and exercises more control 
over effort levels. Complementary to Sliwka’s model, Fershtman and Weiss (1993) 
suggest that employers can compensate workers with status, rather than wage, to activate 
intrinsic motivation. Other work in this vein includes Canton (2005), Seabright (2004), 




theories presented fall along similar lines, thus generating a well vetted economic 
argument for the motivation crowding out hypothesis. 
Institutional structure matters for how workers will respond to employers’ attempts to 
address this dilemma between internal and external motivation. Notably, Francois (2003) 
asks whether a public or private firm has an advantage in eliciting workers’ altruistically 
motivated contribution to the organization’s output. He concludes that a nonprofit 
organization is better equipped than a for-profit alternative to obtain “care motivated 
effort”, in the form of labor donations, as well as pecuniarily motivated effort. The theory 
relies on a residual claimant story, where the individual worker in a for-profit enterprise 
prefers not to donate extra effort in the event that their boss is the one to gain from the 
work. If, instead, a worthy cause reaps the rewards from extra work, the pro-social 
worker is more likely to donate additional labor. The result holds under a regime of 
extrinsic incentives. The crowding out argument thus does not apply when comparing the 
relative effectiveness of non-profits and for-profits in motivating effort in caring 
professions.  
Another form of pro-social behavior in the workplace that is dependent on institutional 
characteristics is professionalism; a person who practices professionalism does not reap 
100% of the benefits from his behavior. Positive externalities extend to the firm, other co-
workers and the customers. Leonard and Masatu (2008) explore the role of 
professionalism among health workers. They define professionalism as “a set of 
characteristics describing a member of a profession and the institutions—such as peer 




all members to hold to accepted standards.” Along these same lines is the concept of a 
work ethic. Like professionalism, a strong work ethic generates positive externalities and 
thus workers have an incentive to ascribe to a weaker work ethic. In Rauh and 
Ramalingham’s model (2009), the principal, or employer, determines the work ethic for 
the firm. The employee chooses whether or not to internalize/buy into that work ethic. 
Basu’s theory of teacher truancy in India (2006) also supports this idea that norms are 
important for determining behavior in the workplace. In Basu’s work, however, the 
norms are not set by the employer but are preexisting in society. Akerlof and Kranton’s 
recent work (2008) explores these ideas more thoroughly with a model of monitoring in 
effort, where “what matters is…how employees think of themselves in relation to the 
firm”. Their paradigm is based on the idea that a worker’s identity determines his effort 
choices, and that supervision can cause worker not to identify with the employer and thus 
provide less effort. Any of these models, where good behavior in the workplace generates 
a positive externality, would suggest that an employer or policy maker should address the 
worker’s group identity, either by determining it or using it as it currently exists. 
Ultimately, it is agreed that institutional structure matters in activating employee 
altruism, but ideas as to why that is or how to address it are varied.  
Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) provide an overview of these major themes in the 
literature. They review papers that look at incentives in the workplace, worker motivation 
or pro-sociality, and optimal worker-employer contracts. They also focus a great deal on 
the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic motivation. All of this they 
categorize as action-oriented altruism (a.k.a. impure altruism, the action itself generates 




institutional goals and potential free riding problems that can arise. The worker is 
considered to have preferences over the final output of the institution, rather than his own 
contribution to it. Francois and Vlassopoulos consider this “output oriented altruism” 
(a.k.a. pure altruism). In the last section of their review, Francois and Vlassopoulos 
discuss papers that look at optimal institutional arrangement for provision of public 
goods. These papers focus on what type of institution best handles the contractibility of 
quality, effort, and other non-observables. In other words, they ask “When is a non-profit 
better for provision and when is a for profit better for provision, when individual worker 
motivation is instrumental in firm output?” The papers reviewed in this last section 
discuss the pro-sociality of institutions, rather than individuals. Thus, in their review, 
Francois and Vlassopoulos take stock of the literature on altruism in the workplace, both 
in terms of individual decision making and in terms of optimal institutional arrangement.  
The theories presented here extend pro-social behavior to the work environment. Putting 
in more than minimal required effort is one way to conceptualize work-related social 
preferences. But sources of worker motivation are likely varied and workers’ social 
preferences may cause them to put in less effort at work than is required (or optimal). 
Institutional structure emerges as central to theorizing about worker social preferences. 
Thus far none of the theory considers the role of risk in social preferences in the 
workplace. Nonetheless, pro-sociality remains an integral factor in the assorted theories 






Just as theories of pro-social behavior are varied, so follows the evidence. Much of the 
empirical work on social preferences has occurred in an experimental economics lab. 
While how to interpret the source of pro-social behavior remains a challenge, the 
presence of pro-social behavior has been documented in countless lab experiments. 
Andreoni (1995) conducted lab experiments to explore the idea of impure altruism. He 
found that people indeed contribute to public goods out of some form of kindness. As a 
complement to Andreoni’s work, Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) found evidence of 
impure altruism, where giving to a public good increased as the group-level benefit of 
contributing increased. Evidence of pro-social behavior from simple games such as the 
dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, and public goods games are 
overwhelming; they show that the expected outcomes rooted in self-interest do not 
dominate (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Forsythe et al., 1994; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1996; 
1997). And while many authors have studied gift-exchange in the work place as a way to 
explain how workers decide on effort levels (Akerlof, 1982; Gneezy and Rustichini, 
2000; Gneezy and List, 2006; Rigdon, 2002), few have considered the impact of pro-
social behavior on these effort decisions outside of the gift exchange context (see 
Charness, 2004). Similarly, there is a limited literature about the impact of risk on 
altruism. Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2005) provided a seminal paper on the issue, 
considering whether individuals focus on ex post or ex ante fairness. Work by Bohnet 




the preferences of the a recipient in ultimatum game decisions under risk. In general, 
procedural fairness is an important factor in individuals’ perception of overall fairness 
and affects willingness to trust. Brock et al. (2010) looks into how risk impacts 
preferences for fairness among givers. Their findings echo others’ results, and also bring 
to light a new result, that giving in a standard dictator game context is highly predictive 
of giving under risk. Net, this evidence from relatively simple games forms the 
foundation for a more detailed look into pro-social attitudes among clinicians. 
2.2.1. Social preferences and risk  
There has been limited work on the interplay between altruistic behavior and risk. Studies 
focus on both recipient response to dictator allocations in the presence of risk, as well as 
the dictator behavior itself. Overall, recipients tend to be more forgiving of unfair 
outcomes if they originate from an ex ante fair allocation of chances. Dictators do appear 
to adjust giving patterns when risk is involved, but this response depends crucially on the 
choice options available to them. In the health setting, Arana and Leon (2002) find 
evidence of willingness to pay for health risk reduction to others. In the medical 
profession specifically there is a sense that providers are duty-bound to assume additional 
risk to themselves in order to reduce the risk of a poor health outcome for their patients 
(Tomlinson, 2008). In what follows we summarize the empirical work on risk and social 
preferences. In chapter three we present results from a set of laboratory experiments in 
this direction done with clinician subjects, the results of which also appear in Brock, 




The empirical work studying risk and social preferences is dominated by laboratory-
generated evidence. One of the foundational papers on the subject, Bolton, Brandts and 
Ockenfels (2005), considers whether individuals focus on ex post or ex ante fairness 
when making their allocation choices. These authors use ultimatum and battle-of-the-
sexes games to look at the trade-off between how an outcome is determined and the 
fairness of the outcome from recipients’ perspective. Their results reveal a complex story 
for recipients’ preferences over ex ante and ex post fairness: an unfair outcome may be 
acceptable given a fair procedure but a fair outcome is preferred regardless of procedure. 
Bolton et al. does not, however, identify if the recipient preferences for a fair procedure 
stem from the human interaction or from a blanket preference for ex ante fairness. 
Investigating such a dynamic directly, Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Bohnet et al. 
(Bohnet et al., 2008) analyze how recipients in risky dictator and trust games adjust 
acceptance rates depending on whether an actual person or a random process determines 
the outcome of the game. Results point to biases against human partners, which the 
authors interpret as the result of minimizing “betrayal costs”. And while none of these 
authors consider how giving decisions are directly affected by risk, their results do 
suggest the presence of norms that might influence giver behavior.  
Echoing and building on these results, Kircher, Ludwig and Sandroni (2009) compare 
whether the type of good being allocated (a private good versus a good with some social 
value) influences individuals’ allocation choices. This extension is directly applicable to 
the healthcare setting, where health may be considered a good with social value. The 
authors allow subjects to choose the allocation mechanism: a subject can choose between 




determine the final allocation. They find that while some subjects do prefer to choose the 
allocation themselves, approximately 30% of subjects choose the coin flip when the good 
in question has some social value. Those with ambivalence between social preferences 
and selfish preferences prefer to switch responsibility to nature. In this way they retain 
the opportunity to achieve the selfish allocation, but they will not be considered selfish if 
that is the outcome (also referred to as “moral wiggle room” in Dana et al. (2007)). Hence 
the authors provide evidence of preference for procedural fairness. In using discrete 
allocation choices, however, the authors cannot speak to the magnitude of this preference 
or determine the point at which individuals who prefer to choose the allocation 
themselves might switch to preferences for procedural fairness. Nonetheless, the paper 
firmly establishes procedural fairness as a meaningful empirical concept among decision 
makers for socially valued goods. Generalizing this concept, Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2010) explore how dictator choices between a safe and a risky option for themselves 
depend on the corresponding payoffs to the recipient. In their experiments, dictators have 
a binary choice between a safe payout option and a risky payout option. They do not vary 
the degree of risk in the risky options. They find that dictators tend to be more risk averse 
when the risk applies to themselves as well as to others. They also find that dictators 
prefer the risky situation over a situation where outcomes are unfair with certainty. While 
this study reveals that decision makers are sensitive to risk borne by recipients, it falls 
short of addressing the degree to which dictators are willing to surrender their own sure 
gains in order to reduce the risk of a partner. Thus we know that procedural fairness is 




Finally, Brock, Lange and Ozbay (2010), included as Chapter 4 of this paper, fill a gap in 
this literature by considering how dictators’ preferences for procedural fairness stack up 
against preferences for ex post fairness. They give decision makers a continuous choice 
set and vary the distribution of risky versus certain outcomes for the dictator and the 
recipient, respectively. The between design allows the authors to determine how much 
decision makers are willing to pay in order to shield either themselves or their partner 
from risk or an unfair outcome. In particular, their design compares generosity in terms of 
monetary outcomes with generosity in terms of chances at increased monetary outcomes. 
They find that altruism in the absence of risk is a reliable predictor of altruism over 
chances; dictators tend to give the same amount away when the units are dollars as when 
the units are lottery tickets. That dictators’ generosity is not substantively affected when 
allocating chances suggests a preference for ex ante fairness – dictators are not giving 
less when giving chances, even though outcomes maybe very unequal. The results are in 
line with Kircher, Ludwig and Sandroni (2009) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2010). The 
novelty of the Brock et al. results lies in the continuity of the dictators’ choice and the 
ability to measure the degree of tradeoff decision makers choose between their own risk 
reduction and that of their partner. Thus Brock et al. contribute to the literature of risk 
and altruism and further confirms that considerations for ex ante fairness is important in 
evaluating decision making under risk.  
2.2.2. Pro-social behavior in the work environment 
Finally, we discuss the empirical evidence on pro-social behavior in the workplace. When 




increasing the monetary compensation from working will induce higher levels of effort 
and thus better quality (Akerlof, 1982). But the strictly positive correlation between 
monetary compensation and worker effort is up to debate (Deci, 1971; Mas, 2006). In 
addition, it is not clear what kind of scheme might be appropriate to motivate increases in 
effort given the potential conflicts between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Deci, 
1972; Kreps, 1997). Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) conducted experiments with 
treatments of either getting paid to do a specific task or not paid to do the task. Their 
results confirm that higher compensation can induce higher effort, if compensation was 
offered at the outset. But they also found that when moving from a no compensation 
regime to a compensation regime, performance is lower. Moreover, in an investigation of 
taxi drivers in New York, Farber (2008) found that many set target income levels, taking 
leisure after reaching their goal for the day, and forgoing income if the goal was reached 
before normal quitting hours. Other work looks at the issue in terms of the workers 
response to employer prompting. Gachter and Falk (2000) looks at overcoming 
inefficiencies from incomplete contracting using reciprocity, repeated game effects 
(reputation), social embeddedness, and incentives. Social embededness is simulated with 
face-to-face repeated partner interactions. They find that social embeddedness does not 
change the behavior relative to an anonymous partner treatment (playing with the same 
person over and over in long term contracts experiments). This should not be a surprise. 
The value of social embeddedness as a contract enforcement device is in non-repeated 
games, where removing anonymity creates a superficial but influential connection 
between the parties (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Eckel and Grossman, 1996). This superficial 




the desired contract enfrocement, as is the case in long term contracting. As is predicted 
in Sliwka (2007), Gachter and Falk also find that trust performs better as a contract 
enforcement device than monetary incentives. Thus, when workers have social 
preferences, it is clear that strictly increasing monetary incentives may not be the most 
effective in motivating workers to provide more effort. 
The counterintuitive results that more money is not always effective in motivating 
workers suggests that social preferences play a potentially important role in workers 
effort and job choices. There are a few studies that look at intrinsic motivation directly, 
rather than considering the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. Rotolo 
and Wilson (2006) finds evidence of “higher civic mindedness” of nonprofit employees. 
They use people’s likelihood to volunteer outside of the workplace as the measure of 
civic mindedness and find a positive correlation between that and job type. Similarly, 
Gregg et al. (Gregg et al., 2011) compares donated labor, measured as unpaid overtime, 
in “caring industries”, between public (nonprofit) and private (for profit) organizations. 
Those with more unpaid overtime are considered to have “high public service 
motivation”. They find that in the caring industries those with high public service 
motivation are more likely to choose a job in the public sector. However, they also 
generate evidence that people who switch between the private and public sectors do not 
change their propensity to put in the extra hours after switching. Such evidence points to 
the possibility that social preferences are more individually driven than institutionally 
driven, and does not detract from the fact that social preferences are active in workplace 





This concludes the discussion of the empirical work that has been done on social 
preferences in the workplace and generosity in the presence of risk. Ultimately there is 
extensive evidence of social preferences, from impure altruism to fairness concerns to 
expectations of reciprocity. Currently, laboratory experimentation on the role of social 
preferences in workplace-like effort decisions is limited to a gift exchange context. 
Outside of the laboratory, there is evidence of pro-sociality in workplace effort choices. 
In these cases institutional context appears to play a role. No one to our knowledge has 
looked at how risk may factor into effort choices. In fact the body of empirical literature 
on risk and social preferences is still somewhat new and many rudimentary questions 
remain up to debate. For example, the literature is dominated by experimental work. 
Further, while all authors find that risk is a meaningful dimension to investigate, there is 
no consensus on which results best summarize the role of risk in the expression of social 
preferences. Taken together, the evidence synthesized here is the basis for the empirical 
aspects of the succeeding chapters.    
2.3. Conclusion 
In the first section of this chapter we discussed the dominant theories of pro-social 
behavior, particularly as it applies to the workplace setting. It was followed by a review 
of empirical evidence of pro-social behavior. The theories are as diverse as the evidence, 
but together tell a story about how pro-social behavior may impact economic decision 
making. What is clear is that people faced with economic decisions do have the 




a laboratory, a charity, an employer or even an institution (broadly speaking). What is 
less clear is why individuals may make less than completely selfish decisions. Theories 
point to fairness norms, warm glow, reciprocity and intrinsic motivation, to name a few. 
The empirical evidence on pro-social behavior in the workplace is limited but varied. 
Most of the data has been analyzed by looking at the interaction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic incentives. Pro-social behavior is observed in effort choices of “employees” in 
laboratory and in field experiments as a kind of gift-exchange scenario with an employer 
(as opposed to the more simple structure of doing work and getting paid for what one 
does). Pro-social behavior also stands in the presence of risk, but the story becomes more 
complex and the structure of the risk appears to matter a great deal. As a case in point, 
how an employee allocates effort to reduce risk implicates not only her own payoffs but 
also that of her employer, the company and any consumer of the product or service the 
company provides. Though considering pro-sociality in the presence of risk workplace 
may be especially important because of the economic implications, it is a venue that has 
yet to be explored. As it stands, we know that social preferences play an important role in 
workers’ effort choices. In the empirical studies that follow we delve into the topics 
reviewed in this chapter, specifically with respect to clinician effort choices in the 
Tanzanian healthcare system. The chapter that follows describes this system and develops 





Chapter 3 : Healthcare and Health Workers in Tanzania 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we explain the application of research on social preferences in the 
workplace to Tanzanian healthcare. Healthcare workers provide an interesting application 
for studying social preferences in the workplace because they are often perceived to be 
socially minded. Healthcare is by name about providing care for another person. As it 
goes with teachers or daycare providers, clinicians are expected to make effort choices 
that are in the best interest of others. Such “caring industries” provide settings wherein 
workers’ social preferences may easily be expressed as some form of altruism. For 
example, a clinician may choose to provide effort above and beyond what is required in 
response to a particularly sick patient. The healthcare industry also may compel workers 
with social preferences a la Akerlof and Kranton (2005; 2008) to act in the interests of 
their institution. Health workers are couched in a larger institutional context that itself 
embodies a specific set of priorities. For example, public health workers must make 
choices for their patient in addition to paying mind to facility, state, and national goals for 
the health of the population. Private facility clinicians are not exempt from the larger 
institutional context – they too must learn specific protocol in school, obtain the required 
degree and practice according to nationally set guidelines. Thus the health worker faces 
various demands on her time and energy that come from her patients’ needs, facility level 
priorities, state agendas and national goals. Finally and perhaps above all, the health 




interests and institutional interests thus provide ample opportunities for health workers 
social preferences to be translated into pro-social behavior. In turn, the setting is ripe with 
opportunities to study the role of social preferences in the work setting.   
The next section in this chapter discusses the specific type of social preferences we 
investigate in this report. It is followed by a review of the theoretical literature, albeit 
sparse, on altruism among health workers. After that we include a discussion of empirical 
evidence on health worker behavior in developing countries, including an extensive 
section on how effort and quality are measured in the healthcare setting. A description of 
the Tanzanian healthcare system concludes. 
3.2. Pride, social identity and risk in health worker decision making 
In this report we look specifically at the expression of health worker altruism with respect 
to patients. We develop our research in light of the results that identity matters in 
economic transactions (Becker, 1971; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet and Frey, 
1999). Our research also draws heavily on Ellingsen and Johannesson’s theory of esteem-
based altruism (2008). In their theory, identity and pride work together to generate a 
perception of being esteemed. The decision maker accrues benefits in the warm glow 
sense, but rather than simply being pleased with her own action, she also gets utility from 
her perception of the recipient’s good opinion of her. Namely, she feels pride at her 
altruistic actions. The strength of that pride depends on how much she values esteem 
from the other. A more extensive discussion of this theory appears in Chapter 5.  
It is perhaps easy to see how this dynamic would exist between a clinician and her peer 




the case in Tanzania. But to what extent does patient identity matter for clinician effort 
decisions? How might patient characteristics and his or her esteem interact with clinician 
effort levels? These are empirical questions that we begin to address in this report. The 
answer depends on how the clinician and the patient evaluate each other’s “value” based 
on observable characteristics. For example, a patient’s speech may betray a low level of 
education, his dress a low level of income. The clinician may respond to that by putting 
in less effort, assuming that it takes less to impress this person. Alternatively, the 
clinician may exert little effort because she is less interested in impressing this person. In 
both circumstances, the clinician’s action reveals that that patient’s regard has less social 
value to the clinician. The opposite may be true if the poorly educated low-income 
patient represents the population in the area and the clinician wants to expand his patient 
base. The clinicians also may respond to this kind of patient if the clinician has a personal 
agenda that may be considered “pro-poor”. Even in the latter case, however, the clinician 
may adjust her effort level according to how much she values an individual’s esteem and 
how easy or difficult it is to gain that esteem. Note that this behavior is distinct form 
discrimination because the clinician here is not biased or prejudiced against the patient in 
and of himself, but rather tailors her effort according to the social returns she gets from 
impressing that patient. These are the dynamics we consider in our exploration of health 
worker altruism with respect to patients.  
Finally, we include an extensive empirical study on social preferences and risk. Risk is a 
salient feature of any health care system and almost certainly plays into health workers’ 
effort allocation choices. Health workers are not only called to mitigate the risk of illness 




being a health worker carries considerable risks. The risk may be to her own health -- a 
patient might come in with a highly contagious life threatening disease, such as 
tuberculosis. It may also be with respect to error; making an error can expose the health 
workers to blame, loss of reputation or a lawsuit. In any case, health workers face risks of 
daily. We suggest that the structure of the risk impacts the expression of any social 
preference they may have. If a clinician is particularly altruistic, but also quite risk 
averse, her behavior will reflect that. Faced with the risk of contracting a serve illness, 
she might behave less generously than in a situation that carries less risk to herself. 
Alternately, a generous clinician may exert more effort than usual in order to address a 
very ill patient’s chance of getting well, thus reducing the chance of a bad outcome. Since 
the impact of risk on pro-social behavior is a relatively new avenue of research, we do 
not attempt to address many of these issues in this dissertation. Rather we tackle some 
more basic issues that we may then build upon moving forward. The description here 
serves to motivate those investigations in the context of health care and place them into 
the overall theme of the work. 
3.3. Health workers’ social preferences, theory 
The theory presented in the preceding chapter raises a number of questions about role of 
pro-social motivation in the provision of health care. To what extent are health workers 
motivated by social preferences? What is the role of pride? How does the riskiness of the 
healthcare setting interact with clinician generosity? These questions are not well 
explored for health workers, though authors have studied the general relationship 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, as well as issues surrounding preferences for 




A small body of literature exists on how social incentives may (or may not) motivate 
healthcare providers’ effort choices at work. In his theory, Prendergast (2007) finds that 
when pro-social attitudes, or “public-spirited” attitudes, are not observable people do not 
necessarily self-select into the appropriate jobs (i.e. non-prosocial people do not 
necessarily sort themselves out of public service jobs). Delfgaauw (2007) applies a 
derivative of this question to a model of health worker job choice, with two types of 
doctors (purely altruistic and purely selfish) and 2 sectors (private and public). Doctors 
can chose between sectors. He finds physicians with higher intrinsic motivation to 
improve patient wellbeing are more likely to choose a job working in the public sector. 
These pro-social physicians are also the ones providing superior quality in that sector. 
The theory suggests that these physicians get utility out of the fact that they can 
contribute to the patient’s welfare more than can other doctors of lower quality in the 
same sector. Finally, Dolea and Adams (2005) provide a review of some literature on the 
motivation of health care workers from the perspective of “needs theories” and “process 
theories”. The authors state that neither theory holds true empirically, but that managers 
continue to use approaches informed by these theories. Since the theories appear to be 
empirically defunct, however, they are not covered in this review. Thus we see that social 
preferences do appear to matter, but the theory specific to this area is fairly sparse. 





3.4. Measuring healthcare quality in developing countries 
There is a large body of empirical work on evaluating clinician performance in both the 
US and abroad. This section discusses evaluating clinician performance, particularly in 
developing countries. First and foremost we touch on how to accurately measure health 
provider quality. In more developed countries, researchers typically use randomized 
controlled trials to study clinician behavior with respect to specific procedures. 
Institutional details have allowed health economists studying less developed countries to 
obtain more detailed measures of clinicians’ actual behavior, as opposed to only 
observing the outcomes of the behavior. The results from the latter set of studies paint a 
picture about the sources of variation between physicians, which we briefly summarize. 
We discuss one particular paper in detail that focuses on strategic effort choices, as it also 
considers the question of whether individual identity, beyond case mix, helps to explain 
variation in quality of care. Overall, we use the work in this area to inform our own 
measures of process quality and effort, which are covered in depth in the chapters that 
follow. We also point out that while clinician behavior and quality of care are well 
studied, there remains ignorance as to what explains variation in care and how to get 
under-performing physicians to work harder. We believe that capitalizing on health 
worker social preferences is a meaningful path to this end and that studying the role of 
social preferences in determining individual effort a key tool.  
Authors studying quality in more developed countries typically study doctor effort by 
looking at clinician performance over a defined set of tasks and have not, to our 
knowledge, explored the behavioral constructs behind their results. Patient chart review is 




offers the most potential for getting an overall measure of quality. Other data sources 
include national databases on health outcomes. These sources have serious limits, 
however, in that they do not allow for analysis of actual clinician behavior. Randomized 
controlled intervention studies are a useful alternative for looking at clinician actions. 
They are usually employed with an aim to determine which means (or interventions) may 
be effective for improving adherence to specific sets of protocol (Boekeloo et al., 1990; 
Fairbrother et al., 1999; Tierney et al., 1986). But few of these studies use economic 
theory to inform the interventions (see Fairbrother at al., 1999 for an example). And 
while some may hint at the behavioral underpinnings of their interventions (Soumerai and 
Avorn, 1990) these issues have not been studied empirically. Thus, while randomized 
controlled trials are powerful tools for evaluating clinician behavior, and widely used in 
more developed countries, they do not allow for study of more general quality of care and 
none to date have been designed to study behavioral underpinnings of health worker 
motivation.   
Authors working on evaluating and/or improving provider quality in developing countries 
have made inroads into measuring individual clinician quality overall, otherwise known 
as process quality. Studies of process quality have been carried out in Indonesia (Santoso 
et al., 1996), Paraguay (Das and Sohnesen, 2007), India (Das and Hammer, 2005; 2007), 
and Tanzania (Leonard and Masatu, 2005; Leonard et al., 2007; Leonard, 2008; 2006). 
The consensus from these studies is that quality is poor in developing countries not only 
because of structural shortcomings, but also because clinician competence is low. Using 
educational interventions combined with chart review of physician prescribing practices, 




appropriate use of drugs for acute diarrhea, a leading cause of child morbidity and 
mortality. Das and Hammer (2005) determine that there are overall low levels of 
competence in their study region in India and that clinicians who are highly competent 
relative to the sample merely have “the ability to identify life-threatening conditions and 
act accordingly”. In this study and others Das and Hammer utilize medical vignettes and 
direct observation. Vignettes are test-like consultations, designed by researchers, where 
the patient is not a sick person, but rather someone who has been trained on how to 
respond to clinicians’ questions according to the case mix he is supposed to represent. An 
observer scores physicians according to how well they treat this imaginary patient. Direct 
observation entails the presence of a non-patient observer in the consultation room. Also 
using vignettes and direct observation, Leonard and Masatu (2005) find that despite low 
levels of competence, practice quality is still lower than it could be; clinicians in 
Tanzania have the capacity to improve their quality even without additional training. In 
later work Leonard and Masatu (Leonard, 2008; Leonard and Masatu, 2006) also use 
patient exit interviews to collect data on physician behavior. Exit interviews complement 
the vignettes and/or direct observation with data on clinician effort while no one is 
observing. These methods allow the authors to look at within clinician variation, an 
approach that is well suited to our goals for studying the role of social preferences in 
clinician effort choices. With these various tools, researchers studying health provider 
quality in developing countries have thus been able to garner more detail on quality of 
health care than is typically available in developed countries. 
Previous work has identified important components of variation in quality of care in 




clinician effort choice. Using vignettes and direct observation, researchers have studied 
the variation in quality by cadre, type of organization, and tenure. Das and Hammer 
(2005) find that the differences in competence between doctors in India are largely 
explained by training. In contrast, they also find that work experience in a neighborhood 
has little impact on competence. Training also plays an important role in determining 
differences in the gap between knowledge and actual practice among Tanzanian 
clinicians (Leonard et al., 2007). But, while non-trivial, training difference between 
clinicians does not tell the entire story. Besides training, the study highlights the 
importance of the type of organization a clinician works for (public, NGO, private). In 
their sample, organization type accounts for 50% of the variation in the dependent 
variable. However, the authors are limited by their sample size and are forced to run a 
number of reduced form regressions, making the meaning of these results unclear. 
Getting closer to looking at the role of social influences, Das and Sohnesen (2007) 
consider the possibility that clinicians in Paraguay make strategic effort choices. Strategic 
effort choices would imply that their motivation is intrinsic and tied to the characteristics 
of the patients they serve. They analyze clinicians’ behavior toward patients relative to 
clinician and patient characteristics. For patients, they focused particularly on wealth 
levels, hypothesizing that clinicians would discriminate against patients based on income. 
Primary results suggest little difference in doctor effort across different patient 
backgrounds and large difference across physicians and facilities along the lines of doctor 
gender, contract type, facility type, and doctor salary. Importantly, in their sample, 
clinicians did not vary effort according to the income level of their patients. The authors 




whether the authors are capturing social preferences with this result. In sum, while 
understanding the factors influencing quality of care occupies a prominent place in health 
care research in developing countries, social preferences remain under-explored. 
3.5. Healthcare in Tanzania  
Our work takes place in the region of Arusha, a semi-urban area of northeastern 
Tanzania. Healthcare in Arusha can be thought of in terms of the types of facilities, the 
services offered (e.g. clinician credentials as well as laboratory equipment) at the 
facilities and the facility ownership. Another salient feature is how the patients access the 
care. We first discuss the role the patient fills and then talk in more detail about clinician 
and facility characteristics. 
A defining feature in the Tanzanian healthcare system, from a patient’s perspective, is the 
system of queuing. Unlike many systems in the developed world, a Tanzanian patient 
does not make an appointment to see a clinician. Rather once they arrive at a facility they 
register with a nurse and the nurse directs them to queue up with any of the general 
practitioners working that day; assignment is essentially random. The exception to the 
more or less random assignment is when a clinician offers specialty services, such as 
consultation and testing for AIDS, TB or diabetes. The system is identical across private, 
public and NGO facilities and is parallel to the urgent care or walk-in clinic arrangements 
present in many more developed countries. We present tests of this more or less random 
assignment of patients to clinicians in Chapter 7.  
Assignment of patients to doctors within each facility is as follows. For outpatient 




name and any insurance information and assign them to one of the doctors in the facility 
taking outpatient clients that day. For example, one facility operates on a “take a number” 
system. When a patient’s number is next in the queue the patient gets his or her 
appointment. Other facilities depend on patients to keep track of their own place in the 
line. Many smaller facilities keep medical records for their patients, which a nurse will 
pull out and either hand to the patient to bring in to the consultation or give directly to the 
clinician, in which case the doctor collects patient medical records as the nurses bring 
them. In some cases the nurses keep an eye out for who is next, but this is not standard 
(perhaps not even formalized) or reliable. Specialty clinics are offered at some facilities 
and nurses can direct patients accordingly, but these are operated separately from the 
ordinary outpatient system and are not included in our dataset. Thus, when a patient visits 
a healthcare facility seeking outpatient care, they do not know which doctor they will see. 
This is especially true for public facilities where clinicians have irregular schedules and 
are moved (by the Ministry of Health) between facilities frequently. 
Waits can be substantial. A patient may wait in line from 10 minutes to 2 hours. The 
number of people waiting when one queues up is not necessarily an indication of how 
long the wait is. Two 2 patients in line may still mean a 40 minute wait. Also, if the 
facility offers more than only outpatient services, the clinician may be called away to deal 
with an emergency. In that case his office remains empty and patients continue to wait for 
him to return and resume with the outpatient visits. Presumably due to the long waits 
patients almost invariably arrive to queue up before the clinicians themselves arrive. For 
their part, most clinicians arrive as is convenient, though they do have set schedules. 




between 9:30am and 11am. While there is not data on clinician tardiness, we estimate 
that on average clinicians arrive no more than 30-40 minutes late.  
A consultation with a clinician can last from 5 to 20 minutes. Typically they are on the 
shorter side. The clinician performs some diagnostic tasks, some history taking tasks and 
may give a prescription, order a lab, or ask the patient to return a second time. If a 
laboratory test is ordered, the patient is responsible for returning to the clinician with the 
laboratory results, which may happen the same day or on a return visit. Sometimes the 
patient can get an appointment if asked to return. In that case, the patient would arrive for 
the appointment and be first in line, ahead of whoever was already there queuing. If the 
clinician is away from his office for emergency, a patient with an appointment waits for 
him to return with everyone else. These visits to health facilities often take the better part 
of the day, preventing people from working those days. A return visit often means 
another day of worked missed. 
Referrals are uncommon in the outpatient setting. A referral eliminates the random 
assignment in terms of which doctor a patient sees, but the patient still must queue up on 
the day they visit the facility or doctor to which they have been referred. In rare cases a 
clinician may self-refer, asking the patient to return to him for a follow-up consultation. 
In the event that the two parties do schedule an appointment for the follow-up, it typically 
means that the patient gets to wait near the head of the queue when they arrive, similar to 
the system in place in the United States. An appointment does not mean a patient gets 




Clinicians schedules are determined 1 to 2 weeks in advance, and are frequently posted 
even later, though informal understandings underlie most scheduling and clinicians 
typically have a good idea of when they will be expected to work. In the more organized 
facilities there are predictable patterns of work, though such patterns rarely follow the 
days of the week. One such pattern is to work 3 days in the AM shift, 3 days in the PM 
shift, and then 2 days off. Clinicians are notorious for arriving late to their shift and 
taking long unscheduled lunch breaks. For example, when conducting consent visits we 
took down schedule information for the next week and planned to visit any given 
clinician within their working hours. Upon arrival at a facility to collect data, we often 
found that the clinician of interest had not arrived as scheduled and no one was able to 
tell us where he was or when he would return. With the exception of a few clinicians who 
seem to always be at their post, this lack of reliability holds for private, public and NGO 
institutions alike.  
Healthcare staff in the outpatient setting consists of clinicians and nurses. Clinicians 
provide the primary diagnostic care; they fill the role of “doctor”, though the majority of 
them do not have full medical degrees. The four cadres of clinicians include: assistant 
clinical officer (ACO), clinical officer (CO), assistant medical officer (AMO), and 
medical officer (MO). Each of these titles requires a specific degree. The medical training 
required for each depends on the degrees an individual already has. Typically, with no 
other degrees and 4 years of secondary school, it requires 3 years of training to become a 
CO. ACOs have less training. AMOs have on average 3.5 years of schooling, though 
again this depends on whether they already have their CO. MOs have the equivalent of a 




Facilities vary in size and ownership. The smallest facilities have a single clinician and 
perhaps one part-time nurse. Larger facilities have staffing structures similar to hospitals 
in the United States, with multiple clinicians and nurses providing both inpatient and 
outpatient care.1 Larger facilities also have a greater variety of services, which may 
include maternity and prenatal care, specialty clinics and ophthalmology. It is not 
uncommon to find on-site laboratories to test samples taken from patients in large and 
small facilities alike. The other defining characteristic of facilities, ownership, is perhaps 
the most germane to this work. Facilities may be publically owned, owned by a non-
governmental organization or privately owned. Quality of care is typically highest at 
private facilities, closely followed by NGOs. Posts at private facilities are coveted 
positions. Many clinicians work their first few years at public facilities before securing a 
place in one of the privately owned or NGO institutions. Insurance plays a very small role 
in healthcare in Arusha, as the vast majority of patients do not carry insurance. As such, 
patients can choose to seek care at whichever facility meets their needs, in terms of 
services offered, quality desired, and prices for consultations. For a more an extended 
description of healthcare system in Tanzania, as well as a model describing health care 
provision, see Leonard et al. (forthcoming).  
 
                                                
1 In US hospitals outpatient services are restricted to emergency rooms. In Tanzania the outpatient care at 





Chapter 4 : Risk and Altruism2 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In many real life settings, actions taken by some persons alter the risks of others. 
Examples are widespread: climate policy involves (sure) abatement costs for the current 
generation while future benefits are uncertain, depending on the sensitivity of the climate 
to the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases; parents have safe and risky options to 
invest or save for their children; donors to charities might not perfectly know the success 
of their investments. More germane to the applications in this dissertation is the example 
that physicians must choose how to allocate (costly) effort in order to increase the 
patients’ chances to be healed. Putting forth full effort may increase chances for a 
positive health outcome substantively, but a clinician cannot fully expend herself for 
every patient every day. Common to all these examples is that a decision maker foregoes 
some benefits in order to increase payoff chances of others, rather than transferring 
income or benefits for sure. By studying giving decisions in risky environments, we 
address the question of whether individual perceptions of fairness relate to comparisons 
of outcomes or rather to comparisons of opportunities, i.e. to the procedure that 
determines the outcomes. 
In this chapter we present results from laboratory experiments that study how the 
riskiness of such transfers affects decisions. The experiments are modifications on a 
                                                
2 This chapter is an augmented version of Brock, Lange and Ozbay (2010). Much of the motivation and 
literature review is the same, but Brock et al. only include results from the laboratory experiments done 




standard dictator game that capture different variants of risky transfers. The treatments 
were piloted with a sample of University of Maryland students (on the UMD campus) 
and then implemented with a sample of Tanzanian clinicians (in Arusha, Tanzania). The 
goal of the pilot was twofold: 1) to take a first step in the empirical research on how risk 
effects giving decisions in dictator games and 2) to isolate which treatments best parallel 
the clinician-patient relationship while also eliciting meaningful responses from subjects 
in the laboratory. We learned that while all treatments help to elucidate the impact of risk 
on altruism, two in particular were most appropriate for implanting with the Tanzanian 
clinicians. Thus the pilot allowed us to select the two treatments most appropriate to the 
Tanzanian setting and most germane to our research questions with respect to the 
Tanzanian clinicians. Results from both the pilot and the Tanzanian implementation are 
reported and discussed in this chapter. 
With this, we contribute to a large experimental and behavioral literature that investigates 
potential social behavior of subjects. Dictator, gift exchange, public good and other 
games show that some subjects are willing to transfer money to other players without 
having any material benefits as a result of doing so (see Camerer, 2003). Such giving 
decisions are often interpreted as a preference for equitable or efficient outcomes 
(Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), as a 
preference for giving (Andreoni, 1990), or as a desire for being seen as behaving fairly 
(Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Dana et al., 2007). Little 
thought has been given so far to the role of risk in giving decisions or to if and how such 




Whether or not social preferences extend to risky environments can be described with a 
theory on ex ante and ex post fairness considerations. We outline the theory below. The 
experiments are then based on this theory .The theory proposes that individuals consider 
ex ante (or procedural) fairness in risky decision making in addition to or instead of 
exclusively considering ex post fairness. Recall the example of Machina (1989) 
mentioned in the first chapter as a reference for how to think about ex ante fairness. A 
mother with two children may be indifferent between allocating the indivisible treat to 
either of her children, but she may strictly prefer giving the treat based on a result of a 
coin toss. Although being a fair procedure, as it gives both kids the same chance to win, it 
will not result in a fair outcome as only one child can get the treat. In this paper, we yield 
new insights into this debate by considering the choices of individuals who are 
themselves directly affected by the outcome. That is, rather than deciding the allocation 
between two other persons as in Machina’s example, the decision maker decides the 
allocation between herself and one other person. Investigating how risk impacts the self-
interest and altruism in this way allows us to discuss how social preference theories may 
extend to risky situations. 
This work is also related to a body of recent work that examines the role of social 
preferences for risk-taking. Similar to Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2005), we consider 
whether dictators focus on ex post or ex ante fairness. These authors use ultimatum and 
battle-of-the-sexes games to look at the trade-off between how an outcome is determined 
and the fairness of the outcome from recipients’ perspective. Unlike their work, however, 
we study the dictator’s allocation choice rather than recipient preferences. Our work is 




analyze how recipients in a risky dictator game adjust acceptance rates depending on 
whether an actual person or a random process determines the outcome of the game. But 
they also do not consider how giving decisions are directly affected by risk. We use 
variations on ordinary dictator games and instead of looking at recipient preferences, we 
consider dictator behavior. Thus in our setting the recipient is a completely passive 
player. In that sense our work builds on Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) who explore how 
dictator choices between a safe and a risky option for themselves depend on the 
corresponding payoffs to the recipient. In their experiments, dictators have a binary 
choice between a safe payout option and a risky payout option. They do not vary the 
degree of risk in the risky options. They find that dictators tend to be more risk averse 
when the risk applies to themselves as well as to others. They also find that dictators 
prefer the risky situation over a situation where outcomes are unfair with certainty. While 
this study reveals that decision makers are sensitive to risk borne by recipients, it falls 
short of addressing the degree to which dictators are willing to surrender their own sure 
gains in order to reduce the risk of a partner. We address this by giving decision makers a 
continuous choice set and varying the distribution of risky versus certain outcomes for 
the dictator and the recipient, respectively. In addition, they use a between subjects study 
design, while we offer results from a within design.  
In summary, our work complements the literature on social preferences for risk by 
looking at how dictators’ giving varies when the outcome for the recipient is uncertain. 
We fill in the gap in knowledge about the degree to which the dictator is willing to 
surrender his or her own wealth, or chances, to increase the chances of the recipient. 




when risk is involved. We also ask: do dictators give as if they are considering ex post 
outcome inequality or ex ante equity of chances. We thus combine the two subjects: how 
risk impacts choices and whether decision makers consider procedural fairness or 
outcomes fairness differently when allocating resources. Our experimental treatments are 
designed to differentiate between these ex post and ex ante formulations and to lend 
insights into their structure.  
One abstraction from reality limits the generalizability of our results. In the treatments 
with risk to both parties, we define the lotteries such that both dictators and receivers 
have the same expected value for one additional chance to win the lottery (i.e. one token 
kept versus token given). Situations where risk allocation or risk sharing occur in real 
life, however, do not necessarily share this trait. For example, when a doctor is deciding 
on how much effort she is going to exert for a given patient, she considers the effort 
required for the other patients she will see that day, as well as the energy she wants to 
have left over to herself at the end of the day. Her expected value for one unit of saved 
effort, if you will, is potentially different from the expected benefit for the patient, were 
the doctor to exert that unit on the patient’s behalf. If the patient is very sick and the 
doctor has the tools to help him, the patient’s expected value of one additional unit of 
effort is higher. In the reverse case, where the patient is not severely ill or the doctor does 
not have the ability to treat him, the doctor’s expected value of one additional unit of 
effort may be higher. This chapter offers a first treatment of the baseline case, where the 
expected value for one additional chance to win a lottery is identical for both dictator and 
recipient. To our knowledge there are no studies that cover the baseline case. Extensions 




we believe that our series of dictator choices, where payoffs are equal those in the 
standard dictator game in terms of expected value, contribute substantial new insights 
into social preferences under risk. 
The next section outlines a model of behavior that informs our experiments and analysis. 
It is followed by a description of 6 treatments (tasks) – while all of these treatments are 
included in the pilot, only the two most salient treatments are part of the Tanzanian 
implementation. The succeeding two sections include more detailed descriptions of the 
pilot and Tanzanian implementations, respectively. A final section concludes. 
4.2. A Model of behavior for risk allocation and risk sharing  
Existing models of social preferences consider individual preferences over certain 
payoffs, represented by a utility function  where c1 and c2 are (final) 
consumption of person 1 and 2, respectively. Charness and Rabin (2002) define  
with a combination of own payoff, minimum payoff and efficiency concerns. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) study inequality aversion, where 
 captures aversion toward payoff differences between players. None of these 
authors looks at how these kind of social preferences extend to situations under risk. To 
address these issues, we consider individual preferences over joint payoff distributions 
. This framework allows us to differentiate between situations in which 
individuals compare their payoffs ex post or their payoff chances ex ante.   
Under the assumption of expected utility maximization, preferences of an individual who 




    (1) 
In contrast, to formalize preferences on ex ante comparisons of payoff chances, we 
assume that each agent’s utility is a function of expected payoffs, E(c), for both 
themselves and their partner, where the expectations for person one and person two are 
evaluated over the lotteries F1 and F2, respectively. The utility based on ex ante 
comparison is then given by 
    (2) 
Thus, in this formulation we assume that agents compare their respective ex ante 
expected values.  
To highlight the different utility constructs under risk, consider an adaptation of 
Machina’s example to an allocation of an indivisible object between the decision-maker 
and the recipient. Any outcome leads to ex post inequality. If the decision-maker at least 
marginally prefers ex post inequality in her favor rather than the other person’s favor, she 
would choose an allocation procedure that secures the object to herself. Differently, 
suppose the decision-maker is ex post inequality averse, but is willing to accept the 
inequitable outcome as long as it is decided upon fairly, as in Bolton, Brants and 
Ockenfels (2005). Then, given the option, she would avoid ex ante inequality using an 
allocation procedure that gives equal chances to the decision-maker and the other person 
to obtain the object. For example, 50/50 gamble, such as a coin toss, would equalize the 




The model brings to light the primary research question of this chapter: whether 
individual perceptions of fairness differ when considering outcomes versus considering 
opportunities for outcomes. We discuss the implication of the model for the different 
treatments in turn, considering first the ex-ante formulation followed by that of the ex 
post formulation. We use the experiments to determine the dominant decision making 
rubric among subjects, ex post or ex ante.  
4.3. The Experiment 
To explore the determinants of giving under risk, we ran a series of modified dictator 
games. Treatment 1 replicates the standard dictator game.3 This standard dictator game 
highlights the decision makers' fairness in outcomes between the recipient and himself 
and serves as a baseline for the other treatments. In this set of experiments, we are 
interested in whether fairness in outcomes translates into ex ante fairness in risky 
situations. Ex ante fairness is equality of chances or initial conditions rather than 
outcomes. The modified treatments coincide with the standard dictator game in terms of 
expected payoffs. The payoff to the decision-maker or to the recipient or to both is, 
however, subject to risk. For example, in the second and third treatments, the dictator 
receives a certain amount of money but the recipient does not. By sacrificing some of his 
monetary payoff, the dictator can increase the recipient’s chance to win a prize. If the 
dictator does not give any money, then the recipient will definitely not get the prize. If he 
                                                
3 A vast literature has been devoted to studying giving behavior in such games in which one player 
(dictator) is asked to allocate a certain amount between himself and another player (recipient).  While any 
dictator who is solely maximizing his or her own payoff should keep the entire endowment, Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) were first to show that most subjects choose an even split giving $10 to each 
player over an uneven split ($18, $2) that favored themselves. Following the first dictator experiment with 
a continuous choice (Forsythe et al., 1994), most studies show that a significant proportion of dictators give 
positive amounts (for summary see Camerer (2003)). List (2007) shows that if taking is allowed, less but 




gives the maximal amount, the recipient wins the prize for sure. Another treatment 
involves a transfer of lottery tickets. This situation is similar to the example of a mother 
allocating a treat to her two children, only that the decision maker needs to choose the 
probability with which she herself or the other person wins the prize (i.e. the treat). That 
is, the decision maker dictates the allocation of chances to win a given prize: giving zero 
secures the prize to the dictator. Increasing giving increases chances of winning for the 
recipient and decreases the dictator’s chances. These treatments allow us to evaluate 
whether – when valuing equality – individuals compare their outcomes after resolution of 
uncertainty (ex post comparison) or if they compare their ex ante chances to gain certain 
incomes (ex ante comparison): no player who solely considers ex post distribution of 
payoffs would give a positive amount if the lottery draws are exclusive, i.e. if only one of 
the players wins the prize. We complement these treatments with one in which the 
dictator cannot change the expected value allocated to himself and the recipient, but only 
their exposure to risk.  
The experiment was first piloted at the University of Maryland before we implemented 
them in Tanzania with the clinicians. We first describe the pilot experiment and results. 
We follow with the report on the experiment done in Tanzania. 
Description of Tasks 
The pilot experiment consisted of six treatments, or tasks. In each task, the decision-
maker was asked to allocate 100 tokens between himself and the recipient, giving away 




and were denoted in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) during the experiment 
( ). Table 4.1 summarizes the payoff consequences for each task.  
Task 1 (T1) replicates the ordinary dictator game, as a baseline for comparison with risky 
decisions. The players’ payoffs are given by . The purpose of this 
task is to position our results within the existing work on the dictator game, as well as to 
serve as a benchmark for other tasks.  
In Tasks 2 and 3, the dictator allocates tokens as in Task 1, but unlike Task 1 the tokens 
given to the recipient represent lottery tickets. Tokens kept by the dictator are interpreted 
the same as in Task 1. More formally, in Tasks 2 and 3, the dictator receives a certain 
payoff in ECU equal to his allocation of tokens kept, , while giving the 
recipient the chance to win a prize. The recipient earns the prize of P=100 tokens with 
probability , , in T2. In T3 the recipient can win the prize P=50 
tokens with probability , . In these two treatments the dictator does 
not face any risk himself. For the recipient a lottery is drawn to determine if he receives 
the payment. T2 and T3 resemble situations as described in the introduction, for example 
a physician’s costly effort to increase the healing chances of patients or bearing 
greenhouse gas abatement costs to reduce climate change faced by future generations.  
We can attribute any difference between the dictator’s decisions in T2 and T3 and that in 
T1 to his assessment of the risk to the recipient, as both the dictator’s payoff and the 
recipient’s expected value are identical across the three treatments, as a function of x. A 
risk-averse dictator with preferences based on ex ante comparisons would evaluate the 




and T3 than in T1. If he is interested in equalizing ex ante chances by equalizing the 
expected values, he might allocate more tokens to the recipient in the treatments with 
risk, T2 and T3. The reverse holds for risk-loving agents. If, on the other hand, the agent 
compares ex post payoffs and is highly averse to unfavorable inequality, he would reduce 
giving in T2 compared with T1. Task T3 avoids this unfavorable inequality as the 
recipient can only win a maximum of . If agents are therefore largely driven by 
ex post inequality concerns, we should expect more giving in T3 than in T2.   
Task 4 (T4) aims to test whether preferences based on ex ante or ex post comparisons are 
more appropriate to model dictators’ allocation decisions under risk. In this treatment, 
both the dictator and recipient face risk. Here, the dictator distributes the chances to win a 
prize. The probability for winning the prize of P=100 is given by  and 
. Thus the token allocations represent the chances of winning a lottery. In 
task T4, the draws are dependent: either the dictator or recipient wins. Again, T4 was 
designed to differentiate between preferences based on ex ante and ex post comparisons. 
Note that ex post formulations of preferences (1) imply 
    
such that for any preference with , we expect subjects to choose 
. As long as agents put slightly more weight on their own than on others’ payoffs, 
we have a clear theoretical prediction. Note that this assumption is satisfied by all models 
in the literature (e.g. Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Conversely, if 




positive amounts in T4. If, for example, subjects try to avoid inequality of expected 
values or try to maximize the minimal ex ante utility, we expect them to choose 
.4   
Task 5 (T5) is identical to T4 except that instead of one lottery, two independent lotteries 
are drawn, one for each player. Here, one of the players, both players, or neither of them 
wins the prize. In terms of ex post comparisons, T4 and T5 therefore differ. Ex ante (i.e. 
when comparing expected values, these tasks are the same. Comparing T4 and T5 
therefore also allows us to further differentiate between ex post or ex ante comparisons. 
We complement these five treatments with one additional task, T6, in which the dictator 
cannot change the expected value allocated to himself and recipient, but can change the 
risk exposure involved. The potential allocations are a 50/50-gamble between x/2 and 100 
- x/2 for person 1 and a 50/50-gamble between 50 - x/2 and 50 + x/2 for person 2. 
Independent lotteries are drawn for each player to determine if they win the high or low 
ECU amount. The purpose of this final treatment is to gain insights into whether social 
preferences affect the allocation of risks consistently with the allocation of expected 
payoffs. As such, predictions for T6 complement those in T4. Ex ante equality in chances 
would be generated by a choice of , for which both players face a gamble 
between  and . We would therefore expect players with preferences based on ex 
ante comparisons who choose to give larger amounts in the standard dictator game to 
choose an allocation close to . If, however, dictators are fully selfish (they give 
                                                
4 Note that the same prediction of zero giving would result if just give in the dictator game because of 
identifiable actions. In T4 and T5, a zero payoff to the recipient could result even if the dictator gave all but 





nothing in the dictator game) we would expect  if they are risk-averse and 
 if they are risk-loving. We thus predict that decisions in T1 should be 
informative for the absolute distance between decisions in T6 and 50.  
In all treatments, recipients were not informed about the actual choice, x. They only 
learned about their own final payoff at the end of the experiment. Dictators did not 
receive direct information about the final payoff to the recipient. The effect of such 
information on giving decisions is left to further research.  
4.4. Pilot implementation: UMD students 
The pilot results reported here are from Brock, Lange and Ozbay (2010). Results from the 
pilot and lessons from implementing the experiment with the UMD students inform the 
choice of treatments to bring to the laboratory with the Tanzanian clinicians. Beyond that 
primary goal, however, this pilot provides unique and novel evidence on the impact of 
risk on altruism. With this pilot data, we first establish that social preferences of most 
players who give non-zero amounts in a standard dictator game are best described as 
being defined over ex ante distribution of risk. These players do not appear to compare ex 
post payoffs, but rather look at equalizing the ex ante chances to win. Decisions are, 
however, affected by the riskiness of final payoffs: decision-makers generally give up 
less income than in the standard dictator game if the transfer is risky, that is, if it does not 
increase the recipient’s income for sure but only her chances to gain income. We also 
show that the propensity to give in a standard dictator-game is a good predictor for giving 




equalize the ex ante situation, i.e. payoff chances, in other games. Our results thus bring 
to light how existing theories of social preferences can extend to risky contexts.  
Recall that our experiment consisted of a series of dictator games in which the dictator 
must allocate 100 tokens between himself/herself and a second player (recipient). We 
report the results of 6 choice tasks. Tasks differ according to the payoff consequences for 
each of the players. One of the tasks replicates the standard dictator game. In the other 5 
tasks, the dictators allocate risk for their recipient counterparts or between themselves 
and their counterparts.   
We conducted our experiment in September of 2009 in the Experimental Economics 
Laboratory at the University of Maryland. A total of 152 subjects were recruited from 
among University of Maryland undergraduates representing a variety of undergraduate 
majors, including but not limited to economics, finance, chemistry, government, and 
biology. Subjects first gathered in one room where they reviewed consent forms. After 
signing a consent form, all subjects were given a copy of the general instructions, which 
were also read aloud by an experimenter. Subjects were randomly assigned to be either 
person 1 (dictator) or person 2 (recipient).5 The dictator subjects were then led into a 
separate room. The recipient subjects remained in the first room. Each dictator was 
randomly matched with one recipient without revealing the identity to either of the 
subjects. No subjects were permitted to communicate before or during the session. An 
experimenter was present in each of the two rooms for the duration of the experiment. A 
copy of the instructions is included in the Appendix.  
                                                




All subjects participated in all 6 choice tasks, resultantly our results are within rather than 
between comparisons. Dictators submitted all of their allocation decisions via computer 
and did not learn of the outcomes of their choices between rounds. Computer stations 
were randomly assigned. Using computers allowed us to also randomize the order of 
tasks for each dictator to minimize order effects6.  
The receivers filled out decision forms using paper and pen and also did not learn dictator 
choices between rounds. Their task was to determine how much they expected their 
dictator partner to allocate to them for each task. The recipients’ decisions had no bearing 
on the final allocations and this was made clear before each session began. Dictators did 
not learn recipients’ expectations, either between tasks or at the end of the experiment. It 
should be noted that the recipient task was not incentivized; there were no consequences 
for reporting beliefs inaccurately, but there were also no reasons for recipients not to 
disclose their true beliefs. Because this task was somewhat informal, we do not provide a 
rigorous exposition of these results. Rather, outcomes from the recipient task are largely 
exploratory. 
After all subjects completed all tasks, payment was determined from one randomly 
selected task round. Using the computer, we selected payment rounds independently for 
each dictator-recipient pair. We did not reveal which round was the randomly selected 
                                                
6 The randomization of treatment order was successful for eliminating any potential order effects, with the 
exception of when Task 1 was ordered before Task 3. When Task 1 was before Task 3 subjects gave 
significantly more in Task 3. This may be because of the significant correlation between giving in Task1 
and the pattern of when Task1 comes before Task3 – when Task 1 comes before Task 3, Task 3 often falls 
at the end of the series of choice tasks. The correlation coefficient between giving in Task 1 and Task 3’s 
order of appearance is 0.35 and it is significant at a .2% level (p<0.01). Since the maximum allowable 
giving in Task 3 is half of what it is in all other tasks, and since those that already gave more in Task 1 
tended to see Task 3 later in their task ordering, Task 3’s appearance at the end of the task set may have 




payment round or what the dictator choice was in that round. Thus, subjects did not learn 
the outcomes of their choices at any time during or after the experiment. They only 
learned of their final earnings. Likewise, the recipients did not know if their final 
earnings were the result of a kind (or unkind) dictator or due to a lottery. Subjects 
received $1.00 in cash at the end of the session for each 10 experimental currency units 
(ECU’s) they earned in the randomly selected task round. A $5 show-up fee was included 
in the subject payments, which were paid at the end of each session. Dictators and 
receivers were paid separately and in private.  
4.4.1. Pilot results and discussion 
The results on the dictators’ choices and the recipients’ expectations are summarized in 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. These tables provide the summary statistics of 
average choices as well as the proportion of players choosing  or  in each 
task. For example, average number of tokens given out of 100 tokens in the dictator game 
is  and thereby consistent with numbers reported in the literature (Camerer, 
2003). It can immediately be seen that significant positive giving occurs for all tasks. 
Figure 4.1 again shows the average contribution by task, while Figure 4.2 displays the 
percentage of subjects giving non-zero amounts (participation rate) and Figure 4.3 shows 
the average contributions for those that chose to give non-zero amounts. The summary 
statistics of these conditional contributions is given in Table 4.4. Notably, the figures 





In a first step, we can study giving decisions in T4. Recall that if ex ante considerations 
dominate we expect subjects to give positive amounts, whereas if subjects have ex post 
considerations we would expect very little positive giving and giving in T4 to be less than 
giving in T1. In our sample, giving in T4 is significantly different from zero: 33 subjects 
(43%) chose to give positive amounts. Additionally, the conditional contributions in T1 
and T4 coincide (see Figure 4.3 and Wilcoxon test in Table 4.5). We also include a table 
reporting the unconditional difference in means and significance using Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests (Table 4.6). Here, too, we find no significant difference between giving in T1 
and giving in T4. The unconditional sample includes those who did not give positive 
amounts in either treatment being compared and thus averages are skewed by the 
concentration of giving at zero. Nonetheless, the directions of differences between 
treatments are the same as in the conditional giving comparisons. Thus, by excluding 
zeros form the analysis we are simply concentrating on a pattern that exists more 
generally in the data. We therefore can clearly reject the hypotheses that ex post 
comparisons are able to explain subjects’ behavior. 
Result 1: Preferences based on ex post payoff comparisons cannot explain giving 
decisions under risk. 
Comparing the distributions of giving in T4 and the standard dictator game may suggest 
that dictator giving with risk may be distinct from non-risky giving -- for T4 there is 
slightly more mass on x=0 and slightly less mass on x=50 than for T1. But the difference 
is indeed small and a Wilcoxon sign-rank test cannot reject the equality of the underlying 
distributions. This finding is consistent with an ex ante comparison of payoff 




ex post comparisons. In line with this result is the apparent similarity between T4 and T5; 
behavior in T4 and T5 should be the same if evaluating payoff prospects ex ante, but they 
would differ in terms of ex post comparisons.  
The comparison between T2 and T3 also informs whether or not dictators evaluate ex 
post payoff differences. As is discussed in the description of the tasks, if agents are 
largely driven by ex post inequality concerns, we would expect more giving in T3 than in 
T2. We find the opposite to be true, however. Conditional on giving, task 2 has a 
significantly higher mean than in task 3, which is not in line with the ex post predictions.  
As another indication for preferences that consider ex ante chances rather than ex post 
payoff realizations, we can compare individual decisions in the standard dictator game 
with those in T6. In T6, the dictator faces a 50/50-gamble between  and  
while the recipient faces potential outcomes of  and . As such, the 
decision x does not affect the expected value for either player, but it does impact the risk 
allocation. For , both players face the same potential payoffs. An ex ante oriented 
player who allocates more to the recipient in the dictator game can therefore be expected 
to choose closer to x=50 in T6. Indeed, we can establish this result: 
Result 2: The more subjects give in a standard dictator game, the more they 
equalize the ex ante risk exposure for risky decisions.  
Table 4.7 provides evidence for this result based on a series of tobit regressions that 




dictator game (T1).7 For example, the absolute value of the difference  is 
smaller the larger the contribution in the dictator game (1% significance). That is, even if 
the decision does not involve a trade off of own expected value, agents’ choices in the 
dictator game are informative for the allocation of risks between themselves and some 
recipient. This is also supported by the analysis of the relationship between giving in T1 




"100 . When T1 giving is higher, so is the 
deviation from the safe option (i.e. giving all the risk to one’s partner). This serves as 
further evidence that the generosity in the standard dictator game predicts a tendency 
toward equating ex ante chances. Similarly, but perhaps less surprisingly, agents are more 
likely to give in all tasks (1% significance) the more they gave in the dictator game 
(Table 4.7). 
In order to confirm that this result is not driven by those who give zero in all tasks (i.e. 
that the regressions are not simply telling us that selfish dictators in T1 are selfish in all 
the other treatments), we also report results from these regressions with an adjusted 
sample to exclude the selfish players. “Selfish” is defined as people who give zero in all 
tasks. When we exclude these subjects, we find that the relationships between giving in 
the dictator game and giving in the risky decisions remains. These results are reported in 
Table 4.8.8 The result holds for alternative definitions of “selfish”; analyses reported in 
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 use samples with giving conditional on T1>0 or T1>0 and Ti>0, 
respectively. We further test the importance of the selfish players by regressing the 
                                                
7 We use tobits because of the concentration of giving at zero in all tasks. 
 
8 Tobit regressions still make sense when excluding selfish types because there is still 30-42% zeros in the 
various tasks. That is, selfish is defined as giving zero in all tasks. We do not consider those that give zero 





decision in each task on a binary variable equal to 0 if the person was selfish in T1 (Table 
4.11). We do not find that being selfish in T1 predicts selfishness in other tasks; 
regression results show that non-selfish people are driving the results seen in regressions 
on the whole sample. Indeed there are a few participants that chose to give zero in all 
tasks, but they do not drive our results. These results confirm that selfish people are not 
driving Result 2.  
We do find, however, evidence that risk faced by the recipient motivates increased 
selfishness among dictators. A series of Wilcoxon sign rank tests reveals that agents give 
more in the standard dictator game than in T2 (5% significance) and T3 (10% 
significance), that is when the recipient’s payoff is subject to risk while the dictator’s is 
not. As such, we establish the following result: 
Result 3: Players’ decisions are affected by the recipient’s exposure to risk.  
Further insights into this result can be obtained from explicitly comparing the 
distributions for the decisions (see Table 4.4). Table 4.12 provides a series of probit 
models where we explain the choice to participate (Column 2), choices being between 1 
and 49 (Column 3), and choices being equal to 50 (Column 5) (always coded as a binary 
variable taking value 1 if the choice fits the criteria) by the decision tasks. For this we 
defined explanatory dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the task is T2, T3, T4, T5, 
respectively. 
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 4.12 show that contributions tend to be lower in the tasks 
involving risk than in the standard dictator game. The result is robust to multiple 




regressing the participation indicator on the treatment dummies in the first stage. In the 
second stage we perform a truncated regression (truncated from below at zero), to adjust 
the distributional assumption of normality. The truncated regression differs from the GLS 
model in magnitude of the coefficients and in one case in significance of coefficients (T5 
is not significant in the truncated model). Otherwise the truncated regression gives the 
same pattern of significance and the coefficients have the same signs as the single 
regression model. While this result is also illustrated in Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 
4.3 reveal that this effect is primarily driven by a reduction in the conditional 
contributions, rather than by a change in the participation rate. In fact, a Wilcoxon test 
(see Table 4.5) shows a difference in conditional contributions between T1 and T2 (1% 
level of significance) and T1 and T3 (1% level). We also show significance in the 
comparison of T2 versus T3, which gives us transitivity with respect to T1, T2 and T3 (i.e. 
T1>T2, T2>T3, T1>T3). 
This result is consistent with the results in columns 4-6 of Table 4.12 where we 
decompose the choice options to distinguish between positive giving, giving between 1 
and 49 and giving equal to 50. We find that fewer subjects choose to give 50 in T2 and 
T3, than in the standard dictator game, while more agents give smaller amounts (between 
1 and 49). This observation is in line with findings by Dana et al. (2007): since the 
potential payoffs to the recipient do not depend on the dictator’s choice, the dictator can 
exploit the “moral-wiggle room”. The recipient will not be able to perfectly infer the 
dictator’s action from observing the outcome. 
It is interesting and puzzling to see, however, that the proportion of players giving zero is 




indicates that some players who displayed selfish behavior in the standard dictator game 
give a positive amount in T3, thereby giving the recipient a chance to win some large 
amount.  
Our experimental design further allows us to compare the decisions made by dictators 
with the expectations of the recipient. While recipients’ answers were not incentivized, 
we believe that the comparison of their expectations with the actual choices of the 
dictators provides interesting insights. Table 4.3 displays the respective averages, 
standard deviations, and proportion of subjects expecting  or  for all tasks. 
Comparing expectations with actual choices, we see that they almost coincide for the 
standard dictator game. In presence of risk, however, expectations generally differ from 
choices. For T2 and T3, subjects expect more generosity than dictators actually provide 
(t-test at 1% significance, Mann-Whitney at 5% for T3). Recipients therefore do not 
expect the dictator’s choices to change when only recipients are exposed to risk. It is 
interesting to see, however, that the expectations for T4 are significantly lower than those 
in the standard dictator game (1%, Wilcoxon). The expectations of recipients are 
therefore much more in line with potential ex post comparisons: 58% of them expect to 
get a zero allocation if the dictator allocates lottery tickets which only allow either person 
to win. They expect a more generous allocation in T5 when both agents could potentially 
win (1%, Wilcoxon between expectations in T4 and T5). This expectation, however, is 
not justified by the actual decisions (10% significance difference in T5, Mann-Whitney). 
Finally, in task T6 recipients expect a larger exposure to risk, i.e. they anticipate the 
dictator to choose safer options than these actually do (Mann-Whitney, 1% significance). 




extreme choice is taken by 16% of dictators while it was only expected by 3% of 
recipients.  We can summarize this discussion as follows:  
Result 4: While correctly anticipating decisions in the dictator game, subjects are 
less able to predict choices when payoffs are risky.  
Result 4 has implications for extensions of the current experimental setup to strategic 
environments: it can be problematic to find equilibrium strategies when beliefs do not 
coincide with actual behavior. Similarly, when extending the current dictator game to an 
ultimatum game context, for example, wrong expectations may affect acceptance 
decisions if players’ preferences depend on expectations (e.g., reference-based models).  
4.5. Full implementation: Tanzanian clinicians 
The pilot study results are interesting and novel in their own right. They also inform our 
choice of treatments to bring to the laboratory with the Tanzanian clinicians. We brought 
T1, T2 and T4 from the pilot to the Tanzanian implementation. We retained T1 because it 
serves as the baseline for comparing the impact of the different treatments on altruism. 
The second treatment measures what we call risk allocation – how much risk the dictator 
is willing to give their partner when they themselves do not face risk. We feel this 
approximates the clinician-patient interaction in that the clinician must expend effort 
(give of his tokens) in order to improve the patient’s chances of getting well. To the 
extent that he does not expend maximally for the patient, or reserves effort, the clinician 
benefits, and his benefit may not be exposed to risk. Meanwhile T4 approximates the 
same kind of situation, but incorporates the fact that in many cases the clinician actually 




choose T4, with dependent lotteries, instead of T5 in order to capture the idea that the 
more effort the clinician exerts for any given patient, the more he risks his own benefit. 
This may be the case when treating a highly contagious patient where optimal treatment 
requires close physical contact between doctor and patient. Our choice of these three 
treatments does not suggest that the other treatments do not some how mirror the doctor 
patient relationship and future research may include further investigation into these 
alternate treatments. 
To clarify the discussion in this chapter, we refer to the Tanzanian implementation of T1, 
T2 and T4 from the pilot as T1T, T2T and T4T, respectively. 9 T1T also corresponds to T1 
in chapter 4. T2T and T4T do not correspond to any other treatments reported in other 
chapters; their results are reported here only. 
4.5.1. Preliminary results, Tanzanian clinicians 
The results on the dictators’ choices and the recipients’ expectations from the Tanzanian 
implementation are summarized in Table 4.13, Table 4.14 and in Figure 4.5. Giving 
results in the standard dictator game, labeled as T1T in the table, are the same as those 
reported in Chapter 5.10 In T1T, the clinicians’ mean tokens given was 34, with 60% of 
participants giving fewer than 50, 29% giving half of their allocation and 7% giving more 
than 50 tokens. Since the Tanzanian sample does not have the conventional concentration 
                                                
9 Note that the naming convention of the treatments in this chapter conflict with those in Chapter 2; T2 in 
chapter 2 is a different treatment than T2T in this chapter. Both chapters report results on experiments with 
clinicians, and originally the treatments in this chapter were labeled T4 and T5. We adjusted the names of 
these treatments to correspond with the matching treatment from the pilot study. This facilitates the 
discussion comparing the behavior of the Maryland students with the Tanzanian clinicians in this chapter. 
 
10 All the Tanzanian experiments were run during the same sessions and we include the T1T results here for 




at zero, the comparable table from the pilot results is Table 4.4, which shows giving 
averages among those UMD students who choose to give a non-zero amount in any task. 
It can immediately be seen that more subjects choose to give over fifty percent of their 
tokens in T2T compared to the baseline, but that the portion of participants giving 50 or 
more drops substantially in T4T, from 40% in T2T to 23% in T4T, shifting the mass of 
givers into the sub-fifty range. This is in contrast to the pilot results, where percentage of 
selfish givers (0<x<50) is greater in T2 than in the T4. Also, for the clinicians, the action 
is on either side of the 50/50 allocation, while the UMD students did not tend to give 
more than 50 tokens to their partners. In fact, while the percentage of those giving 50% 
among the clinicians does not differ between T2T and T4T (and is half as large as T1T), 
more dictators choose the 50/50 allocation in the pilot’s T4 than in T2. 
As in the pilot, giving in T4T is significantly different from zero, but somewhat 
unsurprisingly for this sample the percentage of subjects giving more than zero is 
extremely high: 66 subjects (98%) chose to give positive amounts. We test the difference 
in means between treatments with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (Table 4.15). Unlike the 
pilot where we found no significant difference between giving in T1 and giving in T4, 
among the clinicians giving in T4T is significantly lower than in any of the other 
treatments; all differences are significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, giving in the 
risk allocation treatment, T2T, does not differ significantly from T1T. Recall that we 
expect people with a preference for ex ante fairness to equate expected values and thus 
give closer to the 50/50 allocation in the treatments with risk, whereas those who aim for 
ex post fairness will behave selfishly. Hence, while the pilot suggests that preferences 




1), we cannot reject the hypothesis that ex post comparisons are able to explain their 
behavior in the clinician sample. Furthermore, unlike the pilot sample’s Result 3, we do 
not find evidence that risk faced by the recipient affects the clinicians’ choices. A series 
of Wilcoxon sign rank tests reveals that agents do not give more in the standard dictator 
game than in T2T. Again, it is T4T that motivates changes in generosity, with significant 
reductions in giving when the agents themselves are exposed to risk. 
Since giving in T4T is very different than in other treatments, it is not surprising that 
giving in the standard dictator game is not predictive of T4T giving. Table 4.16 
juxtaposes these results with the comparable results form the pilot. This result also brings 
Result 2 into question, though it is tempered by the fact that agents are more likely to 
give in T2T (risk allocation) the more they gave in the dictator game (1% significance, 
also in Table 4.16). This suggests that clinicians perceive allocating risk similarly to 
allocating tokens when they themselves do not face risk. Generosity is scaled back 
considerably, however, when the clinicians face risk in their own outcomes. Whether or 
not this is a direct result of their work environment (i.e. an artifact of practicing defensive 
medicine) or a reflection of the defensive posture toward risk in the developing economy 
in general is an important question for further investigation. 
Table 4.17 provides a series of probit models where we explain giving patterns by way of 
the decision tasks. We look at selfish choices (giving less than or equal to zero, Column 
2), choices being equal to 50 (Column 3) and generous choices (giving more than 50%, 
Column 4). This is similar to Table 4.12 from the pilot results, where the dependent 
variable is coded as a binary variable taking value 1 if the choice fits the criteria. For this 




respectively. The baseline treatment is T1T. Here, too, we see that in T4T clinicians are 
significantly more likely to be selfish (at the 1% level) and also less likely to be fair 
(significant at the 5% level) than in other treatments. In T2T, on the other hand, clinicians 
are significantly more generous, which is evidence in favor of Result 3 from the pilot 
study – that clinician subjects are responsive to recipients’ exposure to risk. A regression 
of tokens given across all treatments on treatment dummies (Table 4.18) echoes these 
results: when the clinician him or herself is exposed to risk, he or she gives significantly 
fewer tokens than in the standard dictator game. On average dictators decrease their 
giving by about a fifth. The outcome is not sensitive to controlling for clinician 
characteristics, none of which are significant across all specifications in explaining 
behavior. 
Also in Table 4.17, we see that fewer subjects choose to give a fair allocation, splitting 
the endowment roughly in half, in T4T than in the standard dictator game. To some extent 
this may be reflective of subjects exploiting “moral wiggle room” as we observe in the 
pilot, but the response to own exposure to risk and the similarity in mean giving between 
T2T and T4T suggest a more straightforward behavior: subjects are generous when they 
know how much it will impact them directly. In a sense, it is like giving a donation after 
you have met all your other monthly expenses, when you can carefully weigh how nice 
you can afford to be, rather than before you receive your paycheck.  
As in the pilot, our experimental design further allows us to compare the decisions made 
by dictators with the expectations of the recipient. Recall that recipients’ answers were 
not incentivized. Table 4.14 displays the respective averages, standard deviations, and 




choices and expectations for all tasks. Comparing expectations with actual choices, we 
see that despite variations in giving across treatments, expectations hover right around 50 
tokens. The exception is treatment two; recipients on average expected more than half of 
the pie in that treatment. In all treatments expectations exceeded actual giving, especially 
in the case where both players are exposed to risk and giving decreases so much. These 
results appear to suggest that either recipients did not identify with the givers or that in 
the absence of incentive compatibility recipients put little effort into understanding the 
difference between the tasks. Lastly, the fact that recipients would settle on the 50/50 
allocation as a default is evidence of the strength of the 50/50 norm in the non-student 
population.  
4.6. Discussion and conclusions 
Many recent theories attempt to explain behavior in laboratory and field experiments by 
modeling some sort of social preferences. Giving in dictator, ultimatum, gift exchange, 
public good, and many other games has been rationalized using preference structures that 
allow for motivations other than selfishness, such as inequality aversion, concerns for 
efficiency, or consideration of lowest payoffs. It remained an open question, however, 
how such “social” behavior extended to situations that involve risk and how the theories 
can be extended. This chapter provides compelling evidence on various dimensions of 
this issue.  
In particular, we address the issue of whether social preferences are based on 
comparisons of final (ex post) payoffs or on comparisons of ex ante chances. By 




to risk, we differentiate between these two preference structures. We find that the 
behavior in a standard dictator game serves as a good predictor for social preferences 
under risk, but that this predictive power is diminished among clinicians when risk is 
shared. Thus, while the behavior of a substantial fraction of student subjects is consistent 
with dictators comparing ex ante chances, rather than ex post payoff, results suggest the 
opposite for clinicians. Our experimental treatments for the risk allocation and risk 
sharing experiments allow us to differentiate between the ex post and ex ante 
formulations and to lend insights into their structure, but they do not allow us to 
determine why these two populations might behave differently in the laboratory in the 
presence of risk. As we develop these results further, we may consider if there is a model 
that incorporates both types of behavior.  
Our study clearly can only provide a first step towards a better understanding of giving 
decisions under risk that affect other subjects than the decision-maker. For example, 
while we fixed the attainable payoff levels in the lottery situations, it appears worthwhile 
to explore how downside versus upside risk affects behavior or how the availability of 
insurance options changes transfer decisions. Also, it remains an open question whether 
differences in expected value between players impacts generosity. We leave those 
questions to future research.  
Nonetheless, our findings have widespread policy implications, with applications in fields 
ranging from charitable giving to healthcare to environmental conservation. Donations to 
charitable organizations must be made based on beliefs about how the money is used and 
if the financed projects are successful. Physicians make efforts to increase the chances of 




these efforts. Environmental policies, such as those aimed at climate change, regularly 
require costly actions whose benefits are uncertain and might accrue to someone other 
than the decision maker. In the case of climate policy, current generations decide on 
costly abatement of greenhouse gas emissions, while the potential benefits from reduced 
climate change are uncertain and will be experienced by future generations. Our results 
indicate how such uncertainties may affect the willingness of people to give up 
consumption in order to benefit others.  
In summary, our work complements the literature on social preferences for risk by 
looking at how dictators’ giving varies when the outcome for the recipient is uncertain. 
We fill in the gap in knowledge about the degree to which the dictator is willing to 
surrender his or her own wealth or chances to increase the chances of the recipient. 
Specifically, we ask if giving in non-risky situations is predictive of how dictators behave 
when risk is involved. We also ask: do dictators give as if they are considering ex post 
outcome inequality or ex ante equity of chances. We thus combine the two subjects: how 
risk impacts choices and whether decision makers consider procedural fairness or 
outcomes fairness differently when allocating resources. We believe that our series of 
dictator choices, where payoffs equal those in the standard dictator game in terms of 




4.7. Tables and figures 
Table 4.1. Summary of tasks 
Task Payoff for The dictator (ECU) Payoff for Recipient (ECU) 
T1   
T2  0 or 100 determined by a lottery with chances of winning  
T3  0 or 50 determined by a lottery with chances of winning  
T4 
0 or 100 determined by a shared 
lottery, chance of winning 
 
0 or 100 determined by a shared 
lottery, chance of winning  
T5 
0 or 100 determined by an 
independent lottery, chance of 
winning  
0 or 100 determined by an 
independent lottery, chance of 
winning  
T6 
50/50 gamble between  and 
 determined by an 
independent lottery 
50/50 gamble between  
and  determined by an 
independent lottery 
 
























T1 76 21.08 27.45 38 17 50% 22% 
T2 76 15.57 20.13 37 9 49% 12% 
T3 76 15.44 17.67 30 9 39% 12% 
T4 76 18.24 27.12 43 12 57% 16% 
T5 76 16.30 21.74 41 12 54% 16% 






























T1 76 21.43 23.80 32 18 42% 24% 
T2 76 21.25 26.77 32 11 42% 14% 
T3 76 23.51 20.74 20 17 26% 22% 
T4 76 15.74 23.01 44 10 58% 13% 
T5 76 22.72 23.06 29 17 38% 22% 
T6 76 65.91 28.91 2 26 3% 34% 
 















T1 38 42.16 24.79 45% 45% 
T2 39 30.33 18.44 23% 72% 
T3 46 25.52 16.06 20% 80% 
T4 33 42.00 26.36 36% 45% 
T5 35 35.40 18.62 34% 57% 
T6 64 57.19 28.62 27% 34% 
* All subjects who give positive amounts in tasks 1-5 also give positive amounts in task6.   
Table 4.5. Differences in average tokens given, conditional on TG>0 






















4    
3.63 
(27) 
Sample size for each comparison in brackets. Differences tested with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.  






Table 4.6. Differences in average tokens given, unconditional (N=76) 
Task 2 3 4 5 
1 5.51** 5.63* 2.84 4.78 
2  0.12 -2.67 -0.74 
3   -2.79 -0.86 
4    1.93 
Differences tested with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.  
*** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 
Table 4.7. Tobit regression of choices in tasks on dictator game decisions, with 
cluster robust standard errors, full data set 










































R-squared 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.004 






Table 4.8. Tobit regression of choice sin tasks on dictator game decisions, with 
cluster robust standard errors, conditional on giving in at least one task  










































R-squared 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 






Table 4.9. Tobit regression of choices in tasks on dictator game decisions, with 
cluster robust standard errors, conditional on Task1>0 













































49% 39% 57% 54% 22% 18% 
Standard errors in brackets. *** (**) indicates significance at 1% (5%) level. 
Table 4.10. Linear regression of choices in tasks on dictator game decisions, with 
cluster robust errors, conditional on Task1>0 and Taski>0 
 Dependent Variable 
 Tokens Given in T2 
Tokens 
Given in T3 
Tokens 
Given in T4 
Tokens 
Given in T5 
Tokens 

















R-squared 0.35 0.02 0.39 0.08 





Table 4.11. (selfish binary) Tobit regression of choices in tasks on dictator game 
decisions, with cluster robust standard errors 









































R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.001 






Table 4.12. Maximum likelihood estimates with random effects (column 1); Probit 
models (columns 2-4) on dictators; choices of the difference tasks (baseline is 
dictator game T1) 


















































































Figure 4.1. Average tokens given by task 
 






Figure 4.3. Average tokens given, conditional on giving greater than zero 
 






Figure 4.5. Tokens given by treatment, Tanzanian clinicians (bin labels are the 
lower bound of bin contents). 
 
 




































28.53 26.63 50 20,50 2% 75% 13% 10% 













































50.39 26.57 50 0% 45% 25% 30% 
The number of recipient subjects is 69. 
 
Table 4.15. Difference in tokens given, Tanzanian sample 
















  -11.21*** (0.001) 
Differences in means tested with Wilcoxon signed rank tests.  






Table 4.16. Regressions of choices in tasks on dictator game decisions 
Dependent Variable -- Tokens Given to Partner     
Treatment Risk allocation (T2/T2T) Risk sharing (T4/T4T) 







Tokens Given in T1 0.79*** 0.71*** 0.23 0.85*** 
  (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.23) 
Constant 12.34** -11.04** 20.58 -23.73*** 
  (6.04) (4.86) (6.55) (8.96) 
     
 R-Squared 0.28 0.07 0.01 0.04 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 
Table 4.17. Maximum likelihood estimates of treatment effects, probits of dictator 
type on dictators' choices for the different tasks, Tanzanian sample 
 

































Baseline is Treatment 1, the standard dictator game 






Table 4.18. Linear maximum likelihood estimates of treatment effects; dependent 




































Clinician Income   -2.46 (2.43) 
-5.27* 
(3.09) 
Clinician Age    0.51 (0.35) 


















R2 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 
Baseline is Treatment 1, the standard dictator game 












Chapter 5 : Pride and Social Identity Based Social Preferences 
 
5.1. Introduction 
While some people behave generously regardless of the attributes of others, pride and 
knowledge about the recipient characteristics may also motivate altruistic behavior 
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008, hereafter referred to as EJ). This is particularly 
relevant in the healthcare setting, where doctors’ own self-perception and the opinion of 
patients and peers may influence the quality of care doctors provide. In this chapter we 
explore the role of social information and pride in determining pro-social behavior. We 
ask: Does pride change patterns of generosity? How does the response to being chosen 
differ from simply knowing something about one’s partner? We find that pride impacts 
decision making and that providing information about one’s partner reduces selfishness. 
While previous research has considered the role of partner identity for student samples, it 
has not been widely investigated among non-student samples. The pride results are the 
first that we know of addressing that research question. Together these results shed light 
onto a new aspect of altruism in the workplace in general, and among clinicians in 
particular. 
In this chapter we present results from laboratory experiments that study the role of social 
information and pride in altruism. We discuss results from a pilot implementation and an 
implementation with Tanzanian clinicians. The pilot implementation was with a sample 
from the general public at a university-wide event (on the UMD campus). The 




altruism, with the same clinicians. This took place in Arusha, Tanzania. The goal of the 
pilot was to test the payoff structure, the effectiveness of the experimental design and the 
logistics of implementation. From the pilot, we learned that the standard dictator game, 
with a continuous payoff structure, would be more advantageous than the discrete choice 
payoff structure of the trust game, which was used in the pilot. We also worked out the 
details of implementing the pride treatment without computers, the details of which are 
covered in this chapter. The sample size of the pilot bars more than a basic analysis, and 
we focus most of our attention in this chapter on results form the Tanzanian 
implementation.  
We motivate these treatments with a discussion of the literature on social context and 
altruism. It has been shown that people respond to reduced partner anonymity when it 
comes to social preferences. Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Eckel and Grossman (1996), 
among others, find that knowing more about a partner in the laboratory increases giving 
in the dictator game. Further, EJ theorize that pride may motivate us to behave more pro-
socially, with pride being dependent on co-partner similarity. There is also evidence to 
this effect showing that doctors, specifically, alter their effort at work in order to gain 
peer esteem (Leonard and Masatu, 2006). That a clinician offers more effort for a patient 
when he is being observed by a peer suggests that the peer’s esteem motivates increased 
utility from increased effort, as in EJ’s theory. In that theory, decision makers gain utility 
from altruistic acts toward or performed in front of others who are like them, thus 
increasing the pride they feel from the action. An extension of this idea is that individuals 




considers the possibility that patient esteem is important for clinician effort choices and 
that knowledge of patient identities impact the salience of that esteem. 
Group and individual identity are known to be important contributors to economic 
behavior. Identity affects how people behave in various settings, including professionally 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Akerlof and Kranton, 2008). Abundant evidence of type-
based discrimination in economic transactions reveals the importance of observable 
characteristics in how different groups are treated (e.g. Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; 
Becker, 1971; Das and Sohnesen, 2007). Altruism is also found to be contingent on 
recipient characteristics (Eckel, 2007; List, 2004). Notably, Bohnet and Frey (1999) 
investigate how being able to see your partner changes giving patterns. They find that 
visual identification of partners increases giving in dictator games, but only if it is two-
way or accompanied by additional personal information, such as hobbies. Their results 
are evidence that knowing who one’s partner is, beyond what is observable, matters for 
altruism. They do not test the importance of any specific set of characteristics, but rather 
focus on the visual identification impact. Eckel and Grossman (1996) evaluate how a 
specific attribute, deservedness of recipient, changes giving patterns. Their dictators give 
more frequently and are more likely to give large amounts (as much as their entire 
endowment) when a charitable organization is the recipient than when the recipient is an 
anonymous student subject. Notably they use well-known organizations that most 
decision makers would be familiar with, rather than unknown organizations. Thus 
individual attributes do impact economic decision making, even when it is not in an 




Results in this vein are from samples drawn from rather homogeneous populations 
(university students). No study matches service providers with potential clients in the 
laboratory. Also, little research has addressed how recipient preferences and opinions 
impact dictator giving. Holm and Engseld do look at the partner preferences of recipients 
in an ultimatum game, but their design does not allow them to determine how proposers’ 
giving changed according to the recipients’ partner preferences. Moreover, the 
importance of pride has been overlooked in empirical work. It is clear that decision 
makers do respond to co-partner identity, but the relevant set of characteristics is not well 
established, the samples used thus far are limited and the passive role of the recipient is 
largely ignored. This chapter fills gaps in the literature by considering the role of pride in 
dictator decisions and extends the evidence on the importance of social identity to a 
sample of healthcare providers (i.e. non-student sample), mimicking the client-physician 
relationship in the laboratory. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we describe the pride and social information 
treatments, mentioned briefly in the introduction, in more detail. Then we report results 
from both the Maryland Day pilot and the Tanzanian implementation. A final section 
concludes. We include as an appendix to this chapter a model that aims to formalize the 
patterns of behavior we observed in the laboratory with respect to social information and 
pride. The model is based on the EJ theory. It is cast in the framework of clinician 
decision making, where social similarity between clinician and patient plays a key role. 
This is followed by a discussion of some suggestive results on the importance of social 





5.3. The Experiment 
We use basic allocation choice experiments (i.e. trust game and dictator game) to explore 
the importance of pride and social information in individual generosity. While there are 
slight differences between the pilot of the experiments and the Tanzanian 
implementation, the basic set-up is that in one treatment (T2) dictators (P1) know the 
demographic characteristics of their randomly matched partner (P2) and in another 
treatment (T3) the P2 players chose their P1 partners based on P1’s demographic 
information. Information here includes age, sex, income, years of education, region of 
birth and area of work for the pilot sample. For the Tanzanian sample we collected 
information on tribe instead of region of birth. Both implementations include a context-
free standard dictator game to measure baseline levels of altruism (T1). For T2, the 
dictators review the information and make their allocation choice.  
The final treatment, T3, tests the impact of pride on giving. In this treatment we allow 
non-clinician subjects to choose their partner based on the others’ characteristics. The 
characteristics the receiver sees are partner age, sex, income, education and tribe. In T3, 
we give information about at least two P1 players to each of the recipients. Recipients 
review the information on possible P1 partners and rank the potential partners according 
to preference. We then match each P2 with either their first or second choice P1 player. 
Knowing that they are chosen thus, P1’s make the allocation choice. We assume that the 
partner that has been chosen experiences a positive feeling associated with being chosen. 




treatment the identity of the P2’s remains anonymous. P1’s simply know that the partner 
has chosen them and that the recipient knew their characteristics when making that 
choice. In this way we induce in the decision makers a feeling of being esteemed for who 
they are. Results from this treatment reveal if invoking pride changes the nature of the 
social preferences. 
Comparing how the allocation choice changes from one treatment to the next reveals how 
pride and social identity may impact individual generosity. More importantly, since this 
is a within design we are able to compare the relative strength of pride and social 
information at induce changes in giving within individuals. We compare each treatment 
to a context-free baseline to determine the impact of social information and pride on 
allocation decisions. Given past research we expect people to give more in the social 
information treatment. There are no similar experiments that test hypotheses about pride, 
but based on the EJ theory discussed above we predict giving to also increase under the 
pride treatment. We do expect P1’s to respond to being chosen and that there will be 
more dictators choosing the fair allocation than in the baseline treatment.  
To summarize, the aim of the experiment is threefold: to determine if a clinician exhibits 
pro-social behavior toward (potential) patients in a lab; to establish the result that 
knowledge of partner identity increases giving in this sample; and to reveal whether 
induced pride changes the clinicians’ degrees of pro-social behavior. In Chapters 6 and 7, 
we combine data on clinicians’ types, as measured in the laboratory, with field data on 
subjects’ actual workplace effort to determine the extent to which social preferences 




results of the Maryland Day pilot. We then present the details and results from the 
Tanzanian implementation. The final section concludes the chapter. 
5.4. Maryland Day pilot implementation: General public 
The experiments in the Maryland Day pilot study were modified involuntary trust games 
(ITG) McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003), where subjects were asked to choose between 
two different token allocation options for splitting up a token endowment between 
themselves and a partner. In the involuntary trust game a decision maker (P1) must 
decide between two allocation options to distribute an endowment between himself and 
an anonymous partner (P2). It is different from the voluntary trust game (VTG) in that 
the recipient partner is completely passive; in the VTG P2 makes the first move of 
whether or not to trust his partner, P1. If P2 decides to trust, P1 makes the final 
allocation decision. If P2 decides not to trust, a default allocation obtains. Since P2 is 
passive in the ITG the only decision in the game is made by P1, and P1 makes that 
choice absent any norms of reciprocity that might be factors in VTG decision-making. 
Aside from the importance of the choice to trust or not trust, the game’s other 
distinguishing feature is the pay-off structure. As in McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) 
decision makers in our experiment chose between an option where both players get 25 
tokens and an alterative option where the decision maker gets 30 tokens and their 
partner gets 15. Note that the fair option, where both players get 25 tokens, is also the 
socially efficient optimum. This means that preferences for fairness, efficiency or both 
may motivate a decision maker to choose that option. In other words, the design tests for 




preferences. This ITG treatment acts as a baseline in the experiment. Subsequent 
treatments are variations on this standard game, as described above.  
Pilot treatments were run from 10am to 2pm on April 24, 2010 at Maryland Day on the 
University of Maryland campus. Maryland Day is an annual festival-like event hosted by 
the University of Maryland. The event attracts people of all ages and family situations 
from among the student body and the surrounding communities. The event is set up like a 
fair, with booths featuring different groups and departments on campus. All attractions 
are outdoors; this included the pilot implementation. Given this format, the over-riding 
expectation of attendees is to browse the booths without spending too much time at any 
one place. The upshot of this is that each session run with attendees consisted of only one 
of the three treatments described above. All comparisons between treatments are thus 
between comparisons. While between comparisons are not as ideal as within 
comparisons, the results from the pilot nonetheless point to important patterns that we 
explore further in the within design of the full implementation (described below). 
Sessions/treatments were run sequentially and each session lasted roughly 15 minutes. 
Signs and flyers advertising the event helps draw participants, as did members of our 
team who went up to individuals passing by to invite them to participate. Participation 
was voluntary, so we expect a selection bias. Despite the limitations of running the pilot 
at the Maryland Day event, it gives us insight into how to run the experiments in 
Tanzania with a non-student sample. 
Based on the literature, we expect that decision makers in T2 will be more likely to 
choose the fair allocation than in T1, even though P1 is not subject to reciprocity norms 




decision maker to recall social norms that dictate greater generosity when there is a 
“human face” for the recipient. The second variation, called the pride treatment, allows 
P2 to choose their P1 partners. If being chosen is salient for the decision makers, we 
expect higher giving in T3 than in T1. In line with McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) we 
estimate that at least one third of decision makers will choose the fair allocation. Thus we 
predict that priming of social norms (T2) and inducing pride (T3) will decrease the 
number of participants choosing the selfish (but not purely selfish) allocation option.  
Each player’s own characteristics represented their identity to the other players for the 
pride and social information treatments. We used a form to collect data on the subjects’ 
actual age, sex, income, education level, region of birth and area of work. Participants 
filled out the form at the start of each session for treatments 2 and 3. In order to avoid 
introducing unnecessary bias in the baseline, the form was filled out at the conclusion of 
the session for treatment one.11 A copy of the form used to collect these data is included 
in the Appendix of the dissertation. The information was not sufficient for anyone to 
identify who their partner was. The subjects in the Maryland sample were diverse, with 
an age range of 18 to 76 years and incomes from $0 (students) to $200,000 per year. 
Subjects included students, families, seniors and younger single people. No one under 18 
was permitted to participate. Table 5.1, Table 5.2, and Table 5.3 summarize the 
participants’ characteristics. 
Subjects completed consent forms and we read instructions out loud at the start of all 
treatments. They also received a printed copy of the instructions so that they could read 
                                                
11 Due to participants being in a hurry, combined with experimenter error, many treatment one subjects 
ended up leaving the booth without completing the characteristics form. Since the full implementation was 




as we read aloud. Dictators and receivers were already separated at this point. For 
treatment 1 (T1) we followed directly with the decision task. Dictators received a 
decision task form with a summary of the decision task and a place for them to record 
their allocation choice. Recipients received a similar form that also described the decision 
task, but their job was to report what they expected their partners to decide. The recipient 
task was included to avoid boredom and the task was not incentive compatible. 
Participants recorded all decisions (expectations) using paper and pencil. This was the 
most effective way to accommodate the outdoor setting and also to mimic the situation 
we would face in Tanzanian/full implementation, absent the typical computer resources 
available for laboratory experiments.  
In order to preserve anonymity between subjects, we did not allow them to mingle before 
the experiment. If a family participated we tried to assign all family members to be either 
P1 or P2 players, rather than distributing them across player types. While this could lead 
to bias in that some families might be more or less selfish (i.e. a shift in generosity 
compared to average), it was more important to ensure that the giving patterns could not 
be confounded by relationships within a family. Aside from not allowing family members 
to be matched with each other, assignment to be P1 or P2 was done on a first come first 
serve basis, alternating assignment into each group. The number of participants in each 
session was under 10 and so distributing people in this way did not require any 
sophisticated procedure. Using multivariate ANOVA we reject the hypothesis that 
subjects are randomly distributed according to age, sex, income and years of education 
between player types at a 3% level of significance. Inspection of the summary statistics 




This difference is driven by four subjects over the age of 60 in the P2 group; there are no 
players above 60 in the P1 group and below age 60 the age distributions are similar. 
Removing age from the MANOVA procedure we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
subjects are randomly distributed according to characteristics between player types. 
At the end of each session we collected the decision sheets and distributed cards with IDs 
printed on them according to the ID number on each person’s decision sheet. Winnings 
were determined in private and we called participants up by ID number to distribute 
winnings to each participant according to the partner pairing and allocation choices. 
Partner pairing in T1 and T2 was random. Since the experiment was done without the use 
of computers, the random matching was done in advance according to a set of experiment 
ID codes. Codes were preprinted on all decision sheets so that upon collecting the sheets 
the proctor would be able to easily determine who was matched with whom. In T3 the 
recipients chose their partners. A similar technique of pre-coding was used but it did not 
involve setting up the matching before hand. 
Payoff options in the game were in experimental currency units (ECUs). Subjects 
received the show-up fee and their experimental earnings in lottery tickets rather than 
cash.12 For every 10 ECU earned they received 1 lottery ticket. The show-up fee was 2 
lottery tickets. Including the show-up fee, participants each earned 5 lottery tickets on 
average. Subjects learned the translation of ECUs to lottery tickets in the instructions that 
we read at the beginning of each session. The lottery tickets represented chances to win a 
3rd generation iPod shuffle, an item with a retail value of approximately $55. A lottery 
was drawn at the end of the session to select a session winner. We collected winner 
                                                




contact information from each session winner and at the end of the day held a grand prize 
drawing. The winner from each session was represented in this grand prize drawing with 
one ticket. Three winners were selected from this final lottery. Winners received an iPod 
shuffle, which we mailed to them.  
The tickets were double raffle tickets. Each participant received one side of each of their 
raffle tickets and the other side they put into a large paper bag. After all tickets were 
distributed for that session, and the corresponding pairs collected in the paper bag, the 
bag was shuffled and one of the participants was recruited to draw the winning ticket out 
of the bag, which we announced out loud to the group. Participants were then dismissed. 
The person with the winning ticket met with the proctor before leaving the experiment 
area and the proctor recorded their name and phone number. We discarded all tickets 
form that session except the winning ticket, which went into a separate bag reserved for 
the final lottery. At the end of the day we drew the final three winners from the bag of 
session-winning tickets. 
The pilot results show some interesting patterns, though the sample size in each treatment 
was small and significance is low. Nonetheless, the patterns are in line with the literature 
and informative of potential trends that we discuss in more detail with the data from the 
full implementation. Half of the decision makers choose the fair allocation in the baseline 
treatments (ITG with no embellishments) – our participants prove to be less selfish than 
the sample of university students in McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003), 1/3 of whom 
chose the fair options in the ITG. Meanwhile 58% and 63% chose the fair allocation in 
T2 and T3 respectively. Thus it appears that simply providing the social information does 




for the dictator game among student samples in Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Eckel and 
Grossman (1996). Inducing pride also increases generosity by 13% among decision 
makers. But an unpaired t-test reveals that the difference in giving between the pride 
treatment and the baseline treatment is not significant at conventional levels. Recipient 
expectations of generosity also were higher in T2 and T3, though notably more people 
expected to receive the fair allocation in T2 than in T3. In fact, recipients in the social 
information treatment were much more likely to expect the fair, welfare maximizing 
allocation then recipients in other treatments. There is less than 1% significance for 
T1<T2 and 2% significance for T3<T2. T1 is not found to be different from T3. We 
tested each of these relationships using unpaired t-tests. Results are reported in Table 5.5. 
This is the opposite of the pattern between treatments among decision makers, implying 
that recipients underestimated the influence of being chosen on selfishness. Looking at 
giving by demographic characteristics we find two strong results: (1) across all 
treatments, more educated decision makers are 35% more likely to choose the selfish 
allocation (11% significance) and (2) older decision makers are 2% more likely to choose 
the fair allocation (10% significance). A multivariate analysis of variance confirms no 
pattern to assignment among treatments based on observables. We conclude that the 
patterns in giving by demographic characteristic are not being driven by unequal 
assignment of certain types of people to the different treatments. But since subjects are 
not randomly distributed by age to player types, it is possible that the older people who 
are more generous may be driving the (insignificant) pattern of higher generosity in 
certain treatments. Indeed, the 2 of the 4 people over 60 years old are P2 subjects in T2 




people choosing the fair allocation in both T2 and T3 is exactly 2 greater than the number 
of people choosing the selfish option. Hence, it may be that the skewed age distribution is 
responsible for what appear to be treatment effects. This issue will can be addressed in 
the future implementations by carrying out a within design rather than a between design.  
All in all the pilot was successful in shedding light on effects of pride and social identity 
on altruism and in revealing weaknesses in the experimental design. Net the lack of 
significance for some results, we interpret our outcomes as supporting the general 
hypotheses of the value of social information and pride in motivating pro-social behavior. 
Drawbacks to this pilot that were addressed in the Tanzanian implementation include the 
small sample size, the between nature of the design and the discrete payoff structure. We 
follow-up on these results and address the weaknesses in the design in the full 
implementation discussion that follows. 
5.5. Full implementation: Tanzanian clinicians 
Clinicians in Tanzania constitute an ideal subject pool for this investigation because of 
the existing body of literature on this group and because of the importance of 
understanding motivations of this group. Poor overall quality of the health care systems 
in many developing countries is often attributed, at least in part, to under qualification of 
the health workers. There is evidence, however, that even given low levels of education 
and experience, health workers underperform relative to their already low ability in 
outpatient consultations (Leonard and Masatu, 2005; Leonard and Masatu, 2007). We 
also know that clinicians in Tanzania try to “buy” approval from their peers with 




that the esteem-seeking behavior seen in response to the presence of other clinicians may 
occur to some degree with patients. And while fellow clinicians are of similar social 
status as the clinician being observed, the attributes of patients are highly varied. Hence, 
in determining how much effort to exert for any given patient, the clinician is responding 
to various factors: how responsive he is to the patient’s esteem of him, whether the 
patient’s identity matters to him (differentially from the illness) and his own innate 
preference for fairness or identifying with the profession’s value of service to others. 
Thus the clinician sample is well suited to studying the role of pride and social 
information in altruism. The succeeding discussion first details the differences between 
the pilot and the Tanzanian implementation and then covers the results of the Tanzanian 
implementation. 
The structure of the experiments that we ran in Tanzania was similar to the Maryland 
Day pilot, with a few exceptions. First, the baseline game was the standard dictator game, 
rather than the involuntary trust game (ITG). The difference between these two games is 
that the ITG presents participants with two alterative discrete payoffs to choose from, 
whereas the choice is continuous in the dictator game. We made this change in order to 
better capture nuances in selfish and generous behavior, beyond the switching between 
selfish and fair observed in the pilot. Second, in the Tanzania experiments, payoffs were 
in terms of local currency, Tanzanian shillings, Tshs. Participants received 150 Tshs for 
every token earned in a randomly selected payment round. The maximum possible 
earnings from any of the rounds, 15,000 Tshs, was equal to about three day’s of work for 
non-clinicians reporting the median income and three day’s work or less for clinician 




day. Third, all the participants played all the different treatments in the Tanzania 
implementation, allowing for within comparisons and more extensive analysis on the 
interaction of pride and social information responsiveness. The other advantage of the 
between design is the additional statistical power we get from a similar sample size (67 
clinicians participated in the experiment, compared with 52 subjects on Maryland Day). 
We also made sure to have a larger sample size. Fourth, since we were able to bring the 
clinician subjects into a classroom we were better able to preserve anonymity, as 
clinicians and their non-clinician partners never came into contact and were only able to 
see each other from a distance.13 Lastly, the clinicians did two additional treatments 
beyond what was piloted at Maryland Day. These additional treatments were piloted 
separately and we discuss that pilot and the results from the clinicians in Chapter 4.  
To clarify the difference in the payoff structure, the experiments were modified dictator 
games, where subjects were asked to allocate 100 tokens between themselves and a 
partner. As in the pilot, in one treatment (T2) dictators (P1) knew the demographic 
characteristics of their randomly matched partner (P2) and in another treatment the P2 
players chose their P1 partners based on P1’s demographic information. Treatment 1 
(T1), the experimental control, was a standard dictator game. Partners P1 and P2 were 
assigned randomly. P1 decided on an amount to give P2. We expect to see conventional 
results for this type of game, with substantial portion of the population giving selfish 
amounts, and another pooling of giving at the 50/50 split. In treatment 2 (T2), P1 and P2 
are again randomly assigned. Characteristics of P2 were revealed to their P1 partner. This 
                                                
13 Allowing clinicians and non-clinicians to see each other from a distance was an important step in 
establishing with the subjects that their partners were real and that they were from a certain sector of the 




treatment mimics the daily situation of receiving a patient. Information available to 
dictators in T2 included the sex, age, education, income, area of work and tribe of their 
partner. P1 decided on an amount to give P2 based on the characteristics of the other. We 
expect that both the dictator’s own attributes and those of their partner may impact giving 
decisions. Informed by the pilot as well as previous studies showing the importance of 
social identity in motivating pro-social behavior, we hypothesize that a clinician will 
behave likewise and increase giving in the presence of social information. T3 was as in 
the pilot, with recipients choosing partners based on their characteristics. P1 then makes 
the (continuous) allocation choice knowing they have been chosen based on their 
characterisitcs. Given the results from our pilot we expect that inducing pride will 
increase giving compared to the baseline and that clinicians will be more likely to choose 
the fair allocation in this treatment than in the baseline and in the social information 
treatment.  
The experiment allows us to answer: if you choose me from among a group with diverse 
characteristics do I give more money? Do I give you more money if I know something 
about you, than if I do not know? If knowledge of another’s characteristics promotes 
greater amounts of sharing, we can conclude that these clinicians resemble other 
populations that responded to decreased anonymity in the laboratory. We can also 
explore the implications that this social attitude has on workplace effort. If they increase 
their giving when another player chooses them, we can conclude that the feeling induced 
by being chosen impacts the expression of a clinician’s social preferences, as would be 





5.5.1. Main results 
Recall that the contribution of the experiments is three-fold: 1) to test a new treatment 
with induced pride and compare the relative importance of pride with social information, 
2) to compare this population (professionals with non-professional partners) to others 
(university students) using the dictator game and the dictator game with social 
information, and 3) to generate measures of social attitudes in the presence of social 
information and pride for use in the analysis of the field data. Table 5.7 presents a 
summary of giving across treatments. Overall, we see that increased personal information 
about recipients induces more giving than in the baseline. This is consistent with previous 
findings discussed above. Also, when compared with baseline, instilling pride in givers 
increases giving. Differences between T1 and T2 averages and T1 and T3 averages are 
significant at the 5% level using Wilcoxon signed-rank test14. Average tokens given in T2 
is also greater than in T3, but the difference is not significant. Results from these tests are 
presented in Table 5.9. While both pride and social information increase giving relative 
to the baseline, exposure to partners’ personal information elicits more generosity than 
instilling pride in the giver. Furthermore, those who do not respond to decreased partner 
anonymity are less responsive to induced pride; we cannot reject equality of the 
underlying distributions of giving in T1 and T3 in the sample of those who do not 
respond to T2 with increased giving. Conversely, those who do respond to decreased 
anonymity are also much more likely to respond to pride (we reject equality of T1 and T3 
giving at p<0.001 using a Wilcoxon signed rank test).  
                                                
14 Figure 2 suggests that the results are not distributed normally and rather are right skewed with a heavy 





Even with the standard dictator game resulting in nearly 30% of subjects choosing the 
fair allocation, subjects did not remain fixed at that level of giving across treatments. 
Unexpected is that the percentage of dictators choosing the fair allocation goes down 
from T1 to T2 in part because subjects act with more generosity in T2; subjects who start 
off at the fair allocation who want to increase giving in response to the partner 
information actually do allocate more to their partner than themselves rather than remain 
at the 50/50 allocation. Giving greater than 50% of the endowment is unusual in dictator 
games and it is suggestive of people being unfamiliar with the game setting such that 
their baseline giving is high. Also, in the pride treatment dictators continue to allocate 
more than 50 tokens, with many moving from below 50 to the fair allocation. Thus 
although the fair allocation is prominently represented, giving varies quite a bit from 
treatment to treatment.  
Adjusting for unconventionally low levels of selfish behavior, we still find evidence that 
distributions of giving vary from treatment to treatment. The paucity of zeros (Table 
5.10) in all treatments is not a surprise in the context of this sample. Tanzanian culture is 
focused on being polite, which invariably biases experiment and survey responses 
upward (Henrich et al., 2001; K. L. Leonard, 2008). It also potentially speaks to the limits 
of running lab-style experiments in this setting. While we did ensure that decisions were 
anonymous, limits of space meant that decision makers were seated somewhat close 
together and decisions had to be written down on a piece of paper rather than typed into a 
computer. Thus dictators may have felt that their decisions could be seen by peers sitting 
near-by. As such the within results are much more meaningful than the between results 




not use a double blind experimental design, we did not expect many purely selfish 
decisions.15 If we consider amounts given of 10 tokens or less as the selfish choice, 
percent of selfish decision by treatment goes up to 21%, 18% and 21%, respectively, 
which is close to commonly reported patterns of giving in dictator games. Notable, 
however, is that the number of purely selfish decisions decreases form treatment to 
treatment, while percent giving 10 or fever tokens remains relatively constant. 
Distributions of giving in this “selfish range” are reported in Table 5.10. Together with 
the overall difference in means, this suggests that the distribution of giving is shifting 
between treatments.  
Frequency distributions of giving in the three treatments are presented in Figure 5.2. 
Tokens given results in T1 and T3 have bimodal distributions. Secondary peaks are at 10 
tokens given, further suggesting that there are two primary types in this population: those 
that give 10 and those that give 50. T2 does not appear to have a secondary peak, 
suggesting a continuum of types in terms of response to social information. While the 
distribution of giving for T2 is somewhat similar to that of T1 and T3, T2 has fever 
subjects choosing the equal allocation and at least 10% more players giving over 50% of 
the endowment, which contributes substantially to pushing the T2 mean higher than the 
other two treatments.  
Ordinary least squares with treatment dummies reveals that giving in both T2 and T3 is 
substantially higher than in T1 (Table 5.11). Additional regression results show that 
subjects are no less likely to make a selfish choice in the social distance/social 
                                                
15 While ideal for cross study comparisons, the double blind design was not practical in this setting. The 
game procedures needed to be as simple as possible since the subjects are quite unfamiliar with the concept 




information treatment. Selfish here is defined as fewer than 10 tokens to one’s partner, to 
correct for the upward bias in the sample. Generosity, defined as giving more than 50% 
of the endowment to one’s partner, is prevalent and more likely in T2 and T3 than in T1. 
Finally, and most compellingly, pride may influence subjects’ likelihood of giving the 
fair amount (p = 0.106); the same is not true for social information. This result is, 
however, very sensitive to how we define fair giving. For example, if we restrict the 
definition of fair to those who give 50% the coefficient on the pride treatment is no 
longer significant. Nonetheless, this is an interesting result because while pride does not 
increase average giving over social information, it may increase fair giving. This may be 
because being chosen by one’s partner takes the charity aspect away from the allocation 
task and brings it more into the realm of sharing with an active partner – decision makers 
are free of the social influence that may encourage generosity to strangers. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we looked at two factors that may play a role in the expression of altruism 
in the workplace: social identity and pride. We studied two samples: general public 
participants at a fair-like event at the University of Maryland and medical clinicians in 
Arusha, Tanzania. Past research suggests that social identity influences generosity among 
university students, but is silent about the impact of pride. We had no reason to suspect 
that social identity results would differ in our samples and indeed we found that dictators 
tended to give more when we provided them with socio-demographic information about 
their partners. Among the clinicians, social information significantly increases the 
likelihood of a generous allocation compared to the standard dictator game. But it does 




sample social information also motivated increased generosity, but results are not 
significant, which we attribute to the small sample size. The most novel result we present 
is that inducing pride does increase average giving, even when the dictator knows nothing 
about their partner. Notably, induced pride appears to encourage more participants (in 
either sample) to revert to giving 50-55 tokens than the presence of social information.  
Results from the pride treatments are suggestive of EJ’s theory of social preferences 
wherein the interaction of social identity and esteem motivate pro-social behavior. 
Interestingly, induced pride appears to be important even when the partners are of a lower 
socio-economic class, as in the experiments with the clinicians and “patients”. We 
juxtapose these laboratory results with the work of Leonard and Masatu (2006) showing 
clinicians’ response to peer esteem. Apparently clinicians are responsive to pride stimuli 
from both patients and peers, though it remains to be seen whether these sources of pride 
are complements or substitutes. Thus this research finds that patient esteem is important 
for clinician generosity in the laboratory.  
This chapter contributes to the literature with a novel experimental treatment testing the 
impact of pride, unique samples and approximations of real world relationships in the 
experimental design. We study both a general population sample (pilot) and a sample of 
clinicians (full implementation). In the full implementation the treatments mirrored the 
forces potentially influencing clinicians in their everyday workplace decisions. Our 
results both backup and build on existing findings. Further, our results speak to the 
accuracy of theoretical models that include individual heterogeneity of social preferences 




5.7. Tables and figures 
Table 5.1. Respondent characteristics, T2 and T3 (demographic data was not 
collected for T1) 
Characteristics Respondents Dictators 
N  23 23 
Sex     
  Male 8 9 
  Female 12 11 
Age     
  Mean 46.55 32.58 
  St. Dev. (17.58) (13.21) 
  Minimum 18 18 
  Maximum 76 59 
Education (years)    
  Mode 16 16 
  Minimum 12 11 
  Maximum 21+ 21+ 






$20,000) 20% 39% 
  Median $50,000 $75,000 
  Minimum $6,000 $8,000 
  Maximum $200,000 $150,000 
a Income is in US dollars reported by year. The mean, standard deviation, max and min 
do not include students because they heavily skew the distribution and make it more 
























12 50 (15.5) 
16 
(3.1) 42% $48,000 42% 
Recipient 8 41 (18.9) 
18 
(2.5) 88% $32,000 38% 
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8 41 (18.9) 
18 
(2.5) 88% $32,000 38% 























Giving      
Standard ITG (T1) 6 3 3 50% 50% 
ITG with 
Information (T2) 12 7 5 58% 42% 
ITG with Pride (T3) 8 5 3 63% 38% 
Recipient 
Expectations      
Standard ITG (T1) 6 1 5 17% 83% 
ITG with 
Information (T2) 12 10 2 83% 17% 
ITG with Pride (T3) 8 3 5 38% 63% 
 
Table 5.5. Differences in tokens given, UMD Maryland Day 
 Difference in Percentage Choosing Fair Allocation 


















  5% 
 - 46%** 
Differences in means tested with unpaired t-tests.  






Table 5.6. Participant characteristics, Tanzanian sample 
Characteristics Respondents Dictators 
N  69 68 
Sex     
  Male 31 47 
  Female 38 20 
Age     
  Mean 32.71 42.16 
  St. Dev. (10.74) (9.53) 
  Minimum 18 24 
  Maximum 66 65 
Education (years)    
  Mean 9.00 16.14 
  St. Dev. (2.98) (1.69) 
  Minimum 4 11 
  Maximum 19 22 
Income a     
  <100 47 0 
  100-200 13 4 
  201-300 1 12 
  301-400 2 23 
  401-500 0 11 
  >500 0 19 
a Income is thousands of Tanzanian shillings (Tshs) reported by month. $1USD is 











































68 39.34 23.48 50 2% 47% 34% 17% 
Mode is equal to 50 tokens given for all treatments. 
 






































69 48.91 22.23 50 0% 41% 29% 30% 





Table 5.9. Differences in tokens given, Tanzanian sample 
















  -2.50 (2.65) 
Differences in means tested with Wilcoxon signed rank tests.  
p-value in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
 
Table 5.10. Distribution of selfish giving, by treatment 






0 3 1 0 
1 to 9 3 4 7 
10 8 7 7 
0-10 14 12 14 
 






Figure 5.2. Frequency distribution of tokens given across treatments T1, T2 and T3 
 
 






Table 5.11. Maximum likelihood estimates of treatment effects with individual 
random effects (column 1) and probit models (columns 2-4) of dictators type on 
dictators' choices for the different tasks 
 
Linear Random 
Effects Model,  
Tokens Given (TG) 







































Baseline is Treatment 1, the standard dictator game 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 





Results from this chapter showed that social information and pride are meaningful social 
attitudes in evaluating variation in clinician effort. The idea for the experiment was 
heavily influenced by the EJ theory of esteem-based altruism. The main results of the 
chapter test hypotheses about presence of social information and pride. A related 
hypothesis is that the attributes of the patient relative to the clinician’s own attributes help 
to determine the clinician’s generosity in the laboratory. We refer to this as the “social 
distance” between the clinician and the patient. We also use the term “social similarity” 
interchangeably with “social distance”. In this appendix we develop a model to formalize 
some of the trends we see in the main results in the context of social distance. The model 
is an adaptation of the EJ model. The primary difference is that in this model social 
distance plays a central role in motivating responsiveness to pride and social information. 
The model suggests that the salience of another’s esteem is a function of the social 
distance between the giver and the receiver. In contrast, the EJ theory considers the 
similarity in altruistic posture between giver and receiver. In what follows we first 
motivate the case for social distance as a meaningful economic concept. We then present 
the model. Lastly, we present some suggestive results from the laboratory experiments. 
Note that the experiments were not designed to test the social distance hypothesis and any 
correlations between giving and social similarity are not statistically identified. 
Nonetheless, the trends are suggestive of the adapted EJ model. 
From the literature presented in the main body of this chapter and from our results we see 
that decision makers clearly care about the identity of others in economic interactions. 




impact of similarity between actors is mixed. When given the chance to choose partners, 
subjects show clear preferences and may even prefer to choose partners who are like 
them (Holm and Engseld, 2005). In the same study, however, giving levels or frequency 
did not change with partner similarity. (2009) considers the idea that like-prefers-like in 
terms of the professional peer group. He finds in-group behavior to be more generous 
than out-group behavior. Bergstressor’s results thus support the hypothesis that social 
distance in terms of group membership matters. Bohnet and Frey (1999) show that two-
way visual identification increases giving, but it is not clear whether that is because of 
shared characteristics between the co-partners or purely because partners were no longer 
anonymous. In their trust game experiments Eckel and Wilson (2003) find that decision 
makers are more likely to choose a trusting move when they are more similar to their 
partners. Similarity is measured according to sex, favorite color and hobbies. Yet they do 
not find sex of decision makers or partner’s sex to be significant in determining the 
probability of a trusting move. Hence while social distance does appear to impact 
generosity in the laboratory, the evidence is mixed and the dimensions along which it is 
most influential have not been identified. 
5.7.1. A Model of behavior for social preferences in clinician decision making 
The following model describes a 2-person game that potentially underlies the behavior in 
our experiments exploring pride and social information. We base the model on the real 
world interaction of a clinician (player 1) with their patient (player 2) so as to maintain 




Players are heterogeneous and we allow heterogeneity to be multidimensional along 
subject attitudes and characteristics. Attitudes and characteristics together make up a 






















# $ = %,&( ). 
! 
" is the set of all possible 
observable elements in the population and 
! 
" is the set of all possible unobservable 
elements. Player i can learn a player j’s observable (or self-reported private) attributes. 
Each player i estimates their partner’s true attribute set based on the other’s observable 




, such that 
! 
E " j[ ] = E # j | $ j[ ] .16 Players do not 
observe others’ attitudes ex ante; attitudes are revealed as a result of the interaction 
between partners. Players can easily modify behavior based on perceived partner attribute 
set, but attitudes are ex ante unobservable.   
In this study characteristics include age, sex, income and education. Attitudes encompass 




A . The model looks at how giving in a 
one-shot dictator game changes with the interaction of characteristic sets. This is a 
departure from EJ and BT; they define heterogeneity in terms of relative altruism or 
relative selfishness of the players. Players hold beliefs about others’ attribute sets and 
they assign probabilities to the chance that the other’s attribute set satisfies their 
expectations, as a function of observable characteristics. Players have no opportunity to 
update since each treatment is a one-shot game with a new partner. We do not include 
concern for the other in the players’ attribute sets. Characterizing players in this way 
                                                
16 Player i’s expectation of their partner’s true attribute set can also be based on player i’s own experience, 
! 
h , such that 
! 
E " j[ ] = E # j | $ j ,h [ ] . For example, suppose patient j is a mother. A clinician who has 
experience treating mothers may make assumptions about patient j’s unobservable characteristics based on 
what he has observed from other mothers. In this study we do not investigate the role of experience and 




assumes that “I care about the material gain of the other person because they are like me 
in some dimension”. This modification is in the spirit of EJ’s model, as in their model the 
individual is considered esteemed by other players who are of the same type. 




, and their partner’s material 
pay-off, 
! 
m j . Dictator preferences may also include a feeling of being esteemed by the 
partner (the patient, in this case), which we refer to as pride. Pride is 
! 
ˆ " ji . Thus the utility 
function of clinician i concerning interaction with patient j is  
! 
ui = mi + "i
A
m j +
ˆ " ji . 





<1. In EJ, pride is esteem from the partner weighted by the 
salience of a given patient’s esteem. Salience is a function of social distance. Smaller 
social distance makes that esteem more salient. We modify their pride concept slightly to 
better fit the doctor-patient context: we allow pride to have an intrinsic and an extrinsic 
component. Intrinsic pride, 
! 
p i , can be thought of as (fixed) base pride. It is the pride a 
clinician feels in his or her identity as a clinician, independent of anything he or she 
actually does and the patients he or she treats. Extrinsic pride, 
! 
pi , is variable and depends 
on the situation. It is the pride that a clinician gets from the interaction with the patient 
and the actions he or she performs as part of his or her job. Extrinsic pride is weighted by 
salience, 
! 






E[" j ], 
respectively. Social identities affect salience as a result of norms of behavior within 
groups (a clinician and his/her professional peers) and norms of behavior toward certain 





ˆ " ji = p i +# ji pi  
where 
! 
" ji # 0 and 
! 
" ji =" # i,E[# j ]( ). We do not specify a specific functional form for 
salience to keep the model generalizable. In this study, however, we do consider the 
specification that salience is a function of social distance, 
! 
" i # E[" j ]. Smaller social 
distance makes extrinsic pride more salient. The exception to this is when one party 
wants to impress another who is better than them in some way, such as a professional 
peer or a high status patient. In that case, a greater social distance may lead to much 
greater salience.  
Based primarily on the work of BT and EJ, this model helps to formalize some of the 
trends revealed in this study. It also sets the groundwork for further research. One area of 
future research that we explore in this appendix is the role of social distance in 
motivating increased altruism. While the experiment is not designed to identify this 
effect, we find some suggestive results on this hypothesis. 
Following from this model, we explore whether clinician behavior in the laboratory 
changes when a clinician shares a common characteristic with a patient. According to the 
theory, P1 should give higher amounts if they are more similar to their partner in terms of 
the known characteristics.  
5.7.2. Suggestive results on the social distance hypothesis 
One of the hypotheses that come out of the theory presented in this paper is that 
decreased social distance increases giving. While the experimental design does not aim to 




the issue. We first present results of average giving by social distance category: 
differences in age, sex, education and income between clinician and non-clinician 
partners. But social distance is not experimentally controlled and patterns of giving by 
social distance may be driven by the social distance itself, by the clinician’s own social 
reference group or by clinicians’ response to partner identity (independent of his own 
identity). Thus, we then break down the social distance results to consider differences in 
giving by clinician and non-clinician characteristics, independently. The results reported 
here are only form the clinician sample. The Maryland Day sample was not large enough 
to look at giving by characteristic in the social information treatment. 
We now turn to the outcomes from looking at similarity between partners. Comparing 
average giving between clinician dictators in T1 and T2 implies that social distance is 
important in determining giving behavior, but not necessarily uniformly in the direction 
that the theory suggests. Table 5.12 reports results on social distance and giving across 
treatments. Decreased social distance increases giving in the age category; dictators 
whose partners are no more than 5 years younger or older than them give significantly 
more than dictators whose partners are outside of that range. In terms of sex and income, 
on the other hand, greater social distance motivates more giving. Dictators partnered with 
receivers of the opposite sex or with receivers of lower income than them give more 
when they have the sex and income information of their partner. For income, however, 
this effect disappears when income differences reach 300,000 Tshs per month. These 
results show that the significant response to the presence of social information in the 





While the significance of these results is strong, no clear pattern emerges with respect to 
social distance and giving.  And because the effects are absolute (rather than marginal) 
and unidentified, it is necessary to discuss two alterative hypotheses. The first is that the 
dictators own social reference groups drive the social distance results. This hypothesis, 
that individuals behave according to the norms established within social reference groups, 
conforms to the literature on in-group behavior. The alternate hypothesis is that clinicians 
respond to individual patient characteristics with varying levels of generosity. In 
particular, clinicians may behave more generously to the more deserving recipients, as in 
Eckel and Grossman (1996).  
Comparing the results from the social distance analysis with results on giving by clinician 
characteristics reveals that in at least two categories social reference group may be more 
important than social distance. We find that women give more in both T2 and T3 than in 
T1, independent of with whom they are paired (Table 5.13). This result is mirrored in the 
results on social distance, where female clinicians matched with male partners give more 
in T2 than they give in T1, but these same clinicians also give more in T3, where they do 
not know the characteristics of their partners. A Wilcoxon signed rank test confirms that 
female dictators matched with female partners also give significantly more in the social 
information treatment than they give in the baseline treatment, at 5% significance. This 
group also is more generous in the second treatment than their peers matched with male 
partners. Hence, the social distance result is not supported; while women matched with 
male partners give significantly more in T2 than in T1, so do their female peers matched 
with female partners. The other category where clinician social reference category 




partners is 200,000 Tshs. A 200,000 Tshs difference in income appears to make little 
sense as motivating additional giving. But when one considers the distribution of 
clinician and non-clinician incomes combined with the results in Table 5.13 on giving by 
clinician characteristic, it is apparent that this result is not driven by the 200,000 Tshs 
income difference. Rather, clinicians with average income (between 200,000 and 400,000 
Tshs) do give significantly more in T2 and T3 than in T1. Most recipients fall in the 
lowest income ranges, which is roughly 200,000 Tshs less than their average partner. 
Hence, clinician income group appears to be more behind this result than the difference 
between their own and their partner’s income.  
This reasoning, however, does not explain the significantly higher giving by male 
dictators when learning that their partner is a female, since average giving among male 
dictators does not change across treatments. Likewise, the result that a dictator who is 
younger than their partner gives more in T2 than in T3 is not reflected in patterns of 
giving among young dictators. These dictators do not give much more in T2 than in T1, 
but they do decrease their giving in T3 relative to T2, when the social information is not 
present. For this group, being matched with a partner who is older than them motivates 
more giving than being matched with a partner who has chosen them.  
There is also support for the second alternative hypothesis that giving increases with the 
deservedness of the recipient. Differences in giving between the baseline and the social 
information treatment are significant for recipients that are female, that have lower 
education, that have lower income and that are younger. For those groups, giving in T2 is 
significantly higher than in the ordinary dictator game (Table 5.14). That giving would be 




exerts most of his or her effort toward helping the most needy patients -- in this sample. 
An overriding “hero clinician” mentality may confound responsiveness to social distance 
results – dictators may be sensitive to social distance, but if they are more responsive to 
the characteristics of the other than to the difference between themselves and the other 
then the social distance results will not come through. No significant differences by 
patient characteristics emerge when comparing T2 and T3; this is as expected since 
dictators did not have partner information in T3. Thus, we do find support for the 
hypothesis that giving varies by social distance, but the pattern is more complex than the 
EJ theory suggests. Responses to social distance are not identified in this laboratory data 
and patterns supporting alternative hypotheses emerge.  
No strong patterns emerge in either sample, however, when considering the hypothesis 
that this increased generosity varies with social distance. Our results on social distance 
unfortunately do not clear up the nature of the interaction between social identity and 
altruistic action. Our at best suggestive evidence, however, does fall on the side of 
indiscriminate altruism. We point out that this comes from a sample of clinicians. One 
may expect medical professionals not to discriminate purposefully between patients. To 
the extent that reactions to social distance are involuntary, our data point to that clinicians 
also may not discriminate unintentionally. The preliminary results reported here echo 
those of Das and Sohnesen (2007), which also betray no evidence of discrimination. 
Thus, while social theory and some evidence tells us that humans care about the 
similarity of others in economic interactions, we do not find that social distance impacts 




5.7.3. Appendix Tables 
Table 5.12. Differences in giving by paired characteristic 
 
Comparing 






How the same 
dictators behave in 
other treatments  
(not the same 
partners as in T2) 
 
  T2-T1 T3-T1 T2-T3 N 
Male dictator, Female 
partner 9.96** 3.92* 6.04 25 
Same Sex 6.34 5.51 0.83 29 
Female dictator, Male 
partner 7.00* -1.50 8.50** 10 
       
Dictator Younger 1.73 -7.54 9.27* 11 
Same Age a 11.40** 8.87** 2.53 15 
Dictator Older 7.27 6.17 1.10 41 
       
100,000 Tshs apart b -3.50 -3.25 -0.25 4 
200,000 Tshs apart 7.82** 5.64** 2.18 33 
300,000 Tshs apart 3.52 1.39 2.13 23 
       
Same Edu Level c 9.29* 6.58 2.71 24 
Dictator with More Edu 7.12* 3.12 4.00 40 
 
Differences in means tested with Wilcoxon signed rank tests.  
*** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
a‘Same age’ is defined as being within 5 years of each others’ age. 
b $1USD is equal to approximately 1300 Tshs. Income is monthly. 
c Education levels are primary school, secondary school, post-secondary school/college, 
and graduate school.  ‘Same Edu Level’ means that the partners completed some or all of 
the same level of school, or are one level apart. Dictators with more education are those 







Table 5.13. Differences in giving by dictator characteristic 
Characteristics T2-T1 T3-T1 T2-T3 N 
Gender Male 4.77 2.04 2.73 44 
  Female 14.65** 7.65 7.00** 20 
Education 
Post-
Secondary 6.74** 4.40* 2.34 62 
  Beyond 14.00 6.00 8.00 5 
Income a  <100,000 NA NA NA 0 
(thousands of 
Tshs) 100-200 -3.50 -9.50 6.00 4 
  200-300 4.58 10.08** -5.5 12 
  300-400 15.28*** 8.09 7.19* 22 
  400-500 1.55 -1.82 3.37 11 
  500-600 6.12 3.65 2.47 17 
Age up to 30 10.75** -0.38 11.12 8 
(years) 31 to 40 4.28 1.47 2.81 21 
  41 to 50 10.25 10.55*** -0.30 27 
  51 to 65 3.18 -0.91 4.09 11 
Facility Type Public 8.32* 7.43 0.89 28 
  Private 1.79 0.12 1.67 24 
  NGO 16.57** 5.86 10.71 14 
Differences in means tested with Wilcoxon signed rank tests.  
*** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
a Income is reported by month. Tshs are Tanzanian shillings. $1USD is approximately 





Table 5.14. Differences in giving by recipient characteristic 
Characteristics T2-T1 T2-T3 N 
Gender Male 1.04 1.14 30 
  Female 12.35*** 4.08 37 
Education 
Primary 
School 6.98* 3.44 38 
  
Secondary 
School 8.71 1.67 21 
  
Post-
Secondary 12.00* 12.00* 5 
Income a <100,000 7.44** 3.11 45 
(thousands of 
Tshs) 100-200 -2.31 -2.31 13 
  200-300 0 0 1 
  300-400 5 0 2 
Age up to 30 12.26*** 4.83 35 
(years) 31 to 40 -2.65 -5.88 17 
  41 to 50 5.40 10.60 10 
  51 to 65 10.00 2.00 5 
Differences in means tested with Wilcoxon signed rank tests.  
*** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
a Income is reported by month. Tshs are Tanzanian shillings. $1USD is approximately 




Chapter 6 : Clinicians’ Social Preferences in the Workplace 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Beyond the basic laboratory results, I obtain additional insights into the pro-social 
behavior of the clinician subjects by exploiting the fact that the subjects from the 
laboratory experiments are the same as the ones for whom I have field data. We use the 
giving patterns in the laboratory in order to classify clinicians as being responsive to 
social information, responsive to pride and/or as being fair. Using clinician effort in the 
field as the dependent variable, I determine how important these attributes are in 
clinicians’ effort choices in the workplace.  
In this chapter we present results from a field survey on clinician behavior at work. Data 
were collected in healthcare facilities in Arusha, Tanzania. We also use results from the 
pride and social information treatments of the laboratory-style experiments reported in 
Chapter 5. Specifically, we use the results from the implementation in Arusha, Tanzania, 
which we carried out with the same Tanzanian clinicians for whom we have the field 
data.  
Combining data from the laboratory with data from the clinicians at work provides 
unique insights into the role of social preferences in clinician effort choices. The results 
reported in this chapter are particularly compelling because the subjects for whom we 
collected field data are the same clinicians that participated in the laboratory experiments. 




professionals rather than being from the more common university student subject pool. 
Moreover, it is uncommon to combine laboratory with field data in this way and in doing 
so we contribute to the ongoing debate of how to utilize and interpret data collected in the 
controlled laboratory setting with respect to the field setting.  
6.2. Data collection 
6.2.1. The sample -- clinicians in Arusha 
We collected the field data from 104 clinicians in the semi-urban area of Arusha, 
Tanzania from November 2008 until August 2010. This period covered the 18 months 
prior to the laboratory experiments. The data collection involved observing clinicians at 
work and conducting exit interviews with their patients. In total, we spoke with 4,512 
patients from these 104 clinicians. Field data collection lasted from November 2008 to 
June 2010. Not all of the clinicians in the field data chose to participate in the laboratory 
experiment. Since we match behavior in the laboratory with behavior in the field for this 
chapter, we restrict our attention to the subsample of clinicians who also agreed to 
participate in the laboratory experiments.  
We sampled 100 percent of the healthcare facilities in the area with outpatient 
departments, though some facilities were excluded based on convenience; they were 
either too difficult to reach or had too small a patient volume. The sample includes 
public, private, and non-profit/charitable facilities. Clinicians were randomly sampled 
within each health care facility enrolled in the study. We restrict our attention to 




the area, as is discussed in Chapter 3. Clinicians are those health workers with one of the 
following degrees: ACO, CO, AMO, MO.  
None of the facilities approached declined participation, but attrition was a minor 
problem for the individual doctors involved in the study. Only 2 clinicians that had 
originally consented opted out later. There was additional attrition as a result of clinicians 
taking their annual leave or attending compulsory continuing education seminars. 
Whenever possible, we maintained contact with these clinicians and continued to collect 
data when they returned to work. None of these types of attrition are correlated with 
observable clinician characteristics or quality of care, except for very high quality doctors 
whose advanced degrees did not necessitate continuing education and who took little 
vacation. We use data from one day to three days of data collection for each clinician, 
depending on the above-mentioned attrition and the clinicians’ presence at work on the 
days we went to collect data.  
6.2.2. Procedures 
We collected data for each clinician on at least 7 (and not exceeding 9) separate 
occasions over a period of 3 weeks. Start dates were staggered and the days on which we 
collected data for any given clinician were not announced in advance. Length of time 
between the different visits varied according to clinician schedule. We obtained consent 
and collected data on clinician characteristics in an initial visit that preceded the 7-9 
patient data collection visits. On each of the 7-9 data collection visits we interviewed all 
the patients the clinician saw over a 4-hour window. During one of these data visits we 




the research when a clinician from our team met with each clinician subject, but did not 
collect data. In order to avoid anomalies in the data resulting from these intermittent 
meetings, we limit our analysis in this paper to the first three data collection visits. The 
sample in this study is further reduced because not all clinicians who participated in the 
field survey also participated in the laboratory experiment. Further, six of the clinicians 
participating in the experiments did not take part in the field study. Taking these 
limitations into account, the final sample size that we use in this paper includes 61 
clinicians and 805 patients. A regression of experiment participation on practice quality 
shows that although these are negatively correlated, the relationship is not significant 
(Table 6.7). A t-test confirms that those who participated in the experiment are not 
significantly different from those who did not in terms of quality of care. Table 6.1-Table 
6.6 summarize patient and clinician characteristics in the field data. Standard deviations 
are reported in parentheses.  
6.2.3. Instruments 
This study uses data from 2 different data collection instruments. It also uses data from 
the laboratory experiments on social information and pride discussed in Chapter 5. The 
first instrument is a small survey that we used to collect clinician characteristics, such as 
age, education, and income. We administered this instrument during the consent process, 
before the research began. The second instrument, the Retrospective Consultation Review 
(RCR), was administered during each data collection visit for each clinician. The RCR is 
an exit interview survey designed to measure clinician effort. It is administered to 




slightly modified version of the instrument used in Leonard & Masatu (2006). 17 The 
RCR asks the patient what their symptoms were (including the dominant symptom) and 
what tasks the doctor performed during their consultation (by symptom where 
appropriate). It also records information about patient satisfaction, reasons for visiting the 
facility, and general questions on patient wellness. The data from the RCR are at the 
patient level and observations are uniquely identified by the two variables doctor and 
patient. Each patient was interviewed only once during the course of the study. This 
instrument was administered in Swahili.  
The RCR also asks patients’ socio-economic questions such as their job (if employed), 
the materials used to build their home, their education level, ownership of various assets 
and patient sex and age. In the case of accompanied minors we collected the socio-
economic information of their guardian. In the analysis, patient age and sex refer to the 
minor (patient) themselves and education refers to the guardian. This allows us to include 
patient characteristics that would be correlated with illness (type and severity), where 
guardian education is a proxy for family income. Combined with the laboratory data, the 
information from these two instruments permits us to evaluate the impact of social 
preferences on effort in the field. 
                                                
17 Effort measured using RCR data is an accurate approximation of what the doctor is actually doing for the 
patient (Leonard & Masatu, 2006). We therefore use RCR data for our analysis rather than data from direct 





6.3.1. Main estimation 
The main variables of interest in our estimation in this chapter are social information 
responsiveness, pride responsiveness, and the interaction between these two attributes. 
These three attributes are measured in the laboratory (Chapter 5). They are not mutually 
exclusive. Those that give more in T2 than in the ordinary dictator game are considered 
responsive to social information. Those that increase giving when the partner has chosen 
them are pride responsive. Finally, those that give half of the endowment to their partner 
in the standard dictator game, T1, we classify as “fair”. All three are binary variables, 
though the definition of fair is not exhaustive. A clinician-dictator is a fair type if he/she 
gave 50 tokens to the partner and not a fair type if he/she gave fewer than 50 tokens. 
Those that gave over 50 are not included in this definition.18 I also include an interaction 
term for those responsive to both social information and pride. This reflects the idea from 
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) that pride and social information go hand in hand in 
motivating pro-social behavior. Nearly half of the sample responded with higher giving 
to the social information and pride treatments, but only one-third responded to both 
treatments. Less then one-third of the participants can be considered fair types. Figure 6.1 
is a histogram displaying proportion of the population categorized as each type. 
We use an ordinary least squares model with facility level random effects, cj, to evaluate 
the importance of these attributes in clinicians’ effort choices. The model is 
Effortijk = !Si +"Xik + cj + eijk  
                                                




Effortijk is the percentage of symptom-specific protocol items completed by clinician i at 
facility j for patient k. Si is a vector of the four social preference measures and Xik is a 
vector of patient and clinician characteristics including patient age, gender, education 
level and wealth. Xik also includes controls for data collection visit number. In some 
specifications Xik include facility type (private, public or NGO) and average daily patient 
volume. The error term is assumed to be independently and identically normally 
distributed. Random effects is appropriate in this setting since individual facilities were 
not chosen explicitly. Hence, following Nerlove (2002), we assume the presence of an 
effect unique to each facility which produces a constant error in the measures from that 
facility. The effect is considered random in that it is not something we have purposely 
varied – no facility was chosen for any merits particular to that facility. We simply 
recruited as many facilities, and clinicians therein, as we could. A Hausman test confirms 
that individual facility effects are uncorrelated with other covariates; we fail to reject the 
null that coefficients from the random effects estimation are different from those of the 
fixed effects estimation (p=0.99).  
Unobserved patient attributes should also not be correlated with doctor characteristics 
because in the outpatient system in Tanzania patients are essentially randomly assigned to 
doctors, once they have chosen the facility. Patients do not have appointments and cannot 
choose their doctor. When they check in at a facility, the reception directs them to a 
clinician’s queue randomly.19 Also, clinician schedules are not regular so the patient 
cannot come on a specific day of the week, anticipating a certain clinician will be 
working that day. Consequently, we rely on these details that patients are essentially 
                                                
19 Presumably if a patient arrives in an emergency situation, the receptionist can direct them accordingly. We do not 




randomized across doctors and that there is no unobserved patient characteristic that 
would be correlated with doctor characteristics. We explore this assumption in detail in 
Chapter 7.  
We further control for data collection visit number to account for any visit-specific 
effects. This assumes that the structure of how effort may (or may not) change between 
visits is the same for all clinicians and uncorrelated with effort. This is an important 
point. Recall that during the second visit a medical professional from our research team is 
present to observe the clinician at work. From past research we know that this will induce 
most clinicians to work harder and that the pattern of effort changing follows a 
predictable path consistent with a Hawthorne effect (Leonard et al., 2007; Leonard and 
Masatu, 2006). By controlling for visit we take into account this predictable change in 
effort, similar to the effect of including a time trend variable accounts for external shocks 
to a sample and imbalance in number of observations over time (Greene, 2003).20 Finally, 
we use the panel-robust variance-covariance matrix and facility level clustering to correct 
for autocorrelation (correlation between consultations within each facility) and any 
potential heteroskedasticity. An extensive discussion of this treatment of the standard 
errors is included in the next section, on clustering. Thus, with this random effects model 
we estimate the extent to which clinicians’ social attitudes, as measured in the laboratory, 
help to explain variation in effort. 
 
                                                
20 One circumstance that would invalidate the use of visit number dummies to adjust for panel imbalance 
over time is if observations are not missing at random – that not having observations for visits 2 and or 3 is 




6.3.2. Alternative specifications  
In alternative specifications of this model we also control for clinician experience (years 
as a heath worker) instead of and in addition to monthly income. Including patient 
attributes controls for case mix, which is invariably important in clinician effort – a sicker 
patient requires more effort and it may be more difficult to provide a given proportion of 
the required care for very sick patients than for relatively healthy patients. The key 
variables of interest in these regressions are again the social preference variables, Si , 
which were measured in the laboratory with the same sample.  
6.3.3. Unbalanced panel and clustering 
Clustering adjusts the variance-covariance estimates for the fact that the panel is 
unbalanced. It is sufficient as an adjustment (i.e. there is no need to also worry about 
consistency) as long as the reason for the imbalance is not correlated with the dependent 
variable. In this dataset, imbalance in the number of patients per clinician and clinicians 
per facility reflects the population. For the data we use in this study, we planned to visit 
each doctor 1 to 3 times to collect data. During each data collection visit we surveyed all 
of the consenting patients a clinician saw during the time we were at the facility. Hence, 
the number of observations from each data collection visit correspond directly to the 
number of patients a clinician saw that day. Also, for each facility, we engaged as many 
clinicians as possible.21 As these distributions are reflective of the actual population from 
                                                
21 Since the number of small facilities in Arusha is large and our sample reflects this, larger facilities are not 
represented more in the data than smaller facilities. Indeed, 49.7% of the observations are from large 




which we source our sample, unequal numbers of patients per clinician and clinician per 
facility, while not unimportant, should not contribute to estimate bias.  
As stated above, imbalance affects the efficiency of estimates if not appropriately 
adjusted for in the estimates of variance. While the sample is clustered first at the 
clinician level and then at the facility level, with clinicians nested within facilities, it is 
only necessary in our analysis to cluster at the highest level of aggregation (Cameron et 
al., 2006). There are 28 facility clusters in this sample, with cluster size ranging from 1 to 
8 clinicians. Even with differently sized clusters we can use a sandwich, robust variance 
estimator to achieve estimates that are robust to intracluster correlation and arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002). We also present results clustered at the clinician 
level (55 clusters, patients per clinician ranging from 4 to 30) for comparison (Table 6.8). 
Clustering at the clinician level does not appreciably differ from clustering at the facility 
level. Some significance in key variable is lost, but it does not disappear. In conclusion, 
with the cluster dummy variable model, the OLS estimate with random effects is 
consistent; correcting for inter-cluster heteroskedasticity we achieve more efficient 
estimates.  
One additional note on panel imbalance regarding patients per clinician bears mentioning. 
In our sample, the average number of patients per day per clinician is significantly 
negatively correlated with average quality by consultation (
! 
"=-0.14, p<0.001). We 
maintain that this correlation is not a threat to the efficiency of our estimates. Ordinarily, 
if the reason for an unbalanced panel is correlated with the error term (i.e. the dependent 
variable) it is indicative of attrition based on the outcome variable. This kind of attrition 




and thus biased. Recall, our sampling was such that we interviewed all patients that the 
clinician saw on that day and the clinician has no control over the number of patients seen 
any given day. Thus, while this correlation may point to either lower quality clinicians 
have more patients per day or people with more patients per day providing lower quality, 
it does not indicate a problem in our estimation as is discussed above. As an aside, it may 
be true that clinicians who are of lower quality spend less time with each patient 
(completing fewer of the required tasks) and thus can fit more patients into their 
schedule. Alternatively, these clinicians with high volume may be forced to spend less 
time with each patient in order to see all the patients that are assigned to them each day. 
Either way, if minutes per consultation is correlated with the error term as well as 
consultation quality, the dependent variable, (or any of the independent variable of 
interest), there is essentially an omitted variable problem22. The omitted variable, time 
spent per consultation, is not likely to be correlated with the variables of interest and thus 
does not pose a problem for our estimations in terms of consistency. Threats to minimum 
variance estimates are addressed with the variance-covariance estimation techniques 
discussed above. 
6.4. Results and discussion 
6.4.1. Results from the main estimation and alternate specifications 
Results from the main estimations appear in Table 6.8 through 6.11. In Tables 6.9-6.11 
the column labeled “Baseline” has output form the same central estimation, which 
                                                
22 Note that this is not a facility type effect (private versus public); of the seven clinicians in the 90th 
percentile of average daily patient volume, three practice at public facilities and four practice at one of 
three private facilities. Moreover, the significance of the correlation holds in a regression of patient volume 




appears in column 2 of Table 6.8. The most robust result in this regression is that those 
subjects who are both pride responsive and social information responsive provide better 
average effort than their peers who are responsive only to pride. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is positive and highly significant in all model specifications, as is the 
marginal effect of social information responsiveness in the presence of pride (equal to 
0.11 at 1% significance in the baseline regression). On the other hand, responsiveness to 
social information alone or pride alone does not appear to be correlated with workplace 
effort (not significant at conventional levels in the baseline regression). Further, in the 
presence of social information responsiveness the marginal effect of pride responsiveness 
is insignificant. This is due to the fact that although pride responsive people tend to 
provide worse effort than average, having the attribute of also being responsive to social 
information mitigates that negative response. For the clinicians responsive to both social 
information and pride, patient identity is important and knowing more about the patient is 
likely a source of motivation for them. The pride they feel is apparently linked to the 
social interaction inherent in their profession. These are potentially the clinicians who 
feel pride from the service aspect of their job – the pride in the field is triggered by that 
personal interaction. Conversely, clinicians who are only pride responsive (and not social 
information responsive) provide lower effort at significance levels of less than 1%, but 
controlling for clinician income renders the result insignificant at the 10% level. Recall 
that in the Tanzanian outpatient context patients are assigned randomly to clinicians. 
Clinicians know this and pride responsive clinicians who are not also motivated by 




Note that the negative pure pride effect pulls in the opposite direction of the pride-
augmented social information effect. In fact, a Wald test on the sum of coefficients 
reveals that the total impact of the social attitude variables for those that are responsive to 
both pride and social information is not distinguishable from zero. Nonetheless the 
regression helps to explain the variation in effort by decomposing the average. While this 
group of clinicians is not different from average, the marginal effects show that social 
information responsiveness mitigates what would otherwise be the negative impact of 
pride. Also, in the presence of pride, the marginal impact of social information 
responsiveness is greater. This is due to the large magnitude and positive sign of the 
interaction term: combined together, pride and social information responsiveness lead to 
higher effort than pride responsiveness alone. Hence, even though the net effect of both 
pride and social information responsiveness together is not distinguishable from zero, the 
impact of the combined social attitudes is important in that it keeps pride responsive 
clinicians from providing even worse effort. 
We also reject the joint linear hypothesis that all coefficients of the social attitudes 
variables are equal to zero at p < 0.05. Fairness tends to mean higher effort on average 
and has similar magnitude and robustness to the attribute of being both social information 
and pride responsive. This suggests that in this clinician-patient context preferences for 
fairness are at least as important as other social attitudes in determining workplace effort. 
Patient and illness characteristics do impact average effort, as expected. Because these 
observables proxy patient case-mix, they cannot be used to validate the evidence from the 
laboratory of a ‘hero clinician’ norm in this sample. Clinician age and experience are also 




Including both income and experience remedies the loss of model fit, but with equally 
dire consequences in terms of the variance components estimates; estimates of the 
random effects’ variance appear to be negative and so the estimation reduces to OLS, a 
decidedly incorrect specification. Consequently the (pseudo) R2 reported is misleading. 
Also, in this (incorrect) OLS specification the explanatory power of the social attitudes 
variables disappears. Experience appears to absorb all of the explanatory power from 
these variables, though of the four, it is only correlated with the attribute of fairness 
(p=0.03). Clinicians with more than 20 years of experience are much more likely to be 
fair in the standard dictator game. This correlation may merit further investigation, but 
since there do not appear to be any overriding correlations between tenure and the other 
social attitudes, we leave it out of this study. Thus, we perform the sensitivity checks on a 
specification that includes age, not experience; the two share a correlation coefficient of 
0.64 with p<0.001. We ultimately reject the hypothesis that preferences for fairness and 
social information and pride responsiveness do not play an important role in explaining 
clinician workplace effort. 
As a specification check, we perform the regression analysis with different error 
structures. Our baseline model includes robust standard errors, which is appropriate if one 
considers each patient-doctor interaction as having its own unique variance. If instead the 
variance is the same within a facility or within a clinician, clustering is the more 
appropriate technique. Results reported in Table 6.8 show that clustering at the facility or 
clinician levels does not change the primary results. It must be noted however, that the 
significance of the positive coefficient on the interaction term goes up to 1% with facility 




specifications with clustered standard errors serve as bounds on the significance of being 
both social information and pride responsive for explaining variation in effort. 
Primary results do not change under various alternate specifications. Excluding rural 
facilities we still find the same pattern of results (Table 6.10). Results are also robust to 
using item level dependent variables rather than consultation level averages (Brock, 
Lange and Leonard, 2011). Note that performing the regression at the consultation level 
may over-simplify the relationship between social attitudes and clinician effort. Different 
tasks a clinician does are more or less representative of her different skill sets, such as 
medical knowledge or bedside manner. It may be that social attitudes help explain 
variation in certain tasks and not others. If this is the case then collapsing the dependent 
variable into a consultation level average may be simplifying too much and the 
correlation between social attitudes and effort may be spurious or misleading. We do not 
find this to be the case, as results are unchanged when looking at the data at the item 
level. See Brock, Lange and Leonard (2011) for details.  
Further, we estimate a model that includes practice ability in the right hand side. Skill, or 
ability, is almost always a cause of concern in regressions that try to explain performance 
(Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Card, 1999). Although we do not have reason to believe that 
ability is correlated with pride or social information responsiveness, it certainly helps to 
explain variation in tasks completed. Also, ability as an omitted variable may affect the 
variance-covariance estimates. We estimate clinician ability using a latent variable 
model23. When ability is included, fairness drops by almost half and become significant, 
but our central result does not change. Tendency to be fair in the laboratory is 
                                                




significantly correlated with practice ability, (
! 
"=0.218, p<1%) so that including both 
fairness and practice ability as covariates in the regression leads to potentially misleading 
results with respect to the importance of either characteristic. Indeed, we reject the joint 
hypothesis that both coefficients are equal to zero (Wald test with p<1%). Results are 
reported in Table 6.11. Ultimately, ability does not alter the primary results of the 
regression with respect to pride and social information responsiveness. Though it does 
affect our estimates of the importance of fairness, the strength of the correlation between 
the two variables makes the impact difficult to interpret. 
Finally, we estimate the baseline also controlling facility type and patient volume. We do 
this in order to test the extent to which our results are industry wide or whether they are 
being driven by facility culture. Past research suggests that facility type (public, private, 
NGO) and patient volume define elements of facility culture that in turn impacts quality 
of care (Gachter and Falk, 2000; Leonard and Masatu, 2008; Serneels et al., 2009; Serra 
et al.). Facility culture can also have heavy influence on intrinsic motivation and pro-
social behavior in the workplace (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Modeling these 
relationships with respect to the social attitudes measured in the laboratory -- pride 
responsiveness, social information responsiveness and fairness – is beyond the scope of 
this study. Nevertheless, we report the extent to which our results are robust to 
controlling for these facility characteristics so as to inform future research on this topic. 
The results from these estimations appear in Table 6.11, in which we also reproduce the 
baseline regression results for easy comparison. Adding in dummies for facility type and 
patient volume does not change the main result that those responsive to both social 




term stays roughly the same until we add ability and volume, ability and facility type, or 
all three to the baseline specification. In the fullest specification it is 40% the size of its 
counterpart in the baseline specification and is not significant. The fullest specification 
includes ability, facility type and patient volume controls.  
In their own right, facility type and patient volume do not have significant impacts on the 
average quality of care. Consultations in private facilities tend to be met with more effort 
than in public facilities, a result consistent with the literature (Leonard et al., 2007). 
Patient volume tends to have a negative impact on average clinician effort, but the effect 
is only significant in two specifications, the one with ability and the fullest specification 
(the final column). This is presumably due to the small but significant correlation 
between ability and patient volume ( =-0.032, p<5%). Note that practice ability is 
positively correlated with clinician effort whereas patient volume is negatively correlated, 
so that when ability is not present in the regression, volume is picking up some of that 
positive correlation with effort. This, in turn, reduces the patient volume coefficient and it 
becomes insignificant (the variance estimate for patient volume does not change much 
across specifications).  
Adding facility type and patient volume together reduces the significance on the social 
attitudes interaction term. We believe this is not necessarily because the result is weaker, 
but rather due to the strong correlations between the kind of facility one works at and the 
tendency to be both social information and pride responsive. We find that those who 
work at large public or large private facilities are much less likely to be both social 
information and pride responsive than their small facility counterparts. Conversely, those 




laboratory than their small facility counterparts. The relationships are all significant at 
less than 1%. Thus, including both facility size, facility type and social attitudes means 
these variables are all tugging various directions, and potentially eliminating significance 
even for meaningful relationships. Hence even though our results on the impact of being 
both social information and pride responsive are rather robust to controlling for facility 
characteristics, there is clearly a link between these attitudes and facility culture (as it is 
summarized by patient volume and ownership). Practice ability also figures into the story. 
Exploring what that relationship may be between these components is left to future 
research. 
6.4.2. Reverse analysis – evaluating the role of negative social attitudes 
In the preceding analysis we defined social attitudes measured in the laboratory in 
accordance with the Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) theory of pride and salience of 
another’s esteem. An omission to the analysis follows from such a focused view. Social 
information and pride responsiveness are not the only kinds of behavior possible in the 
experiments. Here we consider the subjects that may respond negatively to either social 
information or pride. Does a negative response to knowing about one’s partner or to 
induced pride describe a social attitude that might help explain variation in clinician 
workplace effort?  
Considering this empirical question, we adjust the definitions of social attitudes to 
encompass negative responses to the experimental treatments. We refer to those who give 
fewer tokens to their partner in the pride treatment as negatively responsive to pride. 




classification of being negatively responsive to social information. 25% of the clinicians 
responded negatively to induced pride in the laboratory. A clinician who responds 
negatively to induced pride in the laboratory may have two different effort outcomes at 
work. She may provide less effort at work, signifying a disutility from attracting attention 
or esteem from others. We will call this kind of clinician an introvert. Alternatively the 
clinician who responds negatively to pride in the laboratory may not behave differently 
from her peers in the field because, despite a potential disutility attached to attracting 
esteem in general, she does not get pride out of what she does. A similar story can shape 
our predictions for how those who are negatively responsive to social information may 
behave in the workplace. Negative response to receiving partner information in the 
laboratory points to having disutility from social interactions. We label this type of 
clinician a misanthrope. In the laboratory, 23% of the sample can be classified as 
misanthropes. The misanthropes will always offer less effort than their peers because it is 
impossible to escape the social part of the interaction with the patient. Results appear in 
column 2 of Table 6.12. The column headers in the table refer to how the social 
information and pride variables are defined.  
This analysis gives evidence that those responding negatively to the stimuli in the lab 
may constitute a different “type” of pro-social preferences that we should account for in 
our models. We see evidence of misanthropes – the coefficient on social information is 
significant at the 10% level and implies that those who are negatively responsive to social 
information (and not negatively responsive to pride) give 9% less effort than their peers. 
Put another, more salient way, where the average patient can expect their clinician to 




will only receive 6 of the 10 required items. The economic significance of this result 
ultimately depends on what item is not being performed. The coefficient for negatively 
responsive to pride is insignificant, so we do not see evidence of introverts. Column 1 of 
the Table 6.12 juxtaposes these results with a more inclusive definition of social 
information and pride responsive (in the positive sense). In this column, social 
information responsive includes not only those that gave more tokens in T2 than in the 
standard dictator game, but also those who did not change their giving patterns (the “no-
changers”). Adjusting the definition allows us to directly see how the negatively 
responsive people are behaving in comparison with everyone else. The comparison 
underscores the uniqueness of the result pointing to the presence of misanthropes in the 
clinician sample.  
The regression with the adjusted definitions (column 1 of Table 6.12) also reveals that the 
original definitions of social information and pride responsiveness are indeed meaningful 
measures. The definitions of altruism in response to social information and pride that 
include the no-changers do not have the same explanatory power as the original 
definitions. The converse is true for an identical variation on the definition of the 
negatively responsive types. Including the no-changers in the definition of negatively 
responsive actually strengthens the results from that regression (Column 3, Table 6.12). 
Further we see that the interaction term representing those that are negatively responsive 
to both social information and pride is highly significant (p<1%). The net impact of all 
three negative responsiveness terms, 
! 
"
NEG#SI + "NEG#PRIDE + "NEG#BOTH , is however not 
significant. So, while the interaction of the attitudes may be important in explaining 




differently from their peers once we consider the individual contribution of the 
constituent attitudes. It does mean that those negatively responsive to both pride and 
social information provide more effort than if they were only negatively responsive to 
social information. In some sense, pride appears to be keeping the misanthropes from 
performing too low below average. In conclusion, there is some evidence that a negative 
response to knowing about one’s partner helps explain variation in clinician workplace 
effort, but the impact does not appear to be economically meaningful.  
While the results of this “reverse analysis” do not provide much additional insight into 
the role of pride and social identity in clinician effort choices, they do suggest an 
alternate hypothesis to the ones put forth in the main estimation. The alternate hypothesis 
hinges on how we think about social information responsiveness and the interpretation of 
its coefficient. To be social information responsive in the laboratory is telling of the 
power of social identity in our lives. But when we think about how this characteristic 
might play out in a clinician’s workplace, it is not altogether clear that the social 
information responsive people should behave much differently from their peers or how 
one might use the characteristic to craft a policy, since everyone receives social 
information of patients all the time. We see from the reverse analysis, however, that the 
provocative characteristic may not be social information responsiveness, but rather 
negative response to social information. Replacing social information responsive with the 
negative counterpart in the main estimation does not however, reproduce the significance 
of the social information characteristic seen in Table 6.12 (Columns 2-4). Other results 






In this chapter we explored the role of social preferences in explaining variation in 
average clinician effort in the workplace. Our analysis concerns the real workplace 
performance of medical clinicians, something that is rare in behavioral and experimental 
economics research. Also, the results reported here directly complement our findings in 
the laboratory since the subjects in both analyses were the same. Using measures from 
the laboratory thusly in our field data analysis we contribute to the literature on social 
preferences in the workplace and the literature on making legitimate links between the 
laboratory and the field. 
Clinicians’ attitudes as measured in the laboratory do appear to explain significant 
variation in how they behave at work. Those who are responsive to both social 
information and pride in the laboratory provide roughly 10% more effort than their peers. 
Meanwhile responsiveness to social information alone or pride alone does not have any 
explanatory power. The findings are robust to various specifications, including 
controlling for practice ability, facility type or facility size. When all three additional 
controls are added, however, the results disappear. This belies the complex relationship 
between clinician attitudes and facility culture. But theory is not clear on what these 
relationships might look like. We thus leave modeling of this and the interplay with 
social preferences to future work. We also find that those who give half of their 
endowment in the standard dictator game (fair types) also provide more effort on average, 
but these results are not robust to controlling for practice ability. Surprisingly, practice 




concurrently, at which point it is positive and significant in explaining variation in 
clinician effort.  
Considering the reverse question of whether a negative response to the laboratory stimuli 
is correlated with average effort in the workplace, we find only that those negatively 
responsive to social information, or misanthropes, appear to be distinct from their peers, 
offering approximately 10% worse effort. This result lies outside of the social preferences 
model on which this work is based, but stands as evidence with other results on negative 
social preferences, such as spite (Bradler, 2009; Levine, 1998). 
Taken together, these results suggest that social preferences do impact effort in the 
workplace and speak to the accuracy of the Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) and 
Benabou and Tirole (2006) theories as complements to models of equity-seeking such as 
the Fehr and Schmidt model (1999). Identifying whether this result is in fact derivative of 
the complex relationships between facility type, facility size and practice ability or if it is 
contributing to those relationships remains to be seen. More generally, this analysis 
shows that attributes measured in the lab can illuminate patterns in field data that would 





6.6. Tables and figures 
Table 6.1. Patient characteristics by facility type, full sample 
 Mean age Mean years of Education Percent Female 
Public 18.67 (16.65) 
8.26 
(2.40) 56.97% 
Private 22.44 (15.73) 
9.34 
(2.90) 54.53% 
NGO 26.65 (18.45) 
8.98 
(2.94) 54.66% 




Table 6.2. Patient Characteristics by facility type, reduced sample 
 Mean age Mean years of Education Percent Female 
Public 17.60 (16.63) 
8.18 
(2.33) 55.56% 
Private 23.35 (15.22) 
9.32 
(3.02) 53.47% 
NGO 25.41 (17.84) 
8.88 
(3.12) 55.49% 








Table 6.3. Clinician characteristics by facility type 
 Mean age Mean years of Education Percent Female 
Average years 
experience as a 
health worker  





















Table 6.4. Clinician characteristics by facility type, reduced sample 
 Mean age Mean years of Education Percent Female 
Average years 
experience as a 
health worker  





















Table 6.5. Distribution of each credential level by facility type, full sample 
 Public Private NGO Total 
Overall 35 48 21 104 
ACO 2 3 0 5 
CO 20 28 16 64 
AMO 9 6 2 17 
MO and above 0 2 1 3 





Table 6.6. Distribution of each credential level by facility type, reduced sample 
 Public Private NGO Total 
Overall 26 21 14 61 
ACO 1 0 0 1 
CO 17 19 12 49 
AMO 7 2 2 11 
MO and above 0 0 0 0 
Missing 1 0 0 1 
 
Table 6.7. Probit of participation in laboratory experiment on practice quality, 
clinician level with robust standard errors 






Constant 0.50 (0.51) 
p-values are shown in parentheses. 
 








Table 6.8. OLS regression of average effort by consultation on social attitudes, with 













Responsive to social information  -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.037) 
Responsive to pride  -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.05) 
Attribute of fairness  0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.03) 
Responsive to both social  0.109** 0.109*** 0.109* 
information and pride (0.049) (0.039) (0.062) 
    
Clinician characteristics    
Sex  -0.06** -0.06 -0.06* 
 (0.026) (0.04) (0.033) 
Age  -0.003* -0.003** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Education (years)  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.01) (0.009) 
Income -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) 
Visit 2 dummy (observer present) 0.054*** 0.054** 0.054** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) 
Visit 3 dummy 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) 
Constant  0.905*** 0.905*** 0.905*** 
 (0.126) (0.175) (0.153) 
Number of facilities 28 28 28 
Number of clusters NA 28 54 
R2 0.173 0.173 0.173 
F-test, social attitudes (p-value) 0.004 0.004 0.066 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Sample includes 798. Case mix controls included are patient age, sex, education, illness 





Table 6.9. OLS regression of average effort with facility level random effects, 
controlling for experience, errors clustered at the facility level 






Responsive to social information  -0.008 0.019 0.029 
 (0.041) (0.026) (0.048) 
Responsive to pride  -0.06 -0.109 -0.03 
 (0.053) (0.091) (0.067) 
Attribute of fairness  0.074*** 0.022 0.05 
 (0.028) (0.048) (0.052) 
Responsive to both social  0.109*** 0.077 0.051 
information and pride (0.04) (0.069) (0.076) 
    
Clinician characteristics    
Sex  -0.06 -0.015 -0.127** 
 (0.04) (0.055) (0.054) 
Age  -0.003** -0.004*** -0.007** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Education (years)  -0.002 0.003 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.015) (0.013) 
Experience as health worker 
(years)  0.003*** 0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Income -0.021  -0.045*** 
 (0.016)  (0.017) 
Visit 2 dummy (observer present) 0.054** 0.053** 0.06** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) 
Visit 3 dummy 0.022 0.027 0.032 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) 
Constant  0.905*** 0.711*** 0.691*** 
 (0.175) (0.203) (0.254) 
Number of facilities 28 19 19 
N 798 629 622 
R2 0.173 0.134 0.212 
F-test, social attitudes (p-value) 0.004 0.002 0.546 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Case mix controls included are patient age, sex, education, illness severity (proxied with 





Table 6.10. OLS regression of average effort on social attitudes, excluding rural 
facilities 
 Non-rural Non-rural, controlling for facility type 
S.I. Type  -0.006 0.004 
 (0.037) (0.035) 
Pride Type  -0.082 -0.083 
 (0.059) (0.061) 
Fair Type  0.082*** 0.08*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
S.I. & Pride  0.147*** 0.136*** 
 (0.038) (0.04) 
Clinician Characteristics   
Sex  -0.065* -0.056 
 (0.039) (0.039) 
Age  -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (yrs)  -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Income -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Visit 2 dummy 0.056** 0.058** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Visit 3 dummy 0.021 0.024 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Private Facility  0.096* 
  (0.049) 
NGO Facility  0.101* 
  (0.058) 
Constant 0.988*** 0.916*** 
 (0.147) (0.164) 
   
R-squared 0.183 0.256 
F-test, social attitudes (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
F-test, facility type (p-value) NA 0.125 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Sample includes 798 consultations and 28 facilities. Case mix controls included are 
patient age, sex, education, illness severity (proxied with an AM/PM dummy) and 





Table 6.11. OLS regression of average effort on social attitudes, additional 
specifications as indicated by the column headers 





Social information  -0.008 -0.022 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.039) 
Pride  -0.06 -0.067 -0.062 -0.063 
 (0.053) (0.05) (0.053) (0.055) 
Attribute of fairness  0.074*** 0.043 0.077*** 0.071** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) 
Social information x Pride 0.109*** 0.09** 0.099** 0.104*** 
 (0.04) (0.036) (0.039) (0.04) 
Clinician characteristics     
Sex  -0.06 -0.035 -0.05 -0.055 
 (0.04) (0.031) (0.038) (0.04) 
Age  -0.003** -0.003* -0.004** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (yrs)  -0.002 0.009 0 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income -0.021 -0.015 -0.012 -0.019 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) 
Visit 2 dummy 0.054** 0.050** 0.055** 0.055** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) 
Visit 3 dummy 0.022 0.018 0.023 0.024 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Practice Ability  0.337   
  (0.215)   
Private Facility    0.056 
    (0.049) 
NGO Facility    0.068 
    (0.056) 
Large Facility   -0.085  
   (0.055)  
Constant 0.905*** 0.500 0.865*** 0.85*** 
 (0.175) (0.318) (0.183) (0.187) 
R-squared 0.173 0.191 0.218 0.211 
F-test, social attitudes (p-value) 0.004 0.017 0.012 0.011 
F-test, facility type (p-value) NA NA NA 0.421 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Sample includes 798 consultations and 28 facilities. Case mix controls included are 
patient age, sex, education, illness severity (proxied with an AM/PM dummy) and 





Table 6.11.(continued) OLS regression of average effort on social attitudes, 














Social information  0.004 -0.012 -0.018 -0.004 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.036) 
Pride  -0.065 -0.069 -0.069 -0.07 
 (0.055) (0.05) (0.053) (0.053) 
Attribute of fairness  0.075*** 0.044 0.033 0.032 
 (0.028) (0.03) (0.03) (0.029) 
Social information x Pride 0.096** 0.076** 0.078** 0.06 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) 
Practice Ability  0.372* 0.386** 0.434** 
  (0.195) (0.195) (0.17) 
Clinician Characteristics   
Sex  -0.046 -0.021 -0.023 -0.005 
 (0.039) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) 
Age  -0.003** -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Education (yrs)  0.001 0.013 0.011 0.015 
 (0.01) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Income -0.011 -0.004 -0.011 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
Visit 2 dummy 0.056** 0.051** 0.051** 0.053** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Visit 3 dummy 0.025 0.019 0.021 0.022 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Private Facility 0.041  0.092** 0.083** 
 (0.047)  (0.036) (0.036) 
NGO Facility 0.062  0.076 0.07* 
 (0.045)  (0.054) (0.041) 
Large Facility -0.08 -0.103**  -0.098** 
 (0.053) (0.05)  (0.044) 
Constant 0.818*** 0.419 0.374 0.267 
 (0.187) (0.308) (0.300) (0.279) 
     
R-squared 0.240 0.252 0.245 0.281 
F-test, social attitudes 
(p-value) 0.020 0.042 0.118 0.240 
F-test, facility type  
(p-value) 0.386 NA 0.039 0.039 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Sample includes 798 consultations and 28 facilities. Case mix controls included are patient age, 
sex, education, illness severity (proxied with an AM/PM dummy) and presence of fever, cough or 





Table 6.12. OLS regression of average effort on negative social attitudes; column 
headers refer to the definition of social attitude variables in each regression, labeled 
"Social Information" and "Pride" in the row headers 
Independent Variables 
Positive changers 




Social information  -0.091* 0.056 -0.100* 
 (0.056) (0.061) (0.056) 
Pride  -0.026 -0.009 -0.048 
 (0.031) (0.078) (0.048) 
Attribute of fairness  0.067** 0.067** 0.073*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) 
Social information x 
Pride 0.036 0.036 0.108*** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.039) 
Clinician 
characteristics 
   
Sex  -0.04 -0.04 -0.058 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) 
Age  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Education (years)  -0.003 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Income -0.019* -0.019* -0.020 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) 
Visit 2 (observer 
present) 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.053** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Visit 3 0.029 0.029 0.022 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Constant  0.865*** 0.783*** 0.943*** 
 (0.149) (0.152) (0.192) 
    
R2 0.161 0.161 0.168 
F-test, social attitudes 
(p-value) 0.066 0.066 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Negative changers are those who less in T2 than T1 and/or less in T3 than T1. 
No-changers are those that do not change from T1 to T2 or T1 to T3. 
Sample includes 798 consultations and 28 facilities. Case mix controls included are 
patient age, sex, education, illness severity (proxied with an AM/PM dummy) and 




Chapter 7 : Sensitivity Analysis 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a series of additions and alterations to the model specification in 
Chapter 6 as checks to the sensitivity of the results. We address the potential for non-
random assignment of patients to clinicians in the field (identification strategy), omission 
of ability as an independent variable and plausible inaccuracy of the effort measure 
(dependent variable). Overall we report that the results in the main estimation are robust 
to specification error and alternate independent variable. The effect of random or non-
random assignment is more nuanced, but there is evidence that non-random assignment 
over patient unobservables may influence results. We begin with a discussion of random 
assignment, followed by a detailed treatment of estimating clinician practice ability and 
adjusting the dependent variable to account for item difficulty. 
7.2. Investigating random assignment 
Identification of the impact of social attitudes relies on the institutional characteristics of 
the Tanzanian health care system that suggest a more or less random assignment of 
patients to clinicians, within facility. In some medical systems, patients choose their 
physician and thus thwart any chance that a clinician’s case-mix (or patient mix) is 
random. In Tanzania, however, patients do not choose their clinicians. Rather they choose 
the facility of where to seek care. Receptionists distribute patients to clinicians rather than 




no omitted variable bias as a result of unobserved patient characteristics. On the other 
hand, if random assignment does not hold and patient characteristics are correlated with 
clinicians’ social attitudes, the coefficients of social information and pride responsiveness 
will be bias. Suppose, for example, that patients can influence to whom they are assigned 
or that receptionists practice some form of non-random assignment (e.g. favoritism or 
trying to match patients to doctors according to severity of illness and clinician skill). 
This kind of sorting could invalidate our central identifying assumption.  
It is meaningful to adjust for this bias as it may be substantial if randomness does not 
hold. Small amounts of bias do not affect our main conclusions or any policy 
recommendations because we do not treat the analysis as causal or structural. We aim 
only to determine the magnitude, sign and significance of the relationship between social 
attitudes and effort. But the bias could be substantial (e.g. change the magnitude) if the 
endogeneity results from a clinician having the same type of patient on average over 
time, such that the exposure to their patients changes the way they perceive themselves or 
their job. Self-perception in turn shapes their response to social information and pride 
cues in the laboratory. The omitted variable influence then enters twice into the analysis; 
once to determine the laboratory measures and once to influence effort. It is thus 
important to explore the potential for non-random assignment and understand how such 
non-randomness may impact the coefficient estimates.  
Our analysis of the randomization of patients to clinicians is three-pronged. We use 
multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) to look specifically at the distribution of patient 
characteristics by clinician. We also present results from splitting the sample according to 




rerun our regressions controlling for very small facilities, where patients essentially 
choose the clinician once they commit to a facility.  
7.2.1. Evidence of non-random assignment 
First, we report results from the MANOVA procedure. The aim of the MANOVA is to 
determine which facilities, if any, appear to have non-random assignment of patients to 
clinicians over observable characteristics. We perform the MANOVA with observables 
and take the results as suggestive of some facilities having non-random assignment over 
unobservables. MANOVA treats each clinician as a plausible treatment and evaluates if 
knowing the clinician can “predict” the characteristics of the patient. By design 
MANOVA tests the hypothesis that the clinician effects are jointly non-random with 
respect to outcomes. We essentially regress each characteristic on clinician dummies and 
test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients on the doctors are equal to zero in all 
equations – there is one equation for each patient char. If the coefficient on Dr. Smith is 
equal to zero for all patient characteristics, we conclude that Dr. Smith does not have a 
predictable case mix. If this holds for all the clinicians in the facility, we treat this as 
evidence of more or less random assignment of patients across clinicians in that facility. 
Any such test of our random assignment by facility assumption has the limitation that we 
cannot evaluate the randomness of patient mix for facilities that have only one clinician. 
For one-clinician facilities the equivalent random assignment assumption would be that 
patients choose the facility more or less randomly. This is probably an invalid assumption 
and we adjust our analysis for one- and two-clinician facilities later in this section. 
Omitting the one-clinician facilities reduces the sample on which we run MANOVA to 




The distribution is left skewed, with a median equal to 51 patients per clinician. We run 
the MANOVA separately for each facility and evaluate the random assignment of the 
(observable) patient characteristics age, sex, years of education and presence of fever, 
cough or diarrhea.  
Multivariate analysis of variance reveals that while assignment of patient characteristics 
is more or less random within the facility, there is evidence of sorting by age or gender in 
some facilities. We reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of characteristics 
among clinicians is random for nine of the 23 facilities. These nine facilities constitute 
21% of all facilities, 38% of all clinicians and 39% of patients in the data. The nine 
facilities account for 39% of all facilities with more than one clinician, 46% of 
corresponding clinicians, and 47% of the corresponding patients. Together with the one-
clinician facilities, the nine with potential non-random assignment make up over half of 
the patient observations (56%) in the sample and 56% of the clinicians.  
While a violation of our identifying assumption, the non-random assignment appears to 
follow a predictable pattern that may not be correlated with unobservables. For those 
facilities with potentially non-random assignment we recover the marginal effects of each 
characteristic to determine if one or more of them has significant explanatory power on 
clinician-characteristic match. Table 7.1 lists significance for each facility’s characteristic 
equations, for the nine facilities with evidence of non-random assignment. The 
significance values are for the joint hypothesis that the clinicians explain variation in a 
given patient attribute. Values reporting conventional levels of significance are bolded. 
Looking at the bolded values we can see strong evidence of sorting on age and gender in 




may in fact be the result of sorting on age, where children represent the majority of the 
cases of these symptoms. For example, children in developing countries suffer 
disproportionately from diarrheal diseases (Lopez et al., 2006). This is also true in our 
data – children account for 32% of all patients but 48% of the diarrhea cases. Malaria, the 
most common cause of fever in the area, is a leading cause of death among children in 
Africa (Rosenberg, 2007) In Northeast Tanzanian, the burden of the disease falls 
primarily on children (Lusingu et al., 2004; Winskill et al., 2011). Thus the nonrandom 
matching appears to be due to the overriding pattern that some clinicians are de facto 
pediatricians or women’s health care providers.  
Note that non-random assignment due only to this apparent pattern on observables does 
not pose a problem for our analysis, unless it is indicative of non-random assignment 
over unobservables. Recall that we control for all of these observable characteristics in 
our estimations. They are the variables that we refer to as controlling for case mix. Since 
we control for case-mix, non-random assignment relative to these variables will not 
impact our estimates. Nonetheless the evidence of non-random assignment on 
observables may suggest a more insidious problem. That in some facilities the patients 
are not perfectly randomly distributed on observable means that a) receptionists sort on 
observables, b) certain types of patients seek certain doctors, by facility, c) patients 
ignore the orders of the receptionist and queue up with others who are like them (i.e. 
herding behavior) and/or d) unobservable patient characteristics are correlated with 
clinician characteristics. The trick would be if there is an unobservable patient 
characteristic that is important for effort and correlated with attitudes. Then our estimates 




randomization on observables it is less likely that we have randomization on 
unobservables. That being said, the overriding pattern we describe above may suggest 
that sorting on observables is independent of sorting on unobservables; receptionists may 
indeed practice some form of triage, but may pay little attention to sorting patients 
beyond accounting for the patients’ medically relevant, observable attributes. In the next 
two subsections we aim to determine whether the main results from our estimations 
obtain when we account for potential non-random assignment. 
7.2.2. Controlling for facilities with random assignment 
Is the pattern really all there is, or are there unobservables correlated with social attitudes 
that are also non-randomly assigned? If the presence of de facto pediatricians and 
women’s health practitioners is the extent of the sorting, we would expect clinicians from 
non-random assignment facilities to behave no differently than those from random 
assignment facilities, controlling for patient observables. Recall that random assignment 
is important for two reasons: 1) we depend on it for defending the unbiasedness of our 
estimates and 2) even if the non-random assignment is not correlated with social attitudes 
it may impact the efficiency of our estimates. We estimate our baseline model including a 
dummy variable to control for non-random assignment and find that the average quality 
of care does not differ among those that are randomly assigned. The variable labeled 
“Facility with Non-Random Assignment” (Table 7.2) is a dummy variable equal to one 
for facilities with non-random assignment. This model assumes that clinicians from 
facilities with non-random assignment will differ in the average effort, if at all. The 
coefficient on non-random assignment is positive, but insignificant at conventional 




random and non-random assignment. More importantly, the economic interpretation of 
our results does not change when controlling for non-random assignment, as the pattern 
of sign and significance in our social attitude variables remains.  
7.2.3. Controlling for number of clinicians per facility 
A special case where random assignment may not hold is very small facilities, which are 
often owned and operated by a single clinician. In this case patients choose the facility 
and the doctor simultaneously. We again estimate our main model, this time controlling 
for facility size. Small facilities are defined as having one or two clinicians in our 
sample24. This is a rough estimate of facility size since we did not sample all clinicians 
from each facility. Nonetheless, there were more frequently more clinicians in the study 
for the larger facilities. 26 facilities, 35 clinicians and 1,464 patients in our data are 
associated with small facilities. This constitutes 60%, 34% and 32% of all facilities, 
clinicians and patients in our sample, respectively. We use number of clinicians for this 
analysis instead of patient volume since number of clinicians is the variable that may 
thwart random assignment. Like controlling for non-random assignment, controlling for 
number of clinicians in the facility does not change the sign, significance, or magnitude 
of the original results. The coefficient on the size indicator itself is also not significant, 
though it is significant and negative when we use a continuous version. Results appear in 
Table 7.2. 
What we have shown in this random assignment analysis is that although there is 
evidence of non-random assignment in some facilities, being in one of the facilities with 
                                                
24 We only have data on number of clinicians at each facility for a subset of facilities, so we cannot use that 




non-random assignment or in one of the small facilities is not correlated with social 
attitudes to the extent that it changes our primary result. The regression analyses 
controlling for facility size or non-random assignment come with the caveat that the two 
subsamples would not behave differently for any other reason than being in one of the 
groups of random or non-random assignment. That is, we assume there is no confounding 
factor perfectly correlated with the division of the data in this way that would impact 
behavior. This assumption is more difficult to substantiate with respect to facility size 
(i.e. number of clinicians per facility) because of the previously mentioned correlations 
between facility size (in terms of patient volume), facility type, practice ability and social 
attitudes. Importantly, it may be true that certain subpopulations display meaningful 
patterns in terms of social information and pride responsiveness and effort. We reiterate 
that modeling this relationship is outside of the scope of this paper. Finally, the element 
of random assignment that we aimed to address with this analysis is non-random 
assignment with respect to unobservables. We took an indirect route, treating non-
random assignment on obsevables as potential evidence of non-random assignment over 
unobservables. Closer inspection revealed a predictable pattern that would not be overtly 
correlated with unobservables. Further, controlling for membership in a group with 
potential non-random assignment does not change the sign or significance found in our 
original estimations. Thus, we conclude that while non-random assignment is evidence 






7.3. Including clinician ability and item difficulty 
In this section we elaborate on the measurement of clinician practice ability. Skill, or 
ability, is almost always a cause of concern in regressions that try to explain performance 
(Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Card, 1999). Although we do not have reason to believe that 
ability is correlated with pride or social information responsiveness, it certainly helps to 
explain variation in tasks completed. Also, ability as an omitted variable may affect the 
variance-covariance estimates. In order to adjust for this omitted variable we estimate it 
using a latent variable estimation model called Item Response Theory (IRT). The theory 
comes out of the field of educational statistics. Practitioners use it to evaluate classroom-
type test construction and examinee competence or skill. We use a 2 parameter IRT 
model to jointly estimate item/task difficulty and clinician ability. The basics of IRT are 
covered in some detail below, followed by summary of the ability estimates and a more 
extensive section on incorporating item/task difficulty into our analysis.  
7.3.1. Item Response Theory 
Item response theory (IRT) offers a technique for estimating both clinician ability and 
item or task difficulty, where difficulty and ability are considered latent variables. IRT 
relies on the idea that we can explain performance on a test item based on a set of 
examinee and item-specific latent variables. It also specifies that we can model the 
relationship between performance and the latent traits as a monotonically increasing 
logistic function. Skill or ability is the most common latent examinee trait measured and 




item difficulty, which is constant for each item across all examinees. In our case, the 
examinees are clinicians. The item difficulty scores can be thought of as capturing the 
common component of how challenging an item is to complete, independent of the 
facility or available equipment. Constant item difficulty ignores that facility level or 
patient level characteristics that may complicate how hard any item is to complete. We 
control for this using facility and case-mix controls. The IRT model is 
 





examinee ability and bt is the difficulty of completing item t correctly. The other 
parameter in this model, at , is the slope parameter. It represents how well performance on 
an item signals true high ability or true low ability. The estimate of at is called the item’s 
discrimination score. For an item with a higher discrimination score, the clinician’s 
ability will play more into the probability of completing the item. A two-parameter model 
also allows for estimation of item discrimination, or the extent to which. Because model 
fit cannot be reliably tested directly (Hambleton et al., 1991), choosing between a one or 
two parameter model requires understanding of what the true relationship between 
observable performance and latent variables may be. In the context of our sample we 
follow Leonard, Masatu and Vialou (2007) and use a 2-parameter specification to 





Using the tools of IRT requires three assumptions: unidimensionality, local independence 
and that the logistic function specified captures the “true” relationship between the latent 
variables, or unobservables, and the observed item responses. First, we briefly discuss the 
extent to which our context satisfies these assumptions and the impact violations have on 
the properties of our estimates. We then provide details on how we use the IRT 
techniques to construct the difficulty-weighted measure of effort. Finally, we present 
results from running the baseline and augmented regression analyses with this new 
dependent variable.  
Unidimensionality 
The unidimensionality assumption is that there is one dominant latent trait that a test 
measures. This is most commonly labeled as the skill or ability relevant to the type of 
test. For example, data from a math test will lead to measurements of mathematical 
ability. Interpretation can be even more precise: data from a calculus test can be used to 
estimate examinee calculus ability. We assume a single latent trait, practice ability, or 
ability to practice the required protocol items learned during a clinician’s medical 
education. If in fact the estimated !  is a combination of ability and some other trait, ! , 
such that !  = ABILITY + ! , the main estimating equation estimates on the corresponding 
coefficient will suffer from attenuation bias. Violations of strict unidimensionality such 
as this are common, however, and IRT models are robust to most violations in the 
presence of a single dominant trait (Drasgow and Parsons, 1983; Harrison, 1986). Figure 




there is one dominant latent trait in the RCR data.25 This result is consistent with results 
reported in Leonard, Masatu and Vialou (2007) and in Das and Hammer (2005), which 
uses the same instrument to measure ability. The upshot is that the assumption of 
unidimensionality appears to hold in our data to the extent that it matters for estimating 
latent ability and difficulty parameters. 
Local Independence 
Local independence is the characteristic that the probability of a correct response to each 
item is independent of the probability of a correct response for any other item, 
conditional on ability. Formally, let p(xti|! i) be the probability of a correct response to 
task t, where xti is the response given to task t and ! i is the test taker i’s ability. Local 
independence means 
 
This is the same as conditional independence. Thus it is assumed that the correlation in 
performance across items for an examinee is only due to ability (i.e. the dominant factor 
that influences performance). We rely on the result that given unidimensionality, local 
independence always holds (Hambleton et al. 1991). In the absence of local independence 
the standard errors of the ability estimates will be understated (Ip, 2001). This, in turn, 
would lead to inflated coefficient estimates and deflated t-values for ability in the main 
estimating equation. Since ability is being added as a control, rather than as a variable of 
                                                
25 The analysis includes data from all clinicians in the sample, not just those in the restricted sample of our 
main estimating equation. Using all of the data to confirm unidimensionality is more precise since the 
restricted sample almost certainly suffers from a selection bias, as it is composed of those that chose to 




central interest, we are less concerned about imprecision of ability’s parameter estimates 
due to inaccurate standard error estimates. This brings us back to the reliance on 
unidimensionality, the factor analysis above suggesting unidimensionality and the results 
in the literature showing that IRT is robust to violations of that assumption. 
Estimates of difficulty and discrimination for each item appear in Appendix C. Practice 
ability has a uni-modal distribution that ranges from 0.41 to 0.95, with a median of 0.62, 
a mean of 0.63 and a standard deviation of 0.10. Regressions with practice ability appear 
in Chapter 6. Including ability as an independent variable in our equations of interest 
does not change the results for those that are both pride and social information 
responsive, but the quality of being fair in the laboratory loses its significance, as does 
the quality of being pride responsive. Specific results and discussion can be found in 
Chapter 6.  
7.4. Difficulty-weighted effort 
As we discuss above, the IRT procedure also produces difficulty estimates for each item. 
We use these estimates in order to construct a difficulty-weighted average effort for each 
consultation, thus taking advantage of the item level detail in the data. While running our 
analysis at the consultation level simplifies estimation of the variance-covariance matrix, 
thus making the estimates in some sense more reliable, doing so ignores the information 
available in the task level nature of the data. Some tasks are more difficult than others. 
This detail is not captured in the analysis. We thus provide sensitivity check estimations 
that use difficulty-weighted average effort as the dependent variable. In brief, we find 




the construction of the variable and the second subsection presents the results from the 
estimation.  
7.4.1. Constructing the weighted average 
In this section we elaborate on an alternative way to measure clinician effort that 
incorporates more information from the tasks performed in each consultation. The 
alternative measure is a weighted version of the original measure from our estimating 
equation in Chapter 6. Recall that Effortijk from Chapter 6 is the average performance of 








where ptk is equal to one if the clinician completed symptom-specific task t for patient k 
and pk  is the total number of tasks required by protocol for the symptoms patient k 
presents. Note that the total number of protocol items, by symptom, is constant across 
clinicians and facilities. It is also constant across patients with the same presenting 
symptoms. The k subscript, while a slight abuse of notation, captures that the number of 
tasks required depends on the information the patient brings in to the consultation, his 
symptoms, and that this varies across patients. This measure of effort accurately reflects a 
clinician’s ability to apply the skills learned in school in the work setting, but it falls short 
in that it does not account for varying degrees of item difficulty. We can account for item 





We use item response theory estimates of item difficulty as weights in the calculation of 
WEffortijk. Difficulty estimates are obtained simultaneously with the ability and 
discrimination estimates as is described above. Task difficulty, bt, is defined as the point 
on the ability scale where the probability of a correct answer for task t is equal to 0.50. 
Thus this parameter indicates how skilled one has to be to have an even chance of 
performing the task when it is required. Because the ability scale is centered on zero, bt 
can take positive or negative values. The scale of the difficulty parameter is arbitrary and 
difficulty measures only have meaning in reference to one another. Scale of the 
depending variable, however, is not arbitrary; bounding predicted values between zero 
and one makes the marginal effects easily interpretable. In order to retain the scaling of 
the dependent variable we adjust bt to range between zero and 1, with difficult items 
given higher weight values. Costless items are not included in the weighted effort 




! 0,1[ ]  captures the 
relative nature of the difficulty estimates, but allows for some items to be costless 
(effortless) to perform. To construct the new dependent variable we multiply each item 
by a difficulty weight, !b
t








Table 7.3 has the descriptive statistics for the two different dependent variables and the 
difficulty weights. A full table with all the weights by survey item can be found in the 
appendix. While at first glance the weighted and un-weighted dependent variables look 




item but that those values are between zero and one. Multiplying the weight by the binary 
zero/one task variable condenses the dependent variable’s range. Where the original 
dependent variable can be equal to 1 any time the clinician does all the items required of 
him by protocol for that consultation, the weighted value will be less than one (unless all 
required items have a weight of 1 themselves). WEffortijk thus serves as an alternate way 
to measure effort, the dependent variable, that incorporates information on item 
difficulty.   
Primary results on the role of social information and pride obtain in the difficulty-
weighted effort regressions (Table 7.4), with one main exception. In all difficulty-
weighted specifications the size of the coefficient on the interaction term, social distance 
and pride responsive, is reduced by approximately half. A smaller coefficient may mean 
that the size of the original coefficient was driven by performance of relatively easy items 
and that the clinicians deemed as putting forth more effort simply performed more of the 
easy items. Clinicians deemed as putting forth less effort may have been in fact working 
just as hard but performing fewer, more difficult items. More likely, the reduction in the 
size of the coefficient is a result of the fact that the difficulty weighting changes the range 
of the dependent variable. The reduced range, with the maximum approximately half of 
that for the unweighted version, also limits the value of coefficients for variables that 
explain deviations from the mean, such as the social preferences dummies. As in the 
original results, the coefficient on the interaction term cannot be distinguished from zero 
in the most extensive specification. The most extensive specification controls for practice 
ability, facility type and average daily patient volume for each facility. Also as in the 




for fairness is not robust to alternate specifications. Finally, pride is not significant in any 
of the difficulty-weighted specifications. Likewise the marginal effect of pride is 
insignificant across the board. As is the case with the non-weighted dependent variable, 
practice ability does not gain significance unless we control for patient volume and/or 
facility type concurrently, at which point it is positive and significant in explaining 
variation in clinician effort. Case mix remains important in these results, as does patient 
volume and being in a private facility. Thus the difficulty-weighted dependent variable 
yields the same pattern of results as we see with the unweighted effort variable, albeit 
with coefficients of different values. 
Adjusting the dependent variable for item difficulty is an effective way to incorporate the 
item level detail from the data into the analysis. Where as the dependent variable in the 
main estimations of Chapter 6 is a simple average of protocol items completed for a 
consultation, the weighted dependent variable presented here allows the score to vary 
with item difficulty. This means that clinicians doing fewer but more difficult items may 
obtain the same or even higher effort score than clinicians completing many relatively 
easy items. We used item difficulty estimates from an item response theory procedure, 
adjusted to a [0,1] scale, as the difficulty weights and constructed a weighted average of 
symptom-specific protocol items completed for each consultation. While this 
construction incorporates more detail into the dependent variable, using it does not 
change the pattern of results. This alternative specification does, however, yield different 
estimate values than in the original analysis, though no difference is so drastic as to 
produce a change in estimate magnitude. Since the estimation is reduced form, the exact 




matter. Thus, we conclude that the difficulty-weighted specification, while perhaps more 
precisely representing effort, supports the interpretation and conclusions corresponding to 
the primary estimations of Chapter 6. 
7.5. Conclusion 
This Chapter presents a sensitivity analysis to augment the results in Chapter 6. We 
address the potential for non-random assignment of patients to clinicians in the field, 
omission of ability as an independent variable and plausible inaccuracy of the effort 
measure (dependent variable). With these various alterations to the model, the sign, 
significance and magnitude of the primary results remain, though the impact of potential 
non-random assignment is not fully understood.  
For the analysis of our assumption of random assignment we looked at the distribution of 
observable characteristics across clinicians. We found that some clinicians did appear to 
have concentrations of certain characteristics, a result inconsistent with random 
assignment on observables. Certain clinicians were significantly more likely to have 
female patients or children (paired with the diseases for which children bare the larger 
burden in the population). This predictable pattern of sorting on observables suggests that 
some clinicians are de facto specialists. If patients are being funneled to certain clinicians 
due to observables only, this does not compromise our results since we already control 
for the patient characteristics. As long as there are not any unobservables that sort along 
these same lines (sex or age) then this result is not indicative of non-random assignment 
on unobservables. Controlling for non-random assignment and number of clinicians in a 




being said, there are very likely interesting and important subgroups of the sample for 
which the relationship between social preference and workplace effort is distinct. 
Studying these relationships and the role of facility culture in determining social 
preferences we leave to future research. 
The second and third elements of this chapter were to explain the estimation of practice 
ability, which we used in Chapter 6, and to estimate the model with a difficulty-weighted 
effort variable. Estimating ability and difficulty weights both involved a latent variable 
estimation technique called Item Response Theory (IRT). The IRT procedure is 
essentially an iterated maximum likelihood procedure that estimates difficulty parameters 
and the latent variable practice ability simultaneously. We report summary statistics for 
practice ability. We estimate the main model with the difficulty-weighted dependent 
variable. Results form this difficulty-weighted estimation do not differ from our main 
results. Thus, while the difficulty-weighted specification incorporates more information 
into the estimation, the added information does not appear to have a bearing on the 
relationship between social attitudes and workplace effort.  
With this we conclude that neither potential non-random assignment nor using difficulty-
weighted average effort as the dependant variable appreciably compromise the strength 




7.6. Tables and figures 
Table 7.1. Checking random assignment, results from a MANOVA by patient 





clinicians Patient age Patient sex 
Patient 
education 
8 99 2 0.929 0.769 0.982 
9 165 4 0.426 0.499 0.031 
14 335 9 0.013 0.540 0.320 
15 93 2 0.574 0.235 0.004 
21 155 3 0.000 0.519 0.141 
28 173 3 0.000 0.001 0.350 
33 51 2 0.004 0.870 0.545 
35 362 9 0.000 0.013 0.000 
37 98 3 0.008 0.000 0.637 
 
Table 7.1.(continued) Checking random assignment, results from a MANOVA by 




clinicians Fever Cough Diarrhea 
8 99 2 0.073 0.012 NA 
9 165 4 0.062 0.548 0.460 
14 335 9 0.017 0.123 0.178 
15 93 2 0.525 0.273 0.346 
21 155 3 0.536 0.908 0.309 
28 173 3 0.024 0.489 0.582 
33 51 2 0.021 0.075 NA 
35 362 9 0.002 0.206 0.232 






Table 7.2. OLS estimation controlling for non-random assignment and facility size 







# of Clinicians 
(binary) 
Controlling 
for # of 
clinicians 
(continuous) 
Social Information (S.I.) Responsive -0.016 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) 
Pride Responsive -0.062 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) 
Fair 0.071** 0.074*** 0.069** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
S.I. and Pride Responsive 0.118*** 0.107*** 0.098** 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) 
Non-Random Assignment (facility) 0.055   
 (0.052)   
3 or more Clinicians at the Facility  -0.008  
  (0.053)  
Number of clinicians per facility   -0.018** 
   (0.007) 
Clinician Characteristics    
Sex -0.065* -0.058 -0.046 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Age -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of Education -0.003 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Income -0.025 -0.019 -0.014 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) 
Visit 2 (Observer present) 0.053** 0.054** 0.056** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Visit 3 0.021 0.023 0.024 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Constant 0.912*** 0.899*** 0.896*** 
 (0.171) (0.175) (0.168) 
Case mix controls yes yes yes 
N 798 798 798 
R-squared 0.169 0.176 0.247 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Case mix controls include patient age, sex, education, illness severity (proxied with an 









Table 7.3. Summary statistics for the difficulty weighted average and related 
variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Average effort 0.77 0.25 0 1.00 
Average Effort with 
Difficulty Weights 0.32 0.11 0 0.44 






Table 7.4. OLS regression of difficulty-weighted average effort on social attitudes, 
controlling for practice ability 
Independent Variables Baseline Baseline with Ability 
S.I. Responsive -0.006 -0.014 
 (0.024) (0.025) 
Pride Responsive -0.034 -0.038 
 (0.029) (0.027) 
Fair 0.047*** 0.029 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
S.I. and Pride Responsive 0.064*** 0.053** 
 (0.023) (0.021) 
Sex -0.036 -0.021 
 (0.023) (0.018) 
Age -0.002** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Education -0.001 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Income -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
Practice Ability  0.191 
  (0.124) 
Visit 2 0.032** 0.03** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Visit 3 0.013 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Private Facility   
   
NGO Facility   
   
Patient Volume   
   
Constant 0.496*** 0.266 
 (0.096) (0.182) 
Case mix controls yes yes 
N 798 798 
Overall R squared 0.189 0.209 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Case mix controls include patient age, sex, education, illness severity (proxied with an 





Table 7.5.(continued) OLS regression of difficulty-weighted average effort on social 
attitudes, various specifications 













S.I. Responsive -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.02) 
Pride Responsive -0.034 -0.039 -0.039 -0.04 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
Fair 0.047*** 0.029* 0.024 0.023 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
S.I. and Pride Responsive 0.064*** 0.045** 0.047** 0.037 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Sex -0.036 -0.013 -0.016 -0.005 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Age -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education -0.001 0.007 0.006 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Income -0.012 -0.003 -0.007 0 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.01) (0.009) 
Practice Ability  0.214* 0.216* 0.247** 
  (0.111) (0.115) (0.098) 
Visit 2 0.032** 0.031** 0.031** 0.032** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Visit 3 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Private Facility   0.046** 0.041* 
   (0.022) (0.022) 
NGO Facility   0.039 0.035 
   (0.03) (0.023) 
Patient Volume  -0.061**  -0.058** 
  (0.027)  (0.025) 
Constant 0.496*** 0.216 0.202 0.137 
 (0.096) (0.174) (0.175) (0.158) 
Case mix controls yes yes yes yes 
N 798 798 798 798 
Overall R squared 0.189 0.271 0.257 0.296 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*)indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
Case mix controls include patient age, sex, education, illness severity (proxied with an 




Chapter 8 : Conclusion 
 
Empirical research on worker effort choice is the subject of a vast body or work, but thus 
far the role of social preferences in effort choice has received limited attention. Workers 
are subject to varying sources of non-monetary incentives, including their own posture 
toward altruism and the social norms that may be present in their field or organization. 
One theory of social preferences that may be particularly important in effort choices 
among health workers is that of Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) that specifies altruism 
as a function of the esteem one gains from others due to performing an altruistic act. 
Health workers are a compelling subject pool for this research because we expect them to 
be socially minded. Indeed, many enter the profession with the stated purpose of helping 
people. And while social preferences may motivate clinicians to work hard, exposure for 
themselves and their patient to risk may complicate the translation of social preferences 
into increased effort. In this work we used laboratory and field data from a sample of 
clinicians in Tanzania to explore the nature of clinicians’ social preferences and the 
extent to which such preferences impact workplace effort choices.  
We specifically examine the trade-offs between costly exertion of effort and potential 
social benefits among clinicians in a semi-urban area of Tanzania. Thus, this research 
combines behavioral economics concepts with development economics to try to better 
understand effort choices of health workers in a highly resource-constrained setting. We 
use two unique data sets to test the hypotheses that a) clinicians behave pro-socially in 




laboratory and c) social preferences as measured in the lab help explain the unaccounted 
for variance in clinician effort. 
Our research questions in chapters 5 and 6 centered on the expression of social 
preferences in the workplace, with a focus on a specific type of impure altruism first 
outlined by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008, hereafter referred to as EJ). Do clinicians 
respond to pride and social information with greater generosity, as the EJ theory would 
suggest? If so, do those tendencies help explain variation in effort among clinicians at 
work? We first explore these questions in the laboratory, with pilot using subjects from 
the general public in College Park, Maryland and then an implementation with the 
Tanzanian clinicians. Finally, using the laboratory results we construct the measures of 
social attitudes “social information responsive”, “pride responsive” and “fair”. We use 
these measures to determine the extent to which social preferences matter in explaining 
clinicians’ workplace effort. Past research suggests that social identity influences 
generosity among university students, but is silent about the impact of pride. We had no 
reason to suspect that social identity results would differ in our samples and indeed we 
found that dictators form both the pilot and the Tanzanian implementation tended to give 
more when we provided them with socio-demographic information about their partners. 
Among the clinicians, social information significantly increases the likelihood of a 
generous allocation. But social information does not reduce the likelihood of a selfish 
allocation compared to other treatments. In both samples induced pride increased giving 
and among clinicians is increases the likelihood of a generous allocation. Notably, 
induced pride also appears to motivate dictators to settle on a 50/50 allocation of their 




are suggestive of EJ’s theory of social preferences wherein the interaction of social 
identity and esteem motivate pro-social behavior. We juxtapose these laboratory results 
with the work of Leonard and Masatu (2006) showing clinicians response to peer esteem. 
Apparently clinicians are responsive to pride from both patients and peers, though it 
remains to be seen whether these sources of pride are complements or substitutes. As in 
Das and Sohnesen (2007) we do not find significant evidence of discrimination in 
altruism based on social identity or social distance. Linking these behavioral results to 
data on the subjects’ actual workplace effort, we find that while clinicians responsive to 
only pride or only social information do not behave differently from their peers, those 
responsive to both stimuli provide on average 10% more effort. A sensitivity analysis 
shows that these results are robust to various specifications. This work contributes to the 
literature with a novel experimental treatment testing the impact of pride, a unique 
sample of health care workers and approximations of real world relationships in the 
experimental design. Thus, Clinicians’ attitudes as measured in the laboratory do appear 
to explain significant variation in how they behave at work. These also results stand as 
evidence in support of the EJ theory relating altruism, pride and social identity. More 
generally, this analysis shows that attributes measured in the lab can illuminate patterns 
in field data that would be otherwise difficult to identify. 
Thus, we assert that social preferences are important in explaining variation in effort and 
can thus be exploited in building incentive structures for improving effort in this 
population. The interaction of pride and patient and/or clinician social identity in 
particular plays a role. Policy ideas stemming form our results should center on activating 




way to do this would be to allow patients to choose their clinician. Lessons to be drawn 
from this work are limited, however, by the intimate relationship between facility culture 
and clinician attitudes. Due to limitations of our data we cannot address these questions 
in this report. Suffice to say, any specific policy recommendations would have to take 
into account the fact that the role of social preferences may vary by facility size and type. 
With this we contribute to the research on the role of intrinsic motivation among health 
workers and, more broadly, that of social preferences in the workplace. We also provide 
an example of how laboratory data can be legitimately linked to behavior in the field. 
While pro-social behavior captured in the laboratory is correlated with clinician effort in 
the field, it does not tell the whole story. A host of additional factors besides social 
preferences determines how a clinician will respond to her patient. In particular, a 
clinician’s job is wrought with risk. The clinician treats her patient’s not knowing 
whether or not there will be a favorable outcome – does she ration her effort according to 
that risk? The clinician also faces risk to her own wellbeing because of constant contact 
with contagious diseases and liability from making an error. Does she hold back on 
exerting maximally for her patients in order to protect herself from illness of fatigue 
related mistakes? In our fifth chapter we address the question of whether risk impacts 
altruism and if that impact varies with the structure of that risk. We use laboratory 
experiments in our study of these issues with two implementations: a pilot with university 
students and an implementation with Tanzanian clinicians. The experiments consisted of 
variations on a dictator game, which allow us to evaluate changes in generosity when the 
recipient is exposed to risk or both the recipient and the dictator are exposed to risk, 




we address the issue of whether social preferences are based on comparisons of final (ex 
post) payoffs or on comparisons of ex ante chances. By observing decisions in situations 
that expose the decision-maker, another person, or both to risk, we differentiate between 
these two preference structures. Surprisingly we find that, among university students, 
giving under mutual risk is not different from giving when neither partner is exposed to 
risk; the later is highly predictive of the former. Additionally, dictators are sensitive to the 
risk borne by their partners. They give less on average but they are more likely to give 
non-zero amounts. The opposite is true for clinicians, who increase average giving when 
their partner is exposed to risk. Meanwhile, mutual risk causes clinicians to give 
significantly less than in the standard dictator game. Thus, while the behavior of a 
substantial fraction of student subjects is consistent with dictators comparing ex ante 
chances, rather than ex post payoff, preliminary results suggest the opposite for 
clinicians. Future work may focus on determining the underlying structure of preferences 
or institutions that might lead to such a discrepancy. Future work may also focus on 
upside and downside risk or variations in expected value. Hence, our research in this 
direction is a first step in understanding the dynamics of social preferences in the 
presence of risk. Identifying the whether people dominantly display preferences for 
procedural fairness or outcomes fairness can inform policy where multiple stakeholders 
are involved and outcomes are uncertain. In summary, our work complements the 
literature on social preferences for risk by looking at how dictators’ giving varies when 
the outcome for the recipient is uncertain. We fill in the gap in knowledge about the 
degree to which the dictator is willing to surrender his or her own wealth or chances to 




Overall, this research addresses question surrounding the role of social preferences in 
clinicians’ workplace effort decisions. We studied a population of medical clinicians in 
Tanzania, collecting both laboratory and field data from them. In the laboratory, 
treatments mirrored the forces potentially influencing clinicians in their everyday 
workplace decisions. We find strong evidence of social preferences in this population, as 
well as interesting behavior relative to pro-social behavior and risk exposure. Our results 
both back-up and build on existing findings. Further, our results speak to the accuracy of 
theoretical models that include individual heterogeneity of social preferences and the idea 
that interpersonal aspects of decision making influence pro-social behavior. We also 






Appendix A: Laboratory Experiment Instructions 
A.1. Risk and altruism experiment, UMD students 
A.1.1. General Rules 
This is an experiment in economic decision making. If you follow the instructions 
carefully and make good decisions you can earn a considerable amount of money.  You 
will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the session.   
It is important that you do not talk, or in any way try to communicate, with other 
people during the session.  If you have a question, raise your hand and a monitor will 
come over to where you are sitting and answer your question in private.   
The experiment will consist of several independent rounds. In each, you will face 
a specific decision task. Tasks will be explained in detail before you have to make your 
decision.  
In each round, you will be randomly matched with one other participant.  This 
matching will change each round.  You will not know which of the other people in the 
room you are matched with. Likewise, the other people in the session will not know with 
whom they are grouped.   
In each round, you will have the opportunity to earn points.  At the end of this 




paid in cash an amount that will be determined by the number of ECUs (Experimental 
Currency Units) you earn during the randomly selected payment round.   
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned the role of either Person 
1 or Person 2. Those selected for the role of Person 2 will leave the room with one of the 
experimenters. They will be explained the decision tasks, but then wait until person 1 has 
made all decisions. They will later be paid in private. That is, the identity of the decision 
maker (person 1) will not be revealed. 
Those selected as Person 1 will remain in the room and will take a seat at one of 
the computers. Once all of the Person 2 players have left the room, we will explain the 
decision rules for each of the decision tasks to the Person 1 players. In all rounds, each 
Person 1 player will decide how to allocate 100 tokens between him- or herself and 
Person 2.  
The total number of tokens must sum up to 100.  
That is, Tokens Kept (TK) by person 1 and Tokens Given (TG) to person 2 add up to 
100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
The payoff consequences of the token allocation may differ between the Person 1 and 
Person 2 and from round to round. Payoff consequences will be explained to all Person 1 
and Person 2 players at the beginning of each round. 
In each period you should record the number of tokens allocated to you and to the 




How earnings are determined 
At the end of today’s session, one round will be randomly selected as the payment 
round and payments will be determined based on the ECU earnings that round. Each 
round has the same probability of being chosen as the payment round. Your payments 
will be displayed on the computer. 
Record the selected round and your profit in ECU for that round in the space 
provided at the bottom of the record sheet.   
You will receive $1.00 in cash at the end of the session for every 10 ECU you 
have earned in the payment round.  This amount is recorded in the space titled earnings.  
In addition, you will earn a $5 as show-up fee. 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please quietly raise your hand 
and one of the experimenters will come to you to answer your question. It is important 
that you do not talk with any of the other participants.  
 
 
A.1.2. Instructions for the specific rounds – Person 1 
Treatment 1 
You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens given (TG) add up to 100.  




If this round is selected for payments,  
You will receive      TK ECU 
Person 2 will receive   TG ECU as payoff  
Please enter how many tokens you would like to allocate to Person 2 (TG). Recall, you 
can choose any number between 0 and 100. 
 
Treatment 2 
You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens given (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is selected for payments,  
You will receive     TK ECU  
Person 2 will receive  TG out of 100 lottery tickets which gives him or her the 
chance to win 100 ECU. That is, Person 2 has a TG out 
of 100 chance of winning 100 ECU. 
 
The more tokens you allocate to the Person 2, the higher are Person 2’s chances to win 
100ECU, but the smaller will be your own payoff.  
 
For example, if you allocate all 100 tokens to Person 2, the Person 2 has a 100 out of 100 




payoff. Alternatively, if you allocate 0 tokens to Person 2, Person 2 has no chance to win 
the 100ECU prize, while you get a payoff of 100ECU. 
 
Recall, you can choose any allocation to Person 2 between 0 and 100.  
Please enter how many tokens you would like to allocate to Person 2(TG): 
 
Treatment 3 
You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100. You can allocate at most 50 tokens to 
the other person. 
That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens given (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is selected for payments,  
You will receive     TK ECU  
Person 2 will receive  2xTG out of 100 lottery tickets which gives Person 2 
 the chance to win 50 ECU.  
That is, Person 2 has a 2xTG out of 100 chance of winning 50 ECU. 
 
The more tokens you allocate to the Person 2, the higher are Person 2’s chances to win 
50ECU, but the smaller will be your own payoff. For example, if you allocate 50 tokens 
to Person 2, Person 2 receives 100 lottery tickets and therefore has a 100 out of 100 




50ECU for sure. Alternatively, if you allocate 0 tokens to Person 2, Person 2 has no 
chance to win the 50ECU prize, while you get a payoff of 100ECU. 
 
Recall, you can choose any allocation for the Person 2 between 0 and 50. 
Please enter how many tokens you would like to allocate to Person 2 (TG): 
 
Treatment 4 
You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens given (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is selected for payments,  
You will receive     TK unique lottery tickets 
Person 2 will receive  TG unique lottery tickets 
 
At the end a lottery with a prize of 100 ECU will take place where one of the unique 
lottery tickets wins. Exactly one, and only one, of you will win the prize.  
 
Your odds of winning equal TK over 100. Correspondingly, the odds for Person 2 will 
equal TG over 100.  That is, the more tokens you allocate to the Person 2, the higher are 
Person 2’s chances to win 100ECU, but the smaller are your own chances to win. For 
example, if you allocate all 100 tokens to Person 2, person 2 has a 100 out of 100 chance 




Alternatively, if you allocate 0 tokens to Person 2, Person 2 has no chance to win the 
100ECU prize, while you win for sure. 
 
Recall, you can choose any allocation to the Person 2 between 0 and 100.  
Please enter how many tokens you would like to allocate to Person 2 (TG): 
 
Treatment 5 
You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens given (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is selected for payments,  
You will receive      TK lottery tickets 
Person 2 will receive   TG lottery tickets 
 
At the end, for you and Person 2, lotteries will be drawn with prizes of 100 ECU. Your 
odds of winning equal TK over 100. The odds for Person 2 will equal TG over 100.  The 
draws for you and Person 2 are independent. That is, both of you could win 100 
points, only one of you could win, or both of you could end up without a prize. 
 
That is, the more tokens you allocate to the Person 2, the higher are Person 2 chances to 
win 100ECU, but the smaller are your own chances to win. For example, if you allocate 




person 2 wins the prize for sure, while you do not get any payoff. Alternatively, if you 
allocate 0 tokens to Person 2, person 2 has no chance to win the 100ECU prize, while you 
win for sure. 
 
Recall, you can choose any allocation to Person 2 between 0 and 100.  
Please enter how many tokens you would like to allocate to Person 2 (TG): 
 
Treatment 6 
You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens given (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is selected for payments,  
You will have a 50/50-chance to either receive  
  50+TK/2 ECU 
  50-TK/2 ECU 
Person 2 will face a 50/50-chance to either receive  
  50+TG/2 ECU 
  50-TG/2 ECU 
In the extreme, if you do not allocate any tokens to Person 2, Person 2’s payoff is 50ECU 
while you face a 50/50 chance to win 100ECU or win nothing. If you allocate all 




gamble of winning 100ECU or nothing. Alternatively, if you allocate 0 tokens to Person 
2, Person 2 has no chance to win the 100ECU prize, while you win for sure. 
 
Recall, you can choose any allocation to Person 2 between 0 and 100.  
Please enter how many tokens you would like to allocate to Person 2 (TG): 
 
 
A.1.3. Instructions for the specific rounds – Person 2 
Treatment 1 
You will receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens 
allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100.  That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens 
given (TG) add up to 100.  TK + TG = 100. 
 
If this round is selected for payments,  
Person 1 will receive      TK ECU 
You will receive   TG ECU as payoff  
 
Please enter how many tokens you expect to receive from Person 1 (TG). Recall, Person 






You will receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens 
allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100.  That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens 
given (TG) add up to 100.       TK + TG = 100. 
 
If this round is selected for payments,  
Person 1 will receive      TK ECU  
You will receive   TG out of 100 lottery tickets, which gives you the 
chance to win 100 ECU. That is, you have a TG out 
of 100 chance of winning 100 ECU. 
 
The more tokens Person 1 allocates to you, the higher are your chances to win 100ECU, 
but the smaller will be Person 1’s own payoff.  
 
For example, if Person 1 allocates 100 tokens to you, then you have a 100 out of 100 
chance to win 100ECU. That is you win the prize for sure, while Person 1 does not get 
any payoff. Alternatively, if Person 1 allocates 0 tokens to you, then you ahve no chance 
to win the 100ECU prize, while Person 1 gets a payoff of 100ECU. 
 
Recall, Person 1 can choose any allocation to you between 0 and 100. 







You will receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens 
allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100, but Person 1 can allocate to you at most 
50 tokens.  That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens given (TG) add up to 100 (TK + TG = 
100). 
 
If this round is selected for payments,  
Person 1 will receive     TK ECU  
You will receive  2xTG out of 100 lottery tickets, each of which gives
 you an equal chance to win 50 ECU.  
That is, you will have a 2xTG out of 100 chance of 
winning 50 ECU. 
 
The more tokens Person 1 allocates to you, the higher are your chances to win 50ECU, 
but the smaller will be their own payoff. For example, if Person 1 allocates 50 tokens to 
you, you receive 100 lottery tickets and therefore would have a 100 out of 100 chance to 
win 50ECU. That is, you win the prize for sure, while Person 1 receives 50ECU for sure. 
Alternatively, if Person 1 allocates 0 tokens to you, you have no chance to win the 
50ECU prize, while Person 1 gets a payoff of 100ECU. 
 
Recall, Person 1 can choose any allocation for you between 0 and 50. 







You will receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens 
allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100.  That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens 
given (TG) add up to 100.   TK + TG = 100. 
 
If this round is selected for payments,  
Person 1 will receive      TK unique lottery tickets 
You will receive   TG unique lottery tickets 
At the end of the session a lottery with a prize of 100 ECU will take place where exactly 
one of the unique lottery tickets wins. One, and only one, of you will win the prize.  
 
Your odds of winning equal TG over 100. Correspondingly, the odds for Person 1 will 
equal TK over 100.  That is, the more tokens Person 1 allocates to you, the higher are 
your chances to win 100ECU, but the smaller are Person 1’s own chances to win. For 
example, if you receive all 100 tokens from Person 1, you have has a 100 out of 100 
chance to win 100ECU, that is you win the prize for sure, while Person 1 does not get any 
payoff. Alternatively, if you receive 0 tokens from Person 1, you have no chance to win 
the 100ECU prize, while Person 1 wins for sure. 
 
Recall, Person 1 can choose any allocation between 0 and 100 for you. 







You will receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens 
allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100.  That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens 
given (TG) add up to 100.   TK + TG = 100. 
 
If this round is selected for payments,  
Person 1 will receive      TK lottery tickets 
You will receive   TG lottery tickets 
 
At the end of the session, lotteries will be drawn for you and Person 1 with prizes of 
100ECU each. Your odds of winning equal TG over 100. The odds for Person 1 will 
equal TK over 100. The draws for you and Person 1 are independent. That is, both of 
you could win 100 points, only one of you could win, or both of you could end up 
without a prize. 
 
That is, the more tokens Person 1 allocates to you, the higher are your chances to win 
100ECU, but the smaller are their own chances to win. For example, if Person 1 allocates 
all 100 tokens to you, you have a 100 out of 100 chance to win 100ECU. That is you win 
the prize for sure, while Person 1 does not get any payoff. Alternatively, if you Person 1 
allocates 0 tokens to you, you have no chance to win the 100ECU prize, while Person 1 





Recall, Person 1 can choose any allocation between 0 and 100 for you. Please enter in the 
record sheet how many tokens you expect Person 1 to allocate to you (TG). 
 
Treatment 6 
You will receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens 
allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100.  That is, Tokens kept (TK) and Tokens 
given (TG) add up to 100.   TK + TG = 100. 
 
If this round is selected for payments,  
Person 1 will have a 50/50-chance to either receive  
  50+TK/2 ECU 
  50-TK/2 ECU 
You will face an independent 50/50-chance to either receive  
  50+TG/2 ECU 
  50-TG/2 ECU 
Note that the lotteries faced by you and Person 1 are independent. If you receive from the 
other person a non-zero number of tokens, you will face a lottery of winning either 
something more than 50ECU or something less than 50ECU. Concurrently, Person 1 
would face a separate lottery of winning something more than 50ECU or something less 
than 50ECU. The outcome of your lottery does not impact the outcome of Person 1’s 





While the outcomes of the two lotteries are independent, Person 1’s choice of token 
allocations determines the potential winnings of both players. If Person 1 allocates a non-
zero number of Tokens to you, then each of you faces lotteries with the two potential 
outcomes of something greater than 50ECU and something less than 50ECU (potential 
outcomes are not necessarily the same between you).  
 
In the extreme, if Person 1 allocates zero tokens to you (TG=0), then TG/2=0 and your 
payoff is 50ECU for sure. Person 1 would then face a 50/50 chance to win 100ECU or 
win nothing (50+100/2=100 and 50-100/2=0). Alternatively, if you receive all 100 
tokens, Person 1 will have exactly 50ECU for sure while you face the gamble of winning 
100ECU or nothing. So while the outcome of the lotteries are not connected, the potential 
gains from the lotteries are determined by the allocations chosen by Person 1.   
 
Recall, Person 1 can choose any allocation between 0 and 100 for you. 




A.2. Social information and pride experiments, “Maryland Day” sample 
A.2.1. General rules 
This is an experiment in economic decision making.  If you follow the 
instructions carefully and make good decisions you can earn a considerable amount of 




It is important that you do not talk, or in any way try to communicate, with other 
people during the session.  If you have a question, raise your hand and a monitor will 
come over to where you are sitting and answer your question in private.   
The experiment will consist of several independent rounds. In each, you will 
face a specific decision task. Tasks will be explained in detail before you have to make 
your decision.  
In each round, you will be randomly matched with one other participant.  This 
matching will change each round.  You will not know which of the other people in the 
room you are matched with. Likewise, the other people in the session will not know 
with whom they are grouped.   
In each round, you will have the opportunity to earn points.  At the end of this 
session, one of the rounds will be randomly selected as the payment round. You will be 
paid in cash an amount that will be determined by the number of ECUs (Experimental 
Currency Units) you earn during the randomly selected payment round.   
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned the role of either 
Person 1 or Person 2. Those selected for the role of Person 2 will leave the room with 
one of the experimenters. They will be explained the decision tasks, but then wait until 
person 1 has made all decisions. They will later be paid in private. That is, the identity 
of the decision maker (person 1) will not be revealed. 
Those selected as Person 1 will remain in the room and will take a seat at one of 
the computers. Once all of the Person 2 players have left the room, we will explain the 




In all rounds, each Person 1 player will decide how to allocate 100 tokens 
between him- or herself and Person 2.  
The total number of tokens must sum up to 100.  
That is, Tokens Kept (TK) by person 1 and Tokens Given (TG) to person 2 add up to 
100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
The payoff consequences of the token allocation may differ between the Person 1 and 
Person 2 and from round to round. Payoff consequences will be explained to all Person 
1 and Person 2 players at the beginning of each round. 
In each period you should record the number of tokens allocated to you and to 
the other person on the record sheet.  
 
How earnings are determined 
At the end of today’s session, one round will be randomly selected as the 
payment round and payments will be determined based on the ECU earnings that round. 
Each round has the same probability of being chosen as the payment round. Your 
payments will be displayed on the computer. 
Record the selected round and your profit in ECU for that round in the space 
provided at the bottom of the record sheet.   
You will receive $1.00 in cash at the end of the session for every 10 ECU you 
have earned in the payment round.  This amount is recorded in the space titled earnings.  




If you have any questions during the experiment, please quietly raise your hand 
and one of the experimenters will come to you to answer your question. It is important 
that you do not talk with any of the other participants.  
 
 
A.2.2. Instructions for the specific rounds – Person 2 
Round 1 
You have been randomly assigned to be Person 2. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens to allocate to yourself and to Person 1.  
Payments for this round are: 
You will receive      TK ECU 
Person 1 will receive   TG ECU as payoff  
You can choose between two allocations. 
 Option 1)     TK=25 & TG=25  
 Option 2)     TK=30 & TG=15 
Note that in the first option, TK+TG=50.  In the second option, TK+TG=45. 
 
One Person 1 partner has been randomly assigned to you. Their payment for this 
experiment depends on how many tokens you allocate to them. Please enter how many 
tokens you would like to allocate to Person 1 (TG). Recall, you can choose any number 
between 0 and 100. 
 





You have been randomly assigned to be Person 2. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens to allocate to yourself and to Person 1.  
 
Payments for this round are: 
You will receive      TK ECU 
Person 1 will receive   TG ECU as payoff  
You can choose between two allocations. 
 Option 1)     TK=25 & TG=25  
 Option 2)     TK=30 & TG=15 
Note that in the first option, TK+TG=50.  In the second option, TK+TG=45. 
 
One Person 1 partner has been randomly assigned to you. Their payment for this 
experiment depends on how many tokens you allocate to them. The experimenter will 
provide an information sheet to you with information about your partner’s 
characteristics. Your partner will also receive an information sheet about your 
characteristics. 
 
Please review the information sheet and enter how many tokens you would like to 
allocate to Person 1 (TG). Recall, you can choose any number between 0 and 100. 
 







You have been randomly assigned to be Person 2. In this round, you will decide on the 
number of tokens to allocate to yourself and to Person 1.  
 
Payments for this round are: 
You will receive      TK ECU 
Person 1 will receive   TG ECU as payoff  
 
You can choose between two allocations. 
 Option 1)     TK=25 & TG=25  
 Option 2)     TK=30 & TG=15 
 
Note that in the first option, TK+TG=50.  In the second option, TK+TG=45. 
 
One Person 1 partner has been randomly assigned to you based on their preferences for 
your characteristics. Their payment for this experiment depends on how many tokens 
you allocate to them. 
 
Please review the information sheet and enter how many tokens you would like to 
allocate to Person 1 (TG). Recall, you can choose any number between 0 and 100. 
 





A.2.3. Instructions for the specific rounds – Person 1 
Round 1 
You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will receive a 
number of tokens allocated to you by Person 2.  
 
Payments for this round are: 
You will receive      TK ECU 
Person 1 will receive   TG ECU as payoff  
 
Person 2 can choose between two allocations. 
 Option 1)     TK=25 & TG=25  
 Option 2)     TK=30 & TG=15 
Note that in the first option, TK+TG=50.  In the second option, TK+TG=45. 
 
One Person 2 partner has been randomly assigned to you. Your payment for this 
experiment depends on how many tokens they allocate to you.  
 
Please enter how many tokens you expect to receive from Person 2 (TG).  
 







You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will receive a 
number of tokens allocated to you by Person 2.  
 
Payments for this round are: 
You will receive      TK ECU 
Person 1 will receive   TG ECU as payoff  
 
Person 2 can choose between two allocations. 
 Option 1)     TK=25 & TG=25  
 Option 2)     TK=30 & TG=15 
Note that in the first option, TK+TG=50.  In the second option, TK+TG=45. 
 
One Person 2 partner has been randomly assigned to you. Your payment for this 
experiment depends on how many tokens they allocate to you. The experimenter will 
provide an information sheet to you with information about your partner’s 
characteristics. Your partner will also receive an information sheet about your 
characteristics. 
 
Please review the information sheet and enter how many tokens you expect to receive 
from Person 2 (TG).  
 






You have been randomly assigned to be Person 1. In this round, you will receive a 
number of tokens allocated to you by Person 2.  
 
Payments for this round are: 
You will receive      TK ECU 
Person 1 will receive   TG ECU as payoff  
 
Person 2 can choose between two allocations. 
 Option 1)     TK=25 & TG=25  
 Option 2)     TK=30 & TG=15 
Note that in the first option, TK+TG=50.  In the second option, TK+TG=45. 
 
One Person 2 partner will be randomly assigned to you based on your preferences for 
their characteristics. Your payment for this experiment depends on how many tokens 
they allocate to you.  
 
The experimenter will provide you with information on two potential partners. Please 
rank these potential partners in order of your preference based on their characteristics by 
writing “1” at the top of the sheet for your first choice and “2” at the top of the sheet of 





Please review the information sheet and enter how many tokens you expect to receive 
from Person 2 (TG).  
   
Note: You have two tasks to perform this round. 
 






A.3. All treatments, Tanzanian clinicians 
A.3.1. General rules, Person 1 
A.3.1.a. English version (Experiment instructions) 
This is an experiment in decision making. You will be asked to make decisions and will 
be given the opportunity to earn money from your choices. You will be paid in private 
and in cash at the end of the session. The money you earn during the experiment is in 
addition to the per diem you are receiving for attending the meeting today. 
 
It is important that you do not talk with other people once the experiment has begun. If 
you have a question, raise your hand and someone will come over to where you are 
sitting and answer your question in private.   
 
The experiment will consist of 6 rounds. In each round, you will make a choice 
between options that will be explained in detail before you have to make your decision.  
In each round, you will be randomly matched with one other participant. These other 
participants are gathered in a separate room in this building. These participants are 
ordinary people from around Arusha town. The person you are matched with will change 
each round. You will never know who you are matched with and they will never know 
that they are matched with you.  
 




session, one of the rounds will be randomly selected by drawing one of six cards from 
a bag and you will be paid in cash based on the money you earned during this 
specific round. In addition, all participants receive 5000TSH for participating in the 
experiment. Each round has the same chance of being chosen. We will record the selected 
round and then your earnings for that round on a receipt for you to review. 
 
In all rounds, you are assigned the role of Person 1 and you will decide how to divide 100 
tokens between yourself and Person 2.  
The total number of tokens must sum up to 100. 
 
That is, Tokens you Keep (TK) and Tokens you Give (TG) to Person 2 add up to 100.  
TK + TG = 100. 
 
For example if you give 10 to the Person 2, how many do you keep? ________ 
If you choose to give 90 to Person 2, how many do you keep? ________ 
Can you give 60 to Person 2 and keep 50 for yourself?  Yes  No 
Can you give 40 to Person 2 and keep 40 for yourself?  Yes  No 
 
The way Person 1 and Person 2 may exchange tokens into money is not always the same 
for Person 1 and Person 2, but will be explained to both people before each round. In 
each period you should record the number of tokens you give to the other person 





A.3.1.b. Swahili version (Maelekezo ya Jaribio) 
Hili ni jaribio linalohusiana na kufanya uamuzi. Utatakiwa kufanya maamuzi na utapata 
fursa ya kulipwa fedha kutokana na uamuzi wako. Utalipwa fedha taslimu mwishoni 
mwa zoezi hili. Fedha utakazolipwa katika jaribio hili ni nyongeza kwenye ile posho 
utakayolipwa kwa kuhudhuria mkutano huu leo. 
 
Zingatia kutokuongea na wengine pindi jaribio hili likishaanza. Kama una swali, nyanyua 
mkono wako na mara atakuja mtu hadi hapo ulipoketi na kujibu maswali yako faraghani.   
 
Jaribio litakuwa na awamu 6. Katika kila awamu, utafanya uamuzi kati ya chaguo 
kadhaa utakazoelezwa kwa kina kabla ya kufanya uamuzi huo.  
 
Katika kila awamu, utapangwa na mshiriki mwingine mmoja kwa kubahatisha.  
Hawa washiriki wengine wamekusanyika kwenye chumba tofauti katika jengo hili. 
Washiriki hawa ni watu wa kawaida tu kutoka hapahapa Arusha mjini. mtu 
utakayepangiwa atabadilishwa katika kila awamu. Hutamjua mtu auliyepangiwa na yeye 
pia hatajua kama amepangwa pamoja na wewe.  
 
Katika kila awamu, uamuzi wako utakupa fursa ya kupata fedha. Mwishoni mwa zoezi 
hili, awamu moja itachaguliwa kwa kubahatisha  kwa kuokota toka mfukoni kadi 
moja kati ya sita na utalipwa fedha taslimu kulingana na fedha utakazokuwa 
umepata katika awamu hii itakayokuwa imechaguliwa.  Zaidi ya hizo, kila mshiriki 




Tutaweka kumbukumbu za awamu iliyochaguliwa, kisha malipo yako kwa awamu hiyo 
yataandikwa kwenye risiti ili uyapitie.  
Katika awamu zote, umepewa uhusika kama Mtu 1 na utaamua jinsi ya kugawana kete 
100 baina yako na Mtu 2.  
Jumla ya kete lazima itimie 100. 
Yaani, kete utakazochukua ama kubaki nazo (zako) na zile utakazomgawia mwingine 
(zake) lazima jumla yake itimie 100.  
zako + zake = 100. 
 
Kwa mfano, ukiamua kumpa Mtu 2 kete 10, wewe utabaki na ngapi? ________ 
Ukiamua kumpa Mtu 2 kete 90, wewe utabaki na ngapi? ________ 
Je naweza kumpa mwingine 60 nami nikabaki na 50?  Yes  No 
Je naweza kumpa mwingine 40 nami kubaki na 40?   Yes  No 
 
Utaratibu utakaotumika baina ya Mtu 1 na Mtu 2 kubadilisha kete kuwa fedha utakuwa 
ukibadilika kwa kila awamu, na maelezo yatatolewa kwa wote wawili kabla ya kila 
awamu. Mara zote utapaswa kuandika idadi ya kete In each period you should 
kuandika idadi ya kete unazompa mwenzio (zake)  kwenye nafasi iliyoachwa wazi 





A.3.2. Instructions for specific rounds, Person 1 
A.3.2.a. English version 
Round 1, Person 1 
In this round, one person has been randomly assigned to you. You will decide on the 
number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
 
Remember, Tokens you keep (TK) and Tokens you give to Person 2 (TG) add up to 
100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
 
You will receive      150 TSH for each token you keep (150xTK) 
Person 2 will receive   150 TSH for each token you give (150xTG)  
 
Please write down how many tokens you would like to give to Person 2 (TG). Recall, 







Round 2, Person 1 
 
In this round, again, one other person has been randomly assigned to you. In this round 
you can know a few things about this person. The experimenter will provide an 
information sheet to you with information about Person 2’s characteristics.  
 
In this round, one person has been randomly assigned to you. You will again decide on 
the number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
 
Remember, Tokens you keep (TK) and Tokens you give to Person 2 (TG) add up to 
100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
 
You will receive      150 TSH for each token you keep (150xTK) 
Person 2 will receive   150 TSH for each token you give (150xTG)  
 
Please review the information with Person 2’s characteristics. Then write down how 
many tokens you would like to give to Person 2 (TG). Recall, you can choose any 








Round 3, Person 1 
 
In this round, a Person 2 will be assigned to you based on their preferences for your 
characteristics. That is, the Person 2 reviewed a few facts about you and another person 
and prefers to be matched with you rather than with the other person. They do not know 
who you are, they just know a few characteristics from the form you filled out at the 
beginning of the experiment. Note that this is not necessarily the same person with 
whom you were matched with in the previous period. 
 
Again, you will decide on the number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
 
Remember, Tokens you keep (TK) and Tokens you give to Person 2 (TG) add up to 
100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
 
You will receive      150 TSH for each token you keep (150xTK) 





Recall, that while you do not know the characteristics of Person 2, you know that they 
chose you to make the decision rather than another person.  
 
Please write down how many tokens you would like to give to Person 2 (TG). Recall, 





Round 4, Person 1 
 
In this round, you again have been randomly matched with a person 2. You do not know 
anything about them. In particular, they may not be the same person who you were 
matched with in the previous periods.  In this round, you will again decide on the 
number of tokens for each of you that sum to 100.  
 
That is, Tokens you Keep (TK) and Tokens you Give to Person 2 (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
 
The payments are, however, different from the previous periods. If this round is the 
round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
  




Person 2 will receive  1 Ticket for each token you give which may win 
Person 2 a prize of 15000 TSH.  
 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag, there will be a 
drawing with a prize of 15000 TSH to determine Person 2’s earnings. We draw a ticket 
randomly from a bag that contains 100 numbered tickets just like the tickets you have 
been shown. Each ticket in the bag has a matched ticket and Person 2 will receive one 
matched ticket for each token you give him, giving Person 2 tickets numbered 1 to 
TG. Person 2 wins 15000 TSH if he or she owns the winning ticket, otherwise they will 
receive nothing. That is, if the ticket drawn from the bag shows a number less or equal 
to TG, they will win 15000 TSH. If the ticket drawn from the bag shows a larger 
number than TG, they receive nothing. The more tokens you give them, the more 
chance they have of picking a winning ticket.  
 
You will receive 150 TSH for each token you keep (TK) no matter what the outcome for 
Person 2 is. You will not be informed if person 2 won. Person 2 will know the number of 
tokens allocated to her or him and whether or not they won. 
 
Please write down how many tokens you would like to give to Person 2 (TG). Recall, 
you can choose any number between 0 and 100. 
 






Round 5, Person 1 
 
In this round, you will again decide on the number of tickets for each of you that sum to 
100.  Remember, Tokens you keep (TK) and Tokens you give to Person 2 (TG) again 
add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
You will receive     1 Ticket for each token you keep which may win 
you 15000 TSH 
Person 2 will receive  1 Ticket for each token you give which may win 
Person 2 a prize of 15000 TSH. 
 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag, there will be a drawing 
with a prize of 15000 TSH to determine if you or Person 2’s are the winner. Only one of 
you wins the prize.  
 
If this round is the round selected for payment, we draw a ticket randomly from a bag 
that contains 100 numbered tickets just like the tickets you have been shown. Each 
ticket in the bag has a matched ticket and Person 2 will receive one matched ticket for 
each token you give him, giving him tickets numbered 1 to TG. You will keep the 
remaining tickets. The winner is the person who was assigned the ticket matching the 





Person 2 wins 15000 TSH if the ticket drawn from the bag shows a number less or equal 
to TG. You win 15000 TSH if the ticket drawn from the bag shows a number larger than 
TG. That is, the more tokens you give to Person 2, the more chance they have of picking 
a winning ticket, while your chances decrease.  
 
Please write down how many tickets you would like to give to Person 2 (TG). Recall, 
you can choose any number between 0 and 100. 
 
TG: __________________  
 
 
A.3.2.b. Swahili version 
Awamu 1, Mtu 1 
Katika awamu hii umepangiwa  mtu mmoja kwa kubahatisha. Utaamua kiasi cha kete 
kila mmoja wenu atakazopata, ambazo jumla yake haitazidi 100. Kumbuka, kete 
utakazobaki nazo (zako) zikijumlishwa na zile utakazompa mwenzio (zake) ni lazima 
jumla yake iwe 100.  
zako + zake = 100. 
Ikiwa  hii ndiyo awamu itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
Utapata     TSh 150 kwa kila kete utakayobakia nayo  
 (100x zako) 





Tafadhali andika hapa chini ni kete ngapi utakazopenda kumpa mwenzio. Kumbuka 




Awamu 2, Mtu 1 
Katika awamu hii pia mtu mwingine mmoja amepangwa pamoja nawe kwa kubahatisha. 
Katika awamu hii utaweza kujua machache kuhusu mwenzio huyu uliyepangiwa. 
Mtafiti atakupatia karatasi yenye taarifa zinazomhusu mtu uliyepangiwa.  
 
Utaamua jinsi utakavyogawana kete 100 na mtu uliyepangiwa.  Kumbuka,  jumla ya 
kete utakazobakia nazo pamoja na zile utakazomgawia mwenzio lazima iwe 100. 
zako + zake = 100. 
Ikiwa awamu hii ndiyo itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
Utapata     TSh 150 kwa kila kete utakayobakia nayo  
 (100x zako) 
Mwenzio atapata TSh 150 kwa kila kete utakayompa (150x zake)  
 
Tafadhali pitia taarifa ulizopewa kuhusu mwenzio. Kisha andika ni kete ngapi 







Awamu 3, Mtu 1 
Katika awamu hii, mtu mwingine atapangwa kwako kwa mujibu wa jinsi alivyoyapenda 
maelezo yanayokuhusu wewe. Ni kwamba, Mtu 2 ameyasoma maelezo yanayokuhusu 
wewe na yanayomhusu mtu mwingine, na akapendelea kupangwa awe na wewe badala 
ya Yule mtu mwingine. Hakujui wewe ni nani, anajua tu mambo machache kutokana na 
ile fomu uliyojaza mwanzoni mwa zoezi hili. Kumbuka kuwa huyu si lazima akawa 
yuleyule uliyepangiwa katika awamu zilizotangulia.   
 
Kama mwanzo, utaamua jinsi utakavyogawa kete 100 baina yenu.  Kumbuka, kete 
unazobaki nazo (zako) zikijumlishwa na zile utakazomgawia (zake) lazima zifike 100. 
 zako + zake = 100. 
Ikiwa awamu hii ndiyo itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
Utapata     TSh 150 kwa kila kete utakayobakia nayo  
 (100x zako) 
Mwenzio atapata TSh 150 kwa kila kete utakayompa (150x zake)  
 
Kumbuka, ingawa hujui chochote kuhusu Mtu 2, unajua ndiye aliyekuchagua wewe 
ufanye uamuzi huu badala ya yule mtu mwingine.  
 
Tafadhali andika hapa chini ni kete ngapi utakazopenda kumpa mwenzio. Kumbuka 






Awamu 4, Mtu 1 
Katika awamu hii umepangwa tena na mtu 2. Hujui chochote kumhusu ispokuwa tu 
kwamba amekuchagua. Inawezekana pia siyo mtu yuleyule uliyepangiwa katika awamu 
zilizotangulia. Katika awamu hii utaamua tena idadi ya kete mtakazogawana baina yenu 
ambazo jumla yake ni 100.   
 
Yaani, kete utakazobaki nazo pamoja na zile utakazompa mwingine jumla yake iwe 
100.  
 zako + zake = 100. 
Hata hivyo, malipo katika awamu hii ni tofauti na awamu zilizotangulia. Iwapo awamu 
hii ni ile itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
  
Utapata     TSH 150 kwa kila kete utakayobaki nayo  
 (150 x zako) 
Mtu 2 atapata  Tiketi 1 kwa kila kete utakayompa, ambayo 
atatumia katika bahati nasibu ya kumwezesha 
kushinda zawadi ya TSh 15000.  
 
Kama hii ni awamu itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko, kutakuwa na 
bahati nasibu yenye zawadi ya Tsh 15,000 kwa ajili ya mtu 2. Kama awamu hii 
itachaguliwa kwa ajili ya malipo, tutaokota tiketi kwa kubahatisha kutoka kwenye 




Kila tiketi kwenye mfuko huo ina tiketi inayoshabihiana nayo na Mtu 2 atapata tiketi 
moja kwa kila kete utakayompa, ambazo zitaanzia namba 1 hadi namba itakayoendana 
na idadi ya kete ulizompa. Mtu 2 atashinda sh 15,000 iwapo atabahatika kuwa na tiketi 
itakayoshinda, vinginevyo hatapata chochote. Yaani, iwapo tiketi itakayookotwa 
kwenye mfuko itakuwa na namba sawa au ndogo kuliko idadi ya kete utakazompatia, 
atashinda Tsh 15,000. Kama namba ya tiketi itakayookotwa kwenye mfuko ni kubwa 
kuliko idadi ya kete ulizompatia, hatapata chochote. Kadiri unavyompa kete nyingi 
ndivyo unavyomwongezea uwezekano wa kuokota tiketi itakayoshinda.  
 
Utapata Tsh 150 kwa kila kete utakayobaki nayo bila kujali kitakachotokea kwa Mtu 2. 
Hutajulishwa iwapo Mtu 2 ameshinda au la. Mtu 2 atajua idadi ya kete utakazompatia  na 
atajua pia iwapo ameshinda au la, lakini hatakujua wewe ni nani.   
 
Tafadhali andika hapa idadi ya kete ambazo ungependa kumpa Mtu 2 (zake). Kumbuka 
unaweza kuchagua namba yoyote kuanzia 0 hadi 100.  
 
zake: __________________  
 
 
Awamu 5, Mtu 1 
Katika awamu hii, utaamua kuhusu idadi ya tiketi za kugawana baina yenu ambazo 
jumla yake ni 100. Kumbuka, jumla ya kete utakazobaki nazo pamoja na zile 




 zako + zake = 100. 
Kama hii ni awamu itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
 
Utapata Tiketi moja kwa kila kete utakayobaki nayo, 
ambayo inaweza kukushindia sh 15,000.  
Mtu 2 atapata Tiketi moja kwa kila kete utakayompatia, ambayo 
inaweza kumshindia sh 15,000. 
 
Kama awamu hii itachaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko, kutakuwa na bahati 
nasibu yenye zawadi ya sh 15,000 ambayo ni mmoja wenu tu awezaye kushinda na siyo 
wote wawili. 
 
Kama awamu hii itachaguliwa kwa ajili ya malipo, tutaokota tiketi kwa kubahatisha 
kutoka kwenye mfuko wenye tiketi 100 zenye namba kama hizo tiketi ulizooneshwa. 
Kila tiketi kwenye mfuko ina namba zinazoshabihiana na hizo ulizoona, na Mtu 2 atapata 
tiketi moja kwa kila kete utakayompatia, na hivyo kumwezesha kupata tiketi zenye 
namba kuanzia 1 hadi namba inayoendana na idadi ya kete ulizompatia. Tiketi 
zitakazobaki zitakuwa za kwako. Mshindi ni yule atakayekuwa na tiketi 
itakayoshabihiana na ile itakayookotwa kwenye mfuko. 
  
Mtu 2 atashinda sh 15,000 iwapo tiketi itakayookotwa kwenye mfuko itaonesha namba 
ndogo au sawa na idadi ya kete utakazompatia. Utashinda sh 15,000 iwapo tiketi 




mwenzio. Yaani, kadri unavyompa Mtu 2 kete nyingi ndivyo unavyomwongezea fursa 
ya kushinda huku fursa yako ya kushinda ikipungua.  
 
Tafadhali andika hapa idadi ya kete ambazo ungependa kumpa Mtu 2 (zake). Kumbuka 
unaweza kuchagua namba yoyote kuanzia 0 hadi 100.  
 






A.3.3. General rules, Person 2 
 
A.3.2.b. English version (Experiment instructions) 
This is an experiment in decision making. You will be asked to make decisions and will 
be given the opportunity to earn money from your choices. You will be paid in private 
and in cash at the end of the session. The money you earn during the experiment is in 
addition to the 5000 TSH you are receiving for attending the meeting today. 
 
It is important that you do not talk with other people once the experiment has begun. If 
you have a question, raise your hand and someone will come over to where you are 
sitting and answer your question in private.  
 
The experiment will consist of 6 rounds. In each round, you will be randomly 
matched with one other participant. In each round, this person (Person 1) will make a 
choice between options that will be explained in detail to you. You are asked to state your 
expectation about Person 1’s choice. These other participants are gathered in a separate 
room in this building and are attending a research conference at CEDHA. The person you 
are matched with will change each round. You will never know who you are matched 
with and they will never know that they are matched with you.  
 
Each round gives you the opportunity to earn money. At the end of the session, one of 




will be paid in cash based on the money you earned during this specific round. In 
addition, all participants receive 5000TSH for participating in the experiment. Each 
round has the same chance of being chosen. We will record the selected round and then 
your earnings for that round on a receipt for you to review. 
 
In all rounds, you are assigned the role of Person 2. The other person (Person 1) will 
decide how to divide 100 tokens between you and Person 1.  
The total number of tokens must sum up to 100. 
 
That is, Tokens you Keep (TK) and Tokens you Give (TG) to Person 2 add up to 100.  
TK + TG = 100. 
 
For example if Person 1 gives 10 to you, how many does Person 1 keep? ________ 
If Person 1 gives 90 to you, how many does Person 1 keep? ________ 
Can Person 1 give 60 to you and keep 50 for him- or herself?  Yes  No 
Can Person 1 give 40 to you and keep 40 for him- or herself?  Yes  No 
 
The way Person 1 and Person 2 may exchange tokens into money is not always the same 
for Person 1 and Person 2, but will be explained to both before each round. In each 
period you should record the number of tokens you expect the other person to give 





A.3.2.b. Swahili version (Maelekezo ya Jaribio) 
Hili ni jaribio linalohusiana na kufanya uamuzi. Mtu 1 aliyeko kule ukumbini atafanya  
maamuzi yanayoweza kukupa fursa ya kulipwa fedha kutokana na uamuzi wake. 
Utalipwa fedha taslimu mwishoni mwa zoezi hili. Fedha utakazolipwa mwishoni mwa 
zoezi hili ni nyongeza kwenye zile sh 5000 utakazopata kwa kuhudhuria mkutano huu 
leo. 
 
Zingatia kutokuongea na wengine pindi jaribio hili likishaanza. Kama una swali, nyanyua 
mkono wako na mara atakuja mtu hadi hapo ulipoketi na kujibu maswali yako faraghani.   
 
Jaribio litakuwa na awamu 6. Katika kila awamu, utafanya uamuzi kati ya chaguo 
kadhaa utakazoelezwa kwa kina kabla ya kufanya uamuzi huo.  
 
Katika kila awamu, utapangwa na mshiriki mwingine mmoja kwa kubahatisha. 
Katika kila awamu, mtu huyo atafanya maamuzi baina ya mambo mbalimbali ambayo 
utaelezwa kwa kina baadae. Hawa washiriki wengine wamekusanyika kwenye ukumbi 
hapa CEDHA ambapo wanahudhuria kongamano la utafiti. Mtu utakayepangiwa 
atabadilishwa katika kila awamu. Hutamjua mtu uliyepangiwa na yeye pia hatajua kama 
amepangwa pamoja na wewe.  
 
Kila awamu, itakupa fursa ya kupata fedha. Mwishoni mwa zoezi hili, awamu moja 
itachaguliwa kwa kubahatisha  kwa kuokota toka mfukoni kadi moja kati ya sita na 




itakayokuwa imechaguliwa.  Zaidi ya hayo, kila mshiriki atalipwa sh 5000 kwa 
kushiriki jaribio hili. Kila awamu itakuwa na fursa sawa ya kuchaguliwa. Tutaweka 
kumbukumbu za awamu iliyochaguliwa, kisha malipo yako kwa awamu hiyo 
yataandikwa kwenye risiti ili uyapitie.  
Katika awamu zote, umepewa uhusika kama Mtu 2. Yule mtu mwingine uliyepangwa 
naye aliyeko ukumbini (Mtu 1) ataamua jinsi ya kugawana kete 100 baina yenu wawili.  
 
Jumla ya kete lazima itimie 100. 
 
Yaani, kete Mtu 1 atakazokugawia (zako) na zile atakazobaki nazo (zake) lazima jumla 
yake itimie 100.  
zako + zake = 100. 
 
Kwa mfano, Mtu 1 akikupa 2 kete 10, yeye atabaki na ngapi? ________ 
Mtu 1 akiamua kukupa kete 90, yeye atabaki na ngapi? ________ 
Je Mtu 1 anaweza kukupa  60 naye akabaki na 50?   Ndiyo  Hapana 
Je Mtu 1 anaweza kukupa  40 naye kubaki na 40?   Ndiyo  Hapana 
 
Utaratibu utakaotumika baina ya Mtu 1 na Mtu 2 kubadilisha kete kuwa fedha utakuwa 
ukibadilika kwa kila awamu, na maelezo yatatolewa kwa wote wawili kabla ya kila 
awamu. Mara zote utapaswa kuandika idadi ya kete unazotarajia kupewa (zako)  






A.3.4. Instructions for specific rounds, Person 2 
A.3.4.a. English version 
Round 1, Person 2 
In this round, one person has been randomly assigned to you. You will receive a number 
of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens allocated between you and 
Person 1 sums to 100.  
 
Remember, Tokens Person 1 keeps (TK) and Tokens given to you (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
 
Person 1 will receive     150 TSH for each token Person 1keeps 
 (150xTK) 
You will receive   150 TSH for each token Person 1 gives to you 
(150xTG)  
 
Please write down how many tokens you expect to receive from Person 1 (TG). Recall, 








Round 2, Person 2 
In this round, again, one other person has been randomly assigned to you. In this round, 
Person 1 knows a few things about you. The experimenter will provide an 
information sheet to Person 1 with the information about your characteristics that 
you provided before.  
 
You will receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of 
tokens allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100.  
 
Remember, Tokens Person 1 keeps (TK) and Tokens given to you (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
 
Person 1 will receive     150 TSH for each token Person 1keeps 
 (150xTK) 
You will receive   150 TSH for each token Person 1 gives to you 
(150xTG)  
Please write down how many tokens you expect to receive from Person 1 (TG). Recall, 
Person 1 can allocate any number of tokens to you between 0 and 100 and that Person 1 







Round 3, Person 2 
In this round, the experimenter will provide you information sheets about 
characteristics of two different person 1.  
 
Please carefully review these information sheets. Please choose who you prefer to 
be matched with by writing a “1” (for first choice) or a “2” (for second choice) on 
the information sheets.  
 
Person 1 will know that you preferred to be matched with him or her, but will not know 
your characteristics. Note that this Person 1 is not necessarily the same person with 
whom you were matched with in the previous period. You will receive a number of 
tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens allocated between you and 
Person 1 sums to 100.  
Remember, Tokens Person 1 keeps (TK) and Tokens given to you (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
 
Person 1 will receive     150 TSH for each token Person 1keeps 
 (150xTK) 






Recall, that while Person 1 does not know your characteristics, Person 1 will know that 
you preferred him or her to make the decision rather than another person.  
 
Please write down how many tokens you expect to receive from Person 1 (TG). Recall, 




Round 4, Person 2 
In this round, again, one other person has been randomly assigned to you. They do not 
know anything about you. In particular, they may not be the same person who you were 
matched with in the previous periods.   
You will receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of 
tokens allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100.  
 
Remember, Tokens Person 1 keeps (TK) and Tokens given to you (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
The payments are, however, different from the previous periods. If this round is the 
round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
  
Person 1will receive     150 TSH for each token Person 1keeps (150xTK) 
You will receive  1 Ticket for each token Person 1 gives to you which 





If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag, there will be a 
drawing with a prize of 15000 TSH to determine your earnings. We draw a ticket 
randomly from a bag that contains 100 numbered tickets just like the tickets you have 
been shown. Each ticket in the bag has a matched ticket and you will receive one 
matched ticket for each token you give him, giving you tickets numbered 1 to TG. 
Person 2 wins 15000 TSH if he or she owns the winning ticket, otherwise they will 
receive nothing. That is, if the ticket drawn from the bag shows a number less or equal 
to TG, you will win 15000 TSH. If the ticket drawn from the bag shows a larger number 
than TG, you receive nothing. The more tokens Person 1 gives to you, the more chance 
you have of picking a winning ticket.  
 
Person 1 will receive 150 TSH for each token Person 1 keeps (TK) no matter what the 
outcome for Person 2 is. They will not be informed if person 2 (you) won. Person 2 will 
know the number of tokens allocated to her or him and whether or not they won. 
 
Please write down how many tokens you expect to receive from Person 1 (TG). Recall, 
Person 1 can allocate any number of tokens to you between 0 and 100  
 




Round 5, Person 2 
In this round, again, one other person has been randomly assigned to you. You will 
receive a number of tokens allocated to you by Person 1. The number of tokens 
allocated between you and Person 1 sums to 100.  
 
Remember, Tokens Person 1 keeps (TK) and Tokens given to you (TG) add up to 100.  
 TK + TG = 100. 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag:  
Person 1will receive     1 Ticket for each token Person 1keeps which may 
win Person 1 a prize of 15000 TSH 
You will receive  1 Ticket for each token Person 1 gives to you which 
may win you a prize of 15000 TSH.  
 
If this round is the round selected by drawing a card from the bag, there will be a drawing 
with a prize of 15000 TSH to determine if you or Person 1’s are the winner. Only one of 
you wins the prize.  
 
If this round is the round selected for payment, we draw a ticket randomly from a bag 
that contains 100 numbered tickets just like the tickets you have been shown. Each 
ticket in the bag has a matched ticket and you will receive one matched ticket for each 
token Person 1 gives to you, giving you tickets numbered 1 to TG. Person 1 will keep 
the remaining tickets. The winner is the person who was assigned the ticket matching 





You win 15000 TSH if the ticket drawn from the bag shows a number less or equal to 
TG. Person 1 wins 15000 TSH if the ticket drawn from the bag shows a number larger 
than TG. That is, the more tokens Person 1 gives to you, the more chance you have of 
picking a winning ticket, while Person 1 chances decrease.  
 
Please write down how many tickets you expect to receive from Person 1 (TG). Recall, 
Person 1 can allocate any number of tokens to you between 0 and 100.  
 
TG: __________________  
 
 
A.3.4.b. Swahili version 
Awamu 1, Mtu 2 
Katika awamu hii umepangiwa  mtu mmoja kwa kubahatisha. Utapata idadi ya kete 
ambazo Mtu 1 atakugawia. Jumla ya kete zote mnazogawana ni 100. Kumbuka, kete 
Mtu 1 atakazobaki nazo (zake) zikijumlishwa na zile atakazokugawia (zako) ni lazima 
jumla yake iwe 100.  
zako + zake = 100. 
Ikiwa  hii ndiyo awamu itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
Mtu 1 atapata     TSh 150 kwa kila kete atakayobakia nayo (100x zake) 





Tafadhali andika hapa chini ni kete ngapi unazotarajia Mtu 1 atakupa. Kumbuka 





Awamu 2, Mtu 2 
Katika awamu hii pia mtu mwingine mmoja amepangwa pamoja nawe kwa kubahatisha. 
Katika awamu hii Mtu 1 anajua mambo machache kuhusu wewe. Mtafiti atampatia 
Mtu 1 karatasi yenye taarifa zinazokuhusu ambazo umetupatia.  
 
Utapata idadi ya kete ambazo Mtu 1 atakugawia. Jumla ya kete zote mnazogawana ni 
100. Kumbuka, kete Mtu 1 atakazobaki nazo (zake) zikijumlishwa na zile 
atakazokugawia (zako) ni lazima jumla yake iwe 100.  
zako + zake = 100. 
Ikiwa  hii ndiyo awamu itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
Mtu 1 atapata     TSh 150 kwa kila kete atakayobakia nayo (100x zake) 
Utapata TSh 150 kwa kila kete atakayokupa (150x zako)  
 
Tafadhali andika hapa chini ni kete ngapi unazotarajia Mtu 1 atakupa. Kumbuka Mtu 1 
anaweza kukupa idadi yoyote ya kete kuanzia 0 hadi 100, na kwamba Mtu 1 amepokea 






Awamu 3, Mtu 2 
Katika awamu hii, mtafiti atakupatia karatasi zenye taarifa kuhusu watu wawili tofauti. 
Tafadhali zipitie taarifa hizi kwa makini. Tafadhali chagua kati ya hawa wawili ni yupi 
ungependa kupangwa naye kwa kuandika “1” (kwa chaguo la kwanza) au “2” (kwa 
chaguo la pili) kwenye karatasi hizo zenye taarifa. 
 
Mtu 1 atajua kwamba umemchagua lakini hatajua chochote kuhusu wewe. Kumbuka 
kuwa huyu si lazima akawa yuleyule uliyepangiwa katika awamu zilizotangulia.   
 
Utapata idadi ya kete ambazo Mtu 1 atakugawia. Jumla ya kete zote mnazogawana ni 
100. Kumbuka, kete Mtu 1 atakazobaki nazo (zake) zikijumlishwa na zile 
atakazokugawia (zako) ni lazima jumla yake iwe 100.  
zako + zake = 100. 
Ikiwa  hii ndiyo awamu itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
Mtu 1 atapata     TSh 150 kwa kila kete atakayobakia nayo (100x zake) 
Utapata TSh 150 kwa kila kete atakayokupa (150x zako)  
 
Kumbuka kwamba Mtu 1 hana taarifa zako lakini anafahamu kuwa wewe umemchagua 
afanye uamuzi huu. Tafadhali andika hapa chini ni kete ngapi unazotarajia Mtu 1 







Awamu 4, Mtu 2 
Katika awamu hii umepangwa tena na Mtu 1. Hajui chochote kinachokuhusu. 
Inawezekana pia siyo mtu yuleyule uliyepangiwa katika awamu zilizotangulia. Utapata 
idadi ya kete ambazo Mtu 1 atakugawia.  Jumla ya kete mtakazogawana baina yenu ni 
100.   
 
Yaani, kete atakazobaki nazo pamoja na zile atakazokugawia jumla yake ni100.  
 zako + zake = 100. 
Hata hivyo, malipo katika awamu hii ni tofauti na awamu zilizotangulia. Iwapo awamu 
hii ndiyo itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
  
Mtu 1 atapata     TSH 150 kwa kila kete utakayobaki nayo (150 x zako) 
Utapata  Tiketi 1 kwa kila kete utakayompa, ambayo atatumia 
katika bahati nasibu ya kumwezesha kushinda zawadi 
ya TSh 15000.  
 
Kama hii ndiyo awamu itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko, kutakuwa 
na bahati nasibu yenye zawadi ya Tsh 15,000 kwa ajili ya kubainisha mapato yako. 
Kama awamu hii itachaguliwa kwa ajili ya malipo, tutaokota tiketi kwa kubahatisha 
kutoka kwenye mfuko wenye tiketi 100 zenye namba kama hizo zilizoko kwenye tiketi 
ulizooneshwa. Kila tiketi kwenye mfuko huo ina tiketi inayoshabihiana nayo na utapata 




itakayoendana na idadi ya kete ulipewa. Utashinda sh 15,000 iwapo utabahatika kuwa 
na tiketi itakayoshinda, vinginevyo hutapata chochote. Yaani, iwapo tiketi 
itakayookotwa kwenye mfuko itakuwa na namba sawa au ndogo kuliko idadi ya kete 
utakazopewa, utashinda Tsh 15,000. Kama namba ya tiketi itakayookotwa kwenye 
mfuko ni kubwa kuliko idadi ya kete ulizopewa, hutapata chochote. Kadiri 
utakavyopewa kete nyingi ndivyo unavyoongezewa uwezekano wa kuokota tiketi 
itakayoshinda.  
 
Mtu 1 atapata Tsh 150 kwa kila kete atakayobaki nayo bila kujali kitakachotokea kwako. 
Mtu 1 hatajulishwa iwapo umeshinda au la.  
 
Tafadhali andika hapa idadi ya kete ambazo unatarajia Mtu 1 atakupatia. Kumbuka Mtu 
1 anaweza kukugawia idadi yoyote ya kete kuanzia 0 hadi 100.  
 
zako: __________________  
 
 
Awamu 5, Mtu 2 
Katika awamu hii, umepangiwa tena Mtu 1 kwa kubahatisha. Utapata idadi ya kete 
ambazo Mtu 1 atakugawia.  Jumla ya idadi ya kete mnazogawana ni 100. 
 
Kumbuka, jumla ya kete atakazobaki nazo pamoja na zile atakazokugawia lazima itimie 




 zako + zake = 100. 
Kama hii ni awamu itakayochaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko:  
 
Mtu 1 atapata Tiketi moja kwa kila kete atakayobaki nayo, 
ambayo inaweza kumshindia sh 15,000.  
Utapata Tiketi moja kwa kila kete Mtu 1 atakayokupatia, 
ambayo inaweza kukushindia sh 15,000. 
 
Kama awamu hii itachaguliwa kwa kuokota kadi kwenye mfuko, kutakuwa na bahati 
nasibu yenye zawadi ya sh 15,000 ambayo ni mmoja wenu tu awezaye kushinda na siyo 
wote wawili. 
 
Kama awamu hii itachaguliwa kwa ajili ya malipo, tutaokota tiketi kwa kubahatisha 
kutoka kwenye mfuko wenye tiketi 100 zenye namba kama hizo tiketi ulizooneshwa. 
Kila tiketi kwenye mfuko ina namba zinazoshabihiana na hizo ulizoona, na utapata tiketi 
moja kwa kila kete utakayopewa, na hivyo kukuwezesha kupata tiketi zenye namba 
kuanzia 1 hadi namba inayoendana na idadi ya kete ulizopewa. Tiketi zitakazobaki 
zitakuwa za Mtu 1. Mshindi ni yule atakayekuwa na tiketi itakayoshabihiana na ile 
itakayookotwa kwenye mfuko. 
  
Utashinda sh 15,000 iwapo tiketi itakayookotwa kwenye mfuko itaonesha namba ndogo 
au sawa na idadi ya kete utakazopewa. Mtu 1 atashinda sh 15,000 iwapo tiketi 




alizokupatia. Yaani, kadri unavyopewa kete nyingi ndivyo zivyokuongezea fursa ya 
kushinda huku fursa Mtu 1 ya kushinda ikipungua.  
 
Tafadhali andika hapa idadi ya kete ambazo unatarajia Mtu 1 atakupatia. Kumbuka Mtu 
1 anaweza kukugawia idadi yoyote ya kete kuanzia 0 hadi 100.  
 





Appendix B: Survey Instruments 
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